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Abstract 
Improving public sector managers' accountability with performance measurement is 
one of the dominant themes of the New Public Management (NPM) literature. With a 
case study of HM Customs & Excise (HMCE), this PhD research analyses NPM- 
inspired accounting changes using evidence from interviews with HMCE personnel, 
official publications and parliamentary reports. There are four important research 
findings. First, unlike other service delivery organisations, two sets of competing 
accountability relationships exist in a tax administration, which are operationalised by 
two performance measurement regimes. This necessitates adaptation of leading 
private sector performance measurement models to accommodate the duality. Second, 
HMCE used accounting as a change vehicle in an attempt to shift emphasis from a 
traditional, compliance-driven accountability relationship to a customer-focus driven 
one. Third, the compliance-driven relationship remained the dominant relationship in 
practice despite implementation of the first round of customer-focused accounting 
changes. Fourth, a second round of accounting changes, i. e. a tax gap reduction 
approach, attempts to harmonise the two competing performance measurements. This 
arguably represents a notion of shared accountability of taxpayers and tax 
administration for `tax gap' reduction. From an institutional theory perspective, 
however, adoption of the tax gap approach represents an exercise to (re)gain 
legitimacy in the eyes of Government. The PhD evidence, therefore, suggests that 
success of accounting changes is context specific. Moreover, based on a notion of 
reciprocity of accountabilities in the public sector, the PhD research also develops a 
theoretical framework. This is a significant contribution as existence of multiple 
accountabilities is recognised in the literature but using accounting changes to shift 
emphasis from one accountability form to another is not well addressed. In addition to 
these theoretical contributions, this PhD research is a first field study of PMS of a tax 
administration, and therefore, also improves our understanding of managerial issues 
of a neglected, but important, research site. 
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Chapter 1 
Introducing the Content and Purpose of the Study 
The `New Public Management' (NPM) strongly advocates greater accountability 
of the public sector managers so that the public sector performance is improved 
(Christensen and Laegreid, 1999; Hood, 1995). The PhD study aims to analyse 
the influence of NPM upon accountability relationships in a tax administration - 
Her Majesty's Customs and Excise (HMCE). The research, therefore, is 
motivated by a desire to improve our understanding of interaction between 
accountability relationships in the case of a tax administration, in particular, and 
the use of accounting information for enhancing accountability and 
organisational performance in the public sector, in general. 
The NPM literature claims that public sector managerial practices like 
quantitative targets and outcomes focused management have shaped the new 
styles of management in the public sector. The PhD research investigated the 
extent of such private sector performance measurement practices in the case of a 
tax administration. The evidence generated by the case study was analysed with 
the help of insights drawn from institutional and stakeholder theories and the 
principal-agent model of accountability. Some accounting scholars take the view 
that the context of an organisation is of primary importance when the change 
management role of accounting is analysed (Broadbent and Guthrie, 1992). It is 
worth noting that the period 1997-2003 is important in terms of New Labour's 
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agenda of Modernising Government. Besides many other policy initiatives, 
accounting changes ranked high for implementing the reforms agenda. This PhD 
case study investigates the use of performance measurement for enhancing and 
modifying accountability relationships in the case of HMCE. It therefore falls 
within the umbrella term of `alternative research' suggested by Broadbent 
(1999). As such the PhD research provides an opportunity to research the change 
management use of accounting and contributes to the academic debate 
surrounding this issue. 
The NPM stresses making `customer focus' the basis of accountability system of 
all public sector organisations. Why is the context of a tax administration 
important for an NPM related study? It is because of the dual nature of `tax' - the 
subject which HMCE administers. In whatever sense' the word `tax' is used it 
often prompts a response of `the less, the better' .Z 
But the animosity towards 
taxation and tax collectors is not entirely of recent origin. In fact the legends of 
Robin Hood and Lady Godiva are closely related to the public sentiments against 
taxes3. The public sentiment about taxation is best captured by Adam Smith who 
had himself remained a tax collector: "There is no art which one government 
sooner learns from another than that of draining money from the pockets of the 
1 The dictionary meaning of the word `tax' in its generic sense is `strain, heavy demand or 
burdensome obligation' (Oxford, 1998: p 934). In its narrower technical sense the word tax has 
been defined by OECD as "The term tax is confined to compulsory, unrequited payments to 
general government" (OECD, 1996: p 3). 
2 `Tax doesn't need to be taxing' is the catchy statement made by the Inland Revenue (now 
HMRC) in its advertisement campaign. But it does demonstrate how tax is generally viewed by 
the taxpayers. No wonder tax and tax collectors often attract adverse media coverage. Not only 
stories hostile to tax collection keep appearing in the print and electronic media but many 
Hollywood movies have also projected tax collectors as villains. The following website provides 
a good coverage of such movies and other resources 
http: //faculty. law. lsu. edu/ccorcos/lawhum/irsfilms. htm. Interestingly biblical stories also refer to 
tax collectors as the worst of sinners to whom Jesus offered salvation (Luke 19: 9) 
3 For a good coverage on Robin Hood see: http: //en. wikipedia. ori/wiki/Robin Hood and for 
Lady Godiva see Lady Godiva: A Literary History of the Legend, Blackwell, 2002 by Daniel 
Donoghue 
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people" (Smith, 1776: p 532). However despite being a cause of numerous mass 
unrest and political movements4, taxation has always remained an indispensable 
part of statecraft. In fact GDP/tax ratio is considered to be one of the 
determinants of economic prosperity of a country. This enabling role of taxation 
is best portrayed by the famous words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
inscribed above the entrance of the Internal Revenue Service building in the U. S 
that "Taxes are what we pay for a civilized society" (Simon, 2004: p 2). 
From the preceding lines it can be seen that taxation has two competing 
perspectives. First, those who pay a tax view it as `taking away' therefore they 
generally aspire to minimise the amount of the tax they pay. This aspiration 
ranges from evasion (i. e. fraudulent /criminal methods to minimise tax liability) 
to avoidance (i. e. minimising tax liability by using loopholes in the tax laws). 
Second, tax revenues help governments finance public spending. In this view tax 
is `giving away' benefits to those who are not best served by the forces of a pure 
market economy. Therefore, it can be argued that the two facets of taxation (i. e. 
`taking' and `giving' away') have often been a source of dilemma for rulers and 
those who manage it. The potentially competing perspectives also lead to the 
difficulty in defining the notions of `customers', `customer focus' and 
`accountability' which are central to the NPM inspired literature. In the public 
sector related management accounting literature a few case studies (e. g. Collier, 
2001; Broadbent and Laughlin, 1998) have researched the use of accounting as 
advocated by the NPM for enhancing existing accountability relationships. 
However there is little research which highlights the complexity in accountability 
4 Examples are the French Revolution, 1789; the American War of Independence, 1775-1783; 
the anti-Poll tax riots, 1990 in the U. K. 
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relationships due to reciprocity in such relations. There is no academic literature 
on accountability and performance measurement systems (PMSs) of tax 
authorities. This gap in literature becomes more conspicuous when one comes to 
know that HMCE is one of the oldest public sector organisations (Smith, 1980; 
Carson, 1972). The PhD research was, therefore, motivated by a desire to 
investigate the role of accounting in defining or redefining the notion of 
accountability for performance in a tax administration like HMCE. Informed by 
experiential knowledge the PhD researcher 5 had the advantage of finding the 
barriers of technical issues and jargon of a tax administration not insurmountable. 
Institutional theorists have argued that the ethos of an organisation is shaped by 
its historical origins (Stinchcombe, 1965: p 154). The PhD research found that the 
historical origins of the HMCE define the organisation as a law enforcement 
organisation. It was found that accounting changes were used for reversing the 
emphasis from the traditional form of accountability to the NPM's `customer 
focus' based form of accountability. The analysis of PMSs used by the HMCE 
during 1997-2003 establishes that the tax administration had a concern for two 
competing sets of accountability relationships. This finding helped in 
generalising the relationship of performance measurement to different forms of 
accountabilities in the case of a tax administration. The general thesis that 
emerged can be briefly stated in the following lines. 
5 The PhD author has remained a tax collector in the tax administration of Pakistan 
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In the case of a tax administration the accountability relationships are of 
reciprocal nature between the main stakeholders - the tax collectors6 and the 
taxpayers, which are operationalised by two competing sets of PMS. One PMS 
reports performance in terms of the traditional role of holding taxpayers to 
account for their tax liabilities. The second PMS reports performance in terms of 
public accountability of the tax collectors to the taxpayers7. Applying this generic 
framework to the HMCE it was found that traditionally the PMS of HMCE had 
been dominated by the first form of accountability for performance, even though 
some measures relating to public accountability had also remained included. The 
NPM inspired accounting changes introduced by the New Labour Government 
desired to instil customer-focused ethos in the case of all public sector 
organisations including HMCE. While some studies in other public sector 
organisations reported use of de-coupling strategies or the effect of full 
colonisation, this PhD study found in the case of HMCE that the new form of 
customer-focused accountability through accounting changes had difficulty in 
coexisting with the traditional ethos/institutions of the organisation. The new 
form of accountability was thus ultimately redefined and subsumed by the strong 
organisational ethos. The PhD study, therefore, establishes that off-the-shelf 
6 In this thesis use of masculine pronouns is only for sake of convenience and signifies neither the 
gender of the interviewees, nor should it be taken as gender bias of the author, who believes 
firmly in equality of all irrespective of gender or other differences. 
7 From experiential knowledge the PhD author recalls that in his organisation revenue targets 
were the only yardstick of organisational and individual performance.. The author can recall 
how 
anxiously the berthing of an oil ship at the wharves of Karachi seaport would 
be awaited as a 
single ship could help meet the monthly revenue targets. With a faint grin, the author also 
recollects the statistical tricks that were used to meet the targets. While the 
departmental notion 
of performance was unquestionably clear, the taxpayers who interacted with the 
department had a 
different set of expectations from the department. Even though verbally there was an emphasis 
upon good behaviour towards the taxpayers, the formal performance measurement and reporting 
systems had no provision for the concerns of these external stakeholders. The NPM 
inspired 
changes in the UK therefore provided the author with an opportunity to study the shifting of 
focus from the traditional form of accountability to the new customer focused one. 
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prescriptions do not work in all situations as the organisational context is not the 
same across the whole public sector (Boden et al., 1998). 
In the budget of 2004, the government in the U. K announced its plan of merging 
the HMCE with the Inland Revenue (IR) to form a single tax department called 
HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC). This PhD research does not discuss the 
mechanics of merger as it can be a topic of a separate research study. However, 
the evidence of merger does contribute to the findings of the research as same set 
of reasons are cited for the merger initiative which were earlier cited for 
implementation of accounting changes. In view of the merger of the HMCE, the 
PhD research brings one of the oldest public sector organisations into the glare of 
academic research before it goes into extinction as a distinct organisation. On a 
more general note the PhD research will be helpful in lifting the barriers for those 
researchers who might have an interest in researching the managerial issues 
pertaining to tax authorities. 
Researching a big central government organisation is not without challenges and 
risks. Career bureaucrats often do not fancy being under the spotlight of 
researchers and analysts. Finding access to the personnel is always a daunting 
task and the researcher is never privileged with unbridled freedom in asking 
questions. Even if access is granted to senior managers, they often would tow the 
official line and say things which are already available in the official 
publications. The cobweb of research has to be therefore knitted with greater care 
and subtlety. 
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Since the PhD research also concerned a big central government department the 
researcher was naturally also confronted with all such challenges. The difficulty 
of making the senior managers speak was overcome by making use of oral 
evidence given by the senior management of the Treasury and HMCE before the 
parliamentary committees. During these hearings the managers were obliged to 
answer all types of pleasant and unpleasant questions. Therefore, by collecting 
textual data from three entirely different sources (in-depth interviews, oral 
evidence and official documents), effort was made to ensure triangulation so that 
the evidence is more credible and robust. 
Chapters 2-3 of the thesis set the stage for the research by reviewing the relevant 
literature, explaining the research topic, and the research methodology. Chapter 4 
reviews the historical origins of HMCE and explains the law enforcement-based 
context of the organisation. This analysis is important as the NPM inspired 
accounting changes of the Government desired to shift the emphasis to the 
customer-focused management. Chapter 5 proposes a framework for categorising 
PMSs of tax authorities. The position of the pre-1998 PMS of the HMCE is 
identified on the figure as "behaviour" based where the dominance of traditional 
form of accountability for revenue collection is quite evident. Chapter 6 reviews 
the pressures, emanated from the external environment, which support the 
emphasis shifted to the NPM inspired customer-focused form of accountability. 
The chapter explains the new performance measurement frameworks introduced 
by the New Labour government. Chapter 7 examines the effect of new 
accounting framework as implemented by HMCE and analyses the tensions 
created by attempts to shift the focus of accountability from the traditional notion 
7 
of performance to the new NPM-inspired notion of performance. Chapter 8 
builds upon the evidence analysed in the earlier two chapters and develops a 
generic framework of accountability relationships built around the central notion 
of reciprocity of accountability between the tax collectors and the taxpayers. 
Chapter 9 then discusses the tax gap based PSA as the latest approach of the 
HMCE to reconcile the tensions between the two competing sets of 
accountabilities identified earlier. In Chapter 10 possible explanations from 
various perspectives are presented in order to analyse the problems identified in 
the earlier chapters. Chapter 11 draws upon the analysis of the earlier chapters. It 
sums up the findings of the research and indicates the possibilities of future 
research. 
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Chapter 2 
Accountability for Performance in the Public Sector - 
A Literature Review 
Introduction 
In this chapter the literature concerning accountability for performance in the 
pubic sector is reviewed. Since the literature is very diverse the aim is to identify 
the important themes wherein NPM is related to accountability and accounting 
information. These themes are used in the later chapters for analysing the efforts 
of operationalising accountability with the help of performance measurement 
within HMCE. The chapter has three main aims. First, it identifies the important 
themes of NPM and importance of accountability and performance measurement. 
Second, it also flags the definitions of focal terms like `accountability', 
`performance', `performance measurement' and `performance management'. 
Third, it also flags the noticeable gaps in the literature and how this PhD research 
helps in addressing the gaps. In order to achieve these aims the chapter is 
organised into four main sections. In section 2.1 a general review of the 
management accounting literature with regards to the public sector is carried out 
to establish the need and importance of the PhD research and its positioning 
within the relevant fields of literature. In section 2.2 important themes of NPM 
are identified and related to the core issues of accountability and performance 
measurement. In section 2.3 insights from stakeholder theory and institutional 
theory are drawn as these are to be used later as analytical tools to examine the 
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PhD evidence and answer the research questions. In section 2.4 the principal- 
agent model of accountability is reviewed along with a few examples of 
theorising accountability and performance measurement in the public sector. 
Informed by stakeholder theory, institutional theory and the principal-agent 
model, a simplified model is also proposed for the purpose of this PhD research. 
Section 2.5 concludes the chapter identifying major themes of literature reviewed 
and how the PhD thesis will address the gap in the literature. 
2.1 Management Accounting Research in the Public Sector 
The field of organisational performance has attracted interest of academics and 
practitioners from a variety of disciplines. Carter et al. (1992: 26) state that it has 
generated a literature, with roots in the overlapping disciplines of management, 
accountancy, public administration, social policy and political science, which has 
further compounded "the conceptual and semantic confusion" surrounding the 
notion of performance measures. The published literature is therefore very 
diverse and extends in countless number of directions. However, at a very broad 
level, one may categorise the literature into three broad themes. First are those 
writings which analyse reforms that aim at improving overall performance of an 
organisation. Examples of topics covered under this category are `Total Quality 
Management' (e. g. McAdam and Saulters, 2000; Chenhall, 1997), `EFQM 
Excellence Model' (e. g. Udo et al., 2001; Wongrassamee et al., 2003), Just-in- 
Time' (e. g. Fullerton and McWatters, 2002; Upton, 1998), and `Enterprise 
Resource Planning' (e. g. Scapens and Jazayeri, 2003; Granlund and Malmi, 
2002). 
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Second are those writings which pertain mainly to performance appraisal of 
employees and divisions of an organisation. While the first category analyses 
organisational level performance, authors falling under the second category (e. g. 
Mani, 2002; Liden et al., 2001) discuss performance measurement of individuals 
and associated issues. This category is therefore more `Human Resource 
Management' (HRM) focused. Third are those writings which analyse 
accounting systems for measuring and reporting performance. While many of 
such writings highlight problematic areas of designing PMS, some (e. g. Kaplan 
and Norton, 1992) claim that performance measurement is a performance 
improvement tool as well. 
This PhD research analyses the accountability relationships operationalised by 
performance measurement in HMCE. Therefore while the study is not entirely 
inattentive to the literature of first two categories, it draws mostly on the 
literature of the third category. 
Survey data suggests that between 40 and 60 per cent of companies significantly 
changed their PMS between 1995 and 2000 (Frigo and Krumwiede, 1999). 
Performance measurement is therefore not only of interest to practitioners but 
has attracted the attention of academics as well. However, a review of the 
published literature in the mainstream academic accounting journals establishes 
two important facts. First, despite the fact that there is a growing interest in the 
management accounting issues of the public sector, the area still lags behind 
considerably when compared with the research in the private sector. For instance, 
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Helden (2002) reviews the number of papers published in three accounting 
journals the Financial Accountability and Management (FAM), the British 
Accounting Review (BAR), and the European Accounting Review (EAR), and 
reports the results in the form of the Table 2.1. It can be seen that the research on 
governmental accounting issues is only 12% of the total papers published in 
these journals for the period 1999-2001. 
Journal Total No of papers 
Papers on governmental 
management 
accounting research 
Papers on governmental 
management 
accounting research as 
% of total papers 
FAM 68 17 25% 
BAR 68 9 13% 
EAR 112 4 4% 
Total 248 30 12% 
Table 2.1: Percentage of Papers on Governmental Management Accounting Research in Three 
Accounting Journals for 1999-2001 (Helden, 2002: p 5) 
Second, the research itself is dominated by the case studies of public sector 
organisations addressing the impact of NPM in the public sector. Pollit (2002) 
provides a four-tiered classification of NPM-related literature. First, discursive, 
where he research focuses upon the discourse of the NPM implementers. In this 
stage the research investigates what the authors of official publications say about 
the purpose of NPM reforms. Second, decisions, where the research focuses upon 
the range of decisions made by the reformers. Third, implementation, where the 
researchers focus upon how the decisions are implemented by the reformers. And 
finally, results, where the researchers investigate the results by comparing them 
with the claimed benefits of NPM reforms. The author observes that NPM 
related research has mainly focused upon first two stages, and partly the third 
stage. However there is little research on the fourth type, i. e. results. Helden 
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(2002) also argues that there is still a need for large scale research on NPM 
agenda as the existing research is limited in its scope. 
Broadbent and Guthrie (1992) carried out a survey of the published literature 
focusing upon what they call `alternative research'. The traditional literature, 
according to the authors, assumes accounting to be a powerful force of change. 
The alternative research on the other hand comprises two main groups. The first 
group, like the traditional literature, assumes a change management role of 
accounting; however, it also recognises the context of an organisation as very 
important. The second group is more sceptical about a universal change 
management role of accounting and instead believes that the context of an 
organisation is of primary importance in success of any organisational change 
(including accounting changes). 
Highlighting the relative paucity of critical research in the said area, the authors 
suggested the need for international comparisons; work in different sites to those 
already studied; and studies of different technologies. The authors also called for 
more questioning of the achievements (or otherwise) of the accounting changes 
in the public sector. Reviewing the response, Broadbent (1999) concludes that 
while some progress in the alternative research has been witnessed there is still 
scope for further expansion. 
This PhD researcher also carried out an empirical survey of the papers published 
in four categories of literature, listed in Table 2.2 below. It was found that 
performance measurement has received wider coverage in the journals falling 
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under the categories of `Operational Management' and `Public Sector' as 
compared to the `Accounting' based journals. Surprisingly, the `General 
Management' based journals have offered the least coverage to the topic as an 
academic/research issue. 
Twenty five journals falling under the category of accounting were included in 
the analysis (for details see Annex 2.1). Interestingly, public sector related papers 
are 12.5% of all the papers (i. e. 14 / 112) discussing performance measurement 
in these j ournals. 
No Category Total Journals Private public Total 
1 Operations/Production 10 153 13 166 
2 Public Administration 19 1 141 142 
3 Accounting 25 98 14 112 
[:: 4 
General Management 19 50 9 59 
Total 73 302 177 479 
Table 2.2: Summary of coverage of performance measurement as a research topic for period 1980-2002 
From the preceding reviews, it emerges that public sector related accounting 
research is still a minority topic in the mainstream accounting journals. If the 
focus is turned towards tax authorities there is not a single paper which addresses 
the management accounting issues of tax authorities in the period reviewed. 
Tomkins et al. (2001) and Lamb and Lymer (1999) also point out this neglect of 
an important research site. 
The PhD research, therefore, aims to address the calls made by writers like 
Hopwood (1987; 1983) for case studies that carry out in-depth analysis of the 
process of accounting changes, by writers like Broadbent and Guthrie (1992) and 
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Broadbent (l 999) for case studies in new sites of alternative research, and by 
writers like Tomkins et al. (2001) for tax management specific research. 
2.2 The NPM Debate 
The literature on public sector management in the 1990s has largely centred on 
the notion of NPM. Some authors (e. g. Martin, 1998, Aucoin, 1995; Hood, 1995, 
1991; Zifcak, 1994) sketched the main features of NPM to distinguish it from the 
traditional form of public administration. These writers refer to various 
categories of reforms that have been initiated since the 1980s as a "paradigm 
shift" from the Weberfan model of bureaucracy8 to NPM or the "new 
managerialism". NPM has been succinctly defined as "a loose collection of 
ideas, derived primarily from the private sector, and travelling between 
countries, generated and certified by international organisations like OECD, 
IMF, and the World Bank" (Christensen and Laegreid, 1999; emphasis added). 
Power (1997: 43) identifies the desire of the NPM movement as "to replace the 
presumed inefficiency of hierarchical bureaucracy with the presumed efficiency 
of markets". 
8 Max Weber (1864-1920), an eminent German sociologist and political scientist, is credited with 
popularising the notion of bureaucracy. His seminal work The Theory of Social and Economic 
Organisation (tr. Henderson and Parsons, New York, 1947) outlines how bureaucratic 
organisations work. According to Weber, the attributes of modern bureaucracy include its 
impersonality, concentration of the means of administration, a leveling effect on social and 
economic differences and implementation of a system of authority that is practically 
indestructible. For further details see From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. and ed. by H. 
H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, New York: Oxford University Press, 1946 
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Put briefly, NPM is about transforming the traditional public administration with 
the help of specific reform tools. Christensen and Laegreid (1999) cite specific 
examples of change attempts under NPM reforms as: 
" adoption of performance indicators, 
" quality system management, 
" contracts systems, and 
0 deregulation. 
Hughes, (1998: 4) refers to the various terms used to denote the same 
phenomenon: 
"Though the various terms - new public management, managerialism, entrepreneurial 
government - may vary, they point to the same phenomenon. This is the replacement of 
traditional bureaucracy by a new model based on markets. Improving public management, 
reducing budgets, privatisation of public enterprise seem universal ... 
" 
Araujo (2001: 918) summarises the distinguishing features between the `old' and 
`new' management styles in the form of the following table: 
Elements Traditional Administration NPM 
Government organisation Services provided on a uniform Break up of traditional 
basis operating as single structures into quasi- 
aggregated unit autonomous units 
Control of public Control from the headquarters Hands-on professional 
organisations through the hierarchy of management with clear 
unbroken supervision and statement of goals and 
checks and balances performance measurement 
Control of output measures Control on inputs and Stress results and output 
procedures control rather than 
procedures 
Management practices Standard established procedures Using private sector 
throughout the service management style 
Discipline in resources use Due process and political Check resources demands 
entitlements and `do more with less' 
Table 2.3: Comparison of NPM with traditional bureaucracy (Source: Araujo, 2001 from Hood, 1991). 
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The NPM and its influence upon individual public sector departments can 
therefore be studied under various headings. For example, Christensen and 
Yoshimi (2001) use NPM as a framework for their analysis of performance 
reporting regimes of Australia and Japan. Using Hood's (1995) articulation of 
NPM as a set of seven doctrines, the authors observe that the sixth doctrine of 
using performance measurement as a managerial tool is of central importance to 
NPM framework. The authors claim that primacy of accounting in NPM has 
received attention in literature leading to improved terminology resulting in the 
phrase `new public financial management' (NPFM) which is defined as: 
"development of a performance measurement approach, including techniques such as 
financial and non-financial performance indicators, league tables, citizen's charters and 
program evaluations" (Olson et all. 1998, p 18). 
From a review of NPM related literature four important interrelated broad themes 
can be identified. First, it views the existing public management (traditionally 
called `public administration') as inefficient and believes that it can be improved 
by adopting private sector styled managerial practices. For instance, Kaboolian 
(1998: 64) argues that the main force behind the NPM movement is "to 
maximize productive and allocative efficiencies that are hampered by `bureau- 
pathology' that is, public agencies unresponsive to the demands of citizens, led 
by bureaucrats with the power and incentives to expand their administrative 
empires and `policy spaces"'. Therefore it can be contended that the advocates of 
NPM are concerned mainly with reinventing government by effectively 
translating private sector managerial ideas about quality into the context of 
public administration. 
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"One might put the NPM ideal very simply as a desire to replace the presumed inefficiency 
of hierarchical bureaucracy with the presumed efficiency of markets" (Power, 1997: p 43). 
The central feature of NPM can therefore be termed as "lessening or removing 
differences between the public and the private sector" with the underlying 
assumption that good managerial practices are applicable to all types of 
organisations with no distinction of public or private (Hood, 1995; Dunleavy and 
Hood, 1994) 
Second, unlike traditional public administration, performance is not defined in 
terms of following the rules but instead is gauged on the basis of end results or 
outcomes. Thus, there is a clear shift in the definition of performance. It is not 
sufficient to be economical in usage of resources in order to be a good performer. 
The preoccupation with economy makes way to the 3Es (Economy, Efficiency 
and Effectiveness) which is the most prevalent performance measurement model 
in the context of the public sector. In this model economy refers to minimum 
utilization of inputs for given outputs, efficiency refers to maximum outputs for 
given inputs, and effectiveness refers to achieving success in terms of desired 
outcomes with the given inputs. Value for Money means improvement in all 
these measures of success (Otley, 2001: p 251). 
9 In this approach performance 
can be termed good if for given monetary resources better results or outcomes 
are achieved (Lapsley, 1996). In the literature this notion of performance has 
been explained collectively with the next theme. 
9 This will be further discussed in Chapters 5&7 
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Third, there is an emphasis on the need for greater accountability of the 
managers. More importantly, accountability which is defined in `public 
administration' in terms of economy or limiting corruption, waste and 
incompetence stands redefined under NPM. Dunleavy and Hood (1994) present 
this shift in the following figure: 
High 
Density of rules 
limiting freedom of 
public officials in 
handling money, staff, 
contracts etc 
New Public 
Management (NPM) 
Progressive Public 
Administration (PPA) 
Low Degree to which public 
High 
sector is insulated from the 
private sector in personnel, 
structure, business methods 
Figure 2.1: From traditional or progressive public administration to new public management 
(Dunleavy and Hood, 1994: p 10) 
Dunleavy and Hood (1994) describe the shift from old public administration to 
NPM as going `down-group' and going `down-grid' Going `down-group' means 
making the public sector less distinctive as a unit from the private sector (in 
personnel, reward structure, methods of doing business). Going `down-grid' 
means reducing the extent to which discretionary power (particularly over staff, 
contracts and money) is limited by uniform and general rules of procedure. 
The 
main accountability and control tool under the traditional form of public 
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administration is compliance to rules and regulations, such as ensuring that 
spending is within approved levels and for authorized purposes. Under NPM the 
emphasis from process accountability gets shifted towards a greater element of 
accountability for results/outcomes (Hood, 1995). 
Fourth, the results-based performance should be monitored with the help of 
performance measurement. Hood (1995 : 94) identifies `more emphasis on 
visible hands-on top management'; `explicit formal measurable standards'; 
measures of performance and success' and `greater emphasis on output controls' 
as the major elements of NPM. The NPM, therefore, was based on the notion that 
the activities of public servants need to be more closely appraised (in terms of 
costs) and evaluated by accounting techniques (Hood, 1995: 94; Power and 
Laughlin, 1992: 133). Thus, not only organisational-level performance is assessed 
with performance targets but it also is generally seen as advocating that 
governmental organisations be split into business units and assigned performance 
targets for which managers are held accountable (Gendron et al., 2001). 
These elements of NPM and their interrelationship have also been identified by 
Cunningham and Harris (2001) who observe that the underlying belief of NPM is 
that accountability for results acts as a control that leads to greater effectiveness 
in governmental sub-unit performance. The causal linkages between 
accountability, performance measurement, control and effectiveness are plotted 
by the authors in the following figure: 
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Demands for accountability Expanded demands for Results control achieves 
extending beyond inputs to accountability assume accountability and 10 
outputs and outcomes measurable results and 
10 motivates effectiveness 
universal use of results 
control 
Fig 2.2: Accountability in the new public management (Cunningham and Harris, 2001: p 146) 
Thus, briefly, the underlying doctrine of NPM can be seen as improvement of 
public sector organisations with the help of private sector managerial practices 
with a firm belief in the power of accounting as a change management tool. It 
can, therefore, be argued that accountability through accounting tools such as 
performance measurement emerges as one of the most dominant themes from the 
NPM literature. In the next sections the interrelationships of NPM, 
accountability, and performance measurement are examined. 
It is claimed by some authors (e. g. Christensen and Yoshimi, 2001) that the NPM 
movement was given impetus by the influential book Reinventing Government of 
Osborne and Gaebler (1992). In the book the authors stressed the need for a new 
entrepreneurial global paradigm for public sector management. Greer (1994: 29) 
contends that "Management consultants also played an important role in 
packaging, selling, and implementing the NPM reforms". Some authors on NPM 
contend that the term "new" does not imply that the concepts of NPM 
first 
appeared in the 1980s, as NPM is to a large extent based on a "repackaged 
version of ideas" that go back at least to the `Programming, Planning, and 
Budgeting System' (PPBS) movement and thus its development has to be 
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understood in relation to the "old" public management of the 1960s (Martin, 
1998; Hood, 1995). 
2.2.1 NPM and Accountability for Performance 
From the writings on NPM it emerges that the NPM desires to improve the 
public sector's performance by enhancing accountability of the managers for 
their usage of the resources financed by taxpayers' money. Thus, `accountability' 
and `performance' can be identified as the central notions of NPM. It is, 
therefore, important to investigate their meaning in the literature. 
Kane (1996: 125) defines performance in terms of results/outcomes as: 
"Performance is the record of outcomes achieved in carrying out a specified job aspect 
during a specified period" 
Brumbach (1988), however, believes that mere results can not define 
performance as behaviour is the other important dimension of performance. The 
author cites the example of a car salesperson that can be rude or courteous while 
selling a car. The author argues that behaviour emanates from the performer and 
transforms performance from abstraction to action. 
1° He uses a two dimensional 
typology of success and failure to view the notion of performance. Performance 
can be a `positive success' if both results and behaviour were positive. It will 
be 
a `negative failure' if both behaviour and results are negative. Performance can 
be a `negative success' if results are positive but behaviour was negative. 
10 The author claims that behaviour is not only an instrument for results but is an outcome in its 
own right as well. According to the author behaviour is the product of mental and physical effort 
applied to tasks and must be judged separately from immediate results. 
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Similarly performance can be a `positive failure' if results are negative but the 
behaviour was positive. 
Results 
Achieved Did not Achieve 
W Positive 
Negative 
Positive Success Positive Failure 
Negative 
Success 
Negative Failure 
Fig 2.3: The double meanings of `Success' and `Failure' (Brumbach, 1988: p 388) 
In contrast with the emphasis on individual performance in the human resource 
management literature, the discipline of accounting has traditionally remained 
more interested in organisational-level performance such as profit, return on 
investment (ROI), and profit margin (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987). Otley (1999) 
suggests that an organisation that is performing well is one that is successfully 
attaining its objectives, in other words, one that is effectively implementing an 
appropriate strategy. In the 1990s many authors (e. g. Kaplan and Norton, 1992; 
Fitzgerald et al., 1991) advocated multidimensional notions of performance in 
terms of final results and determinants, or drivers of those results. 
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Accountability" is a complex and `chameleon-like' term which is now 
commonplace in both management accounting and public administration 
literature (Mulgan, 2000; Sinclair, 1995; Day and Klein, 1987). Mulgan (2000) 
explores the conceptual meaning of the term accountability by analysing 
extended usages of the term and concludes that while extensions in the meaning 
of accountability as a concept are understandable, there is a need for preserving 
the core sense of the term which refers to the external calling of account for 
one's actions12. However, before the question of accountability in the public 
sector is analysed any further it is pertinent to ask why is there a great emphasis 
upon the notion of accountability under NPM. 
11 The social psychologists (e. g. Garfinkle, 1967; Mead, 1934) look at accountability in the 
context of identity of the self as they try to answer the question: how do we understand, interpret 
and explain others and ourselves, and thereby manage to interact with each other in everyday 
life? It is argued that all members of a particular social group take for granted that every other 
member must at the outset `know' the settings in which he is to operate if his practices are to 
serve as measures to bring particular located features of these settings to recognizable account. 
Therefore, the accountability of actions is a pervasive matter, and actions are accounted for 
routinely (Garfinkle, 1967). 
12Mulgan (2001) argues that over the years the term accountability has increasingly been 
extended beyond the central concerns emanating from the core meaning. A review of such 
extended usages is made by the author. He starts by comparing 'Accountability' and 
`Responsibility' and concludes that though sometimes the term responsibility is used 
interchangeably with accountability, now it is increasingly confined to its more accustomed 
ethical territory of personal liability, freedom of action and discretion. Then relying mainly upon 
Day and Klein (1987), the internal accountability concept in terms of professional and personal 
accountability is analysed. It is concluded that the notion of internalised accountability may 
sometimes be seized on as a last resort by those who feel they ought to be accountable to 
someone but cannot identify to whom. Another extended usage of accountability is identified as a 
mechanism of imposing control over public organisation. It is also argued that in extended 
meaning it is sometimes identified with control itself. Yet another extended meaning of 
accountability is identified as Responsiveness to the wishes of general public. Here the principle 
of deliberative democracy has influenced this extended meaning of accountability as a dialogue 
between the public servants and the public. 
Willmott (1996) distinguishes between `universal' and `historical forms' of accountability where 
the former applies as an integral part of human nature while the latter is defined by historical and 
cultural frameworks. Roberts (1991: 365) distinguishes between `individualizing' and 
`socializing' forms of accountability. He argues that formal hierarchical accountability, in which 
accounting information plays a central role, is exclusively preoccupied with the strategic or 
instrumental consequences of action, and thus results in separating broader ethical concerns from 
the strategic ones. The author makes a case for bringing back instrumental and moral accounting 
into a relation which the author believes is possible through the mechanism of dialogue. 
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Two factors can be cited as an explanation. First, many writers on the modem 
state contend that the emergence of modern state built on the `contract device' 
has resulted in erosion of traditional form of ministerial accountability (e. g. 
Normanton, 1966: p 12; Smith, 1971: p 3-69). Therefore, calls for greater 
accountability under NPM essentially aim to bring back accountability to the 
public sector management. Second, the advocates of NPM believe that the 
private sector managers work under accountability pressures of shareholders and 
the market. Consequently, the problem of perceived lack of effective 
accountability in the public sector can be resolved by redefining service delivery 
in the public sector around notions of customer focus, outcomes and quality 
improvement. Therefore, the advocates of NPM believe that importing private 
sector practices in the public sector enhances accountability of the managers. 
Rhodes (1997: 5) believes that the recent developments have restrained the 
traditional mechanisms of democratic accountability. He argues that while the 
state had been `hollowed out', managerial accountability has been sharpened 
through the NPM with its emphasis on a sharper distinction between politics and 
administration. Similarly, Kaboolian (1998) argues that an orientation to 
`customer service' focuses managers and agencies on what users of the services 
define as important. 
In view of the extended usages of the term accountability, the PhD study 
has 
used the term in its formal meaning, where it can be defined as "a relationship 
involving the giving and demanding of reasons for conduct" (Roberts and 
Scapens, 1985: p 447). It is, however, important to know about different types of 
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accountability relationships. Different authors have classified accountability 
relationships along different lines (see Table 2.4). This typology of 
accountabilities will be used as an analytical tool to examine the performance 
measurement of HMCE. 
Category Sub-category Types Definition 
Political/public making officials who perform public duties 
answerable to the people. 
Managerial Fiscal/ making sure that money has been spent as 
regularity allocated and agreed in accordance with 
prescribed rules. 
Process Economy ensuring that the best possible terms are applied 
in acquiring the resources. Thus, it is the input 
stage which comes under scrutiny under this 
form of accountability. 
Efficiency ensuring that maximum output is obtained from 
the resources employed or conversely minimum 
resources are employed while achieving a given 
level of output. 
Programme / ensuring that a given course of action or 
effectiveness investment of allocated resources results in 
achievement of intended objectives and goals. 
Legal scrutiny of observance of legal provisions. 
Personal moral obligations and pricks of conscience 
Professional meeting standards set by the peers of a group 
(e. g. ACCA or CIMA for accountants or 
General Dental Council for dentists) 
Table 2.4: Types of accountabilities [tabulated by the PhD author from Power, 1997: p 49-50; 
Sinclair, 1995; Day and Klein, 1987: p 25-28; Rhodes, 1985: p 402-6] 
The first major type is political / public accountability as the officials of public 
sector organisations are politically accountable to the people through indirect 
linkages held intact by the process of ministerial responsibility. Managerial 
accountability is concerned with the exercise of delegated authority by 
managers for carrying out agreed tasks according to agreed criteria of 
performance. This form of accountability may have a more formal technical 
appearance and may be carried out by impartial, neutral experts on behalf of the 
principals. The economy, efficiency and effectiveness, the three Es, are 
collectively also termed Value For Money accountability (VFM), as mentioned 
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earlier. Stewart (1984: p 17) distinguishes the bases of accountability in the form 
of a `ladder'. `Accounting for probity and legality' reports that funds have been 
used in appropriate manner. The next level is `process accountability' which 
accounts for the details of the action processes followed by the `agent'. 
`Performance accountability' and `programme accountability' together are 
intended to provide an account of the total work performance of the `agent' in 
terms of specific goals set by the `principal'. Finally, `policy accountability' 
complements the `performance' and `programme' levels presenting the account 
in broad policy terms in relation to the goals. In legal accountability the 
ministers and officials are held to account by judicial bodies such as courts and 
tribunals. The personal accountability concerns the domain of one's personal 
views of what is good and bad and to refrain from doing something bad. 
Professional accountability refers to the situation of persons who perform tasks 
of professional nature like doctors, lawyers, accountants. They feel accountable 
to their peer group for professional competence. 13 
Romzek and Dubnick (2000) provide a typology of accountability along two 
dimensions of `sources of expectations and/or control' (internal/extemal) and 
`degree of autonomy' (low/high). The authors argue that accountability can be 
built in internally or it may be carried out by an external actor. If it is internal and 
hierarchical in nature the managers have a low degree of autonomy. On the other 
13 Stone (1995) also provides a classification of accountability mechanisms in the public sector 
by suggesting five types. Parliamentary control subjects officials to control and 
direction on an 
issue-by-issue basis. Managerialism, by contrast, involves setting policy and procedural 
guidelines then stepping back from detailed control. Judicial or quasi-judicial review relies on 
mechanisms for appeal against decisions. `Constituency relations' consist of various mechanisms 
to make organisations more responsive to their publics, from consultative committees to the 
Citizen's Charter. Finally, marketisation seeks to achieve the same end by giving clients choice 
among alternative service providers. 
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hand if it is of professionals then the managers have greater autonomy. If 
accountability is done externally, and is of legal nature then the managers have 
again little autonomy. But if it is of political nature then the autonomy is much 
greater. The authors state that the broken lines between cells are intended to 
convey the permeability of these category boundaries. 
Sources of expectations and / or control 
Internal 
Low 
Degree of 
autonomy 
High 
External 
Hierarchical Legal 
Professional Political 
Fig 2.4: Types of Accountability Relationships (Romzek and Ingraham, 2000: p 242) 
The authors argue that public sector managers are faced with cross pressures of 
accountabilities as the various accountability relationships emphasise different 
values and behavioural expectations (see fig 2.5) 
Type of accountability Value emphasis Behavioural expectation 
Hierarchical Efficiency Obedience to organisational 
directives 
Legal Rule of law Compliance with external 
mandates 
Professional Expertise Deference to individual 
judgment and expertise 
Political Responsiveness Responsive to key external 
stakeholders 
Fig 2.5: Values and Behavioural Expectations of Different Accountability Types 
(Romzek and Ingraham, 2000: p 242) 
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2.2.2 NPM and Accounting 
Enhancing accountability of managers was identified in the previous sections as 
of central importance in the NPM discourse. How can accountability be 
effectively operationalised is however a question which is not so well articulated 
in the literature. The notion of accountability at an abstract level is simple but its 
actual implementation is cloudy (Robinson, 2003; Collins, 1992; Swieringa and 
Weick, 1983). 
According to Romzek and Dubnick (1998) the process of operationalisation 
requires establishment of expectations, verification of performance, maintaining 
responsiveness of agents, assessment of blame, sorting out responsibilities, 
determining who the masters are, and management under conditions of multiple 
accountability systems. Arguably all these attributes are easier said than done. 
The authors further argue that the growth of professionalism in the modern 
service delivery state has further compounded the problems of accountability, as 
a professional believes that he or she is accountable only to his or her peers. 
Despite these challenging issues, the advocates of NPM prescribe accounting as a 
device of making accountability process more visible (Broadbent and Guthrie, 
1992). `Performance measurement' can therefore be seen as an effort on the part 
of policy makers to operationalise accountability in the public sector. 
A few studies have investigated the role of accounting in the process of 
accountability. Ahrens and Chapman (2002) observe that the relationship 
between accounting and processes of accountability is of vital interest to 
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accounting researchers as it emphasises the demanding and giving of reasons for 
action as the most important social function of accounting 14. The NPM also 
appears to be placing its faith in accounting as a tool of accountability. Hood 
(1995) highlights the key role played in the emergence of NPM process by 
`accountingisation'. The NPM therefore is based on the notion that the activities 
of public servants need to be more closely appraised (in terms of costs) and 
evaluated by accounting techniques. (Hood, 1995: p 94; Power and Laughlin, 
1992: p 133). 
The issue of performance measurement in the public sector has been addressed in 
the literature in three main ways. First, at macro level many authors (e. g. Martin, 
1998) have investigated the influence of NPM on public sector organisations. 
Second, they examine governmental level accounting reforms across the whole 
public sector (e. g. Bevir and O'Brien, 2001). Third, at micro level, many authors 
have examined implementation of performance measurement in an organisation 
or a range of organisations, on a case study basis (e. g. Greener, 2003; Laughlin et 
al. 1994). 
To a varying degree the authors address the question as to how effective are 
accounting changes (such as changes in performance measures) in enhancing or 
modifying accountability relationships? Guided by Broadbent and Guthrie 
(1992), the writers can be categorised as belonging to three categories. First, the 
Ia They review the accountability literature and conclude that it is primarily based on narratives 
around bipolar distinctions between financial accountability and competing orientations. 
They 
cite examples as functional (Ahrens, 1999), professional/public service (Ashmore et al., 
1989; 
Laughlin, 1996; Llewellyn, 1998; Kurunmäki, 1999), engineering/public service (Dent, 1991), 
technological/local community (Berry et al., 1985), or operational/experimental (Jönsson and 
Grönlund, 1988). 
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`normative' category (e. g. Kaplan and Norton, 2001; Kaplan, 2001; Chow et al., 
1998; Forgione, 1997; and Carter, 1991). Such writers contend that many of the 
problems of performance assessment transcend the public/private distinction 
reflecting characteristics which cut across this divide. They are of the view that 
performance measurement can be used as an effective management tool by the 
public sector managers in the same way it is used in the private sector. In the 
public sector, Likierman (1993) 15 is a good example of such a category of 
writers. 
Second, the `sceptics' category (Talbot; 2000; Pollitt, 1986; Mayston, 1985) 
where the authors take their inspiration from the institutional theorists (e. g. 
Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Scott 1987). The institutional theorists argue that in 
organisations such as government departments and agencies, whose survival 
depends primarily on the support of external constituents and only secondarily on 
actual performance, managers will implement the mandated systems in order to 
appear modern, rational and efficient, but will not actually use the systems for 
improving performance. Hyong (2002), for instance, claims that the search for 
`best practice' in public sector management through private sector practices has 
taken on `mythic proportions'. The author laments the fact that the managerial, 
organisational, financial, legislative or policy-driven approaches are keenly 
15 He draws twenty lessons from his review of Performance Indicators (PIs) used in the 
government departments and classifies them into four categories. The first category relates to 
Concept, which should address issues like all organisational elements, appropriate number, 
safeguards and accountability. The second category is that of Preparation which includes issues 
like ownership, Avoiding short-termism, Reflecting effort and Thinking about uncontrollables. 
The third category of Implementation relates to issues like Revision, Linkages, Understandability, 
Use as proxies and reassessment. The final category of Use includes issues like Trusted data, 
Guidance Feedback, Trade-off and User friendliness. 
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pursued in the literature even though they have largely failed to deliver the 
sweeping improvements those organisations initially expected. Ittner and 
Larcker (1998) stress that instead of embracing performance measurement in the 
public sector as a matter of belief, its applicability must become a research 
question which should aim at answering whether mandated PMSs are actually 
used for internal decision making and performance evaluation or are simply 
implemented to legitimate the government departments with the legislatures and 
other stakeholders? 
Third, the `rationalists' category (e. g. Broadbent and Laughlin, 1998; Power, 
1997) where the authors take the middle approaches. They are of the view that 
accounting changes may have no effect upon the practices of an organisation if 
these are decoupled or marginalised. However, they may also, in some cases, 
transform the basic values of the organisation if they have the colonizing effect. 
The rationalists and sceptics have produced literature that has been termed as the 
`alternative research' by Broadbent and Guthrie (1992). This PhD case study 
investigates the use of performance measurement for enhancing and `modifying' 
accountability relationships in the case of HMCE. It therefore falls within the 
umbrella term of `alternative research'. 
During the review of literature pertaining to performance measurement it 
transpired that there exists wide variation in the meanings of fundamental terms 
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used by various authors16. It is therefore important for sake of clarity that 
important terms like performance measurement, performance management, PMS, 
performance measures and performance indicators (PIs) are defined for the 
purpose of this PhD study. 
Neely et al. (1995) define `performance measurement' 17 as the process of 
quantifying the efficiency and effectiveness of an action. It is argued by the 
authors that the level of performance a business attains is a function of the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the actions it undertakes. The term effectiveness 
used in the definition refers to the extent to which customer requirements are 
met, while the term efficiency is a measure of how economically the firm's 
resources are utilized when providing a given level of customer satisfaction. The 
authors stress the importance of the distinction and contend that it not only 
identifies two fundamental dimensions of performance, but also highlights the 
fact that there can be internal as well as external reasons for pursuing specific 
courses of action. `Performance Management' 8 is broader in meaning and is 
16 Lack of clarity on usage of terms in performance related literature is well documented. For 
instance Neely et al., (1995) express their concern over the fact that the writings of many authors 
on organisational performance have an implied assumption that the term performance is well 
understood by all. The authors argue that the performance measurement literature is diverse 
where individual authors have tended to focus on different aspects of PMS design. However, the 
borders between the definition of the terms and concepts are often not well defined and consensus 
upon meaning and scope of performance management and measurement in both literature and 
practice is conspicuously missing (Lapsley and Mitchell, 1996). 
17 CIMA( 2000) defines performance measurement as: 
"The process of assessing the proficiency with which a reporting entity succeeds, by the 
economic acquisition of resources and their efficient and effective deployment, in achieving 
its objectives. Performance measures may be based on non-financial as well as financial 
information. " 
18 Just as is the case with the term `performance', the terms performance measurement and 
performance management are also often used in taken for granted meaning. For instance, in the 
official publications of government departments like Cabinet Office and NAO, the terms 
performance management and performance measurement have often been interchangeably used 
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often used more loosely by practitioners and authors implying a generic sense. 
Molleman and Timmerman (2003) review various definitions of `performance 
management' as used in the published literature and observe that what is 
common in most of these and other definitions is that they relate `performance 
management' with different organisational levels (organisation, unit, group, 
individual worker) and refer to a cyclical process with different stages, such as 
planning, appraisal and reward. The authors, however, contend that such 
definitions differ in their focus as the literature on general management and 
production management emphasises the organisational or unit level of 
performance, while HRM literature primarily focuses on the individual worker. 
Williams (1998) is of the view that three perspectives on performance 
management are distinguishable: individual performance, organisational 
performance and an integration of the two. However authors of performance 
management point out that despite the contention that objectives must be 
coherent throughout an organisation, the relations between individual and 
organisational objectives and targets has generally been accorded less concern 
(Bach, 2000; Hansen, 2000; Storey and Sisson 1993). 
From the public sector perspective Harry (2002) defines `performance 
management' as the use of performance information to affect programs, policies 
e. g. performance management has been defined in a joint publication issued by the Cabinet 
Office and NAO in the following tautological manner: 
"Performance management can refer to managing the performance of an organisation or an 
individual" (HM Treasury., 2001a; p 7) 
Talbot (2000) provides numerous examples of the confusion which characterises the variant 
policy pronouncements issued by the central government policy managers over the 
issue of 
performance improvement. 
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or any other organisation actions aimed at maximizing the benefits of public 
services. It is worth recalling that the focus of this PhD research is upon 
`performance measurement' which is seen as an important tool of performance 
management. 
Neely et al. (1995: 80) define a `performance measure' as "a metric used to 
quantify the efficiency and/or effectiveness of an action ". Fry (1992) describes 
`measures' as a means of tracking. Nanni et al. (1990) use the analogy of a 
thermostat to explain how performance measures are part of a feedback loop, 
which "controls operations against a specific value". 
When it is not possible to measure an activity (as the phenomenon may be 
intangible or too complex to be defined by simple measures) some proxy is used 
which indirectly reflects progress achieved on the desired activity. This proxy 
measure is termed a `performance indicator' 19 (PI), and is often used 
interchangeably with performance measure. Peursem, et al. (1995) refer to 
Culyer, (1983, p 11) and Holland, (1983, p 53) and insist that performance 
measures20 reported to the public should be viewed as no more than indicators, as 
indicators are not associated with precision or reliability, but exist to focus 
attention towards an issue of interest. The authors contend that PIs are useful if 
19 Carter et al. (1992) classify the use of PIs as prescriptive or dials which are linked to objectives 
and targets set by ministers or managers and used to monitor progress towards their achievement, 
descriptive or tin-openers which simply record change, or proscriptive or alarm-bells which give 
warning about intolerable things. 
20 In the literature often the phrase Performance Measurement System (PMS) is used to examine 
the performance measures, indicators employed for measuring organisational performance. PMS 
is defined by Neely et al. (1995: 81) as the set of metrics used to quantify both the efficiency and 
effectiveness of actions. The authors further state that a PMS can be examined at three different 
levels. First, the individual performance measures; second, the set of performance measures - the 
PMS as an entity; and third, the relationship between the PMS and the environment within which 
it operates. 
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they inspire further enquiry, but indicators cannot be expected to stand alone as a 
source of information. 
2.3 Stakeholder Theory and Performance Measurement 
In the preceding sections the central importance of accountability for NPM 
inspired reforms was underscored where accountability in its formal sense was 
defined as a relationship involving the 'giving and demanding of reasons for 
conduct'. The principal-agent approach models the interaction between two sets 
of people, the `principal' on the one hand and the `agent' on the other hand 
(Ricketts, 2002). The one who demands accounts is the principal while the one 
who gives accounts is the agent (Laughlin, 1996; Mayston, 1993). Consequently 
the question of how the principal defines performance becomes important as the 
nature of accounts will depend on the notion of performance. A review of the 
literature on performance measurement suggests that the notion of performance 
has steadily evolved to accommodate more than one perspective. 
Tracing the development of management accounting, Anthony (1989: 5) claims 
that customarily `performance' was construed around a plant or a business unit. 
The research in the mid-1980s began to focus on the manufacturing planning and 
control system. Kaplan (1983) is thought to be among the first ones who 
highlighted the shortcomings of traditional cost accounting in today's 
manufacturing environment. Authors like Fry and Cox (1989) also challenged 
the operating assumptions made by traditional cost accounting and proposed new 
PMSs based on theory of constraints. Lockamy and Spencer (1998) further state 
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that while some researchers (e. g. Schonberger, 1990) focused on individual 
performance measures and examined various dimensions of quality, cost, time 
and flexibility from a strategic perspective, others (e. g. Kaplan and Norton 1992; 
Dixon et al. 1990, Fitzgerald et al., 1991) developed frameworks for relating 
functional or local performance to overall business level performance. In the 
Table 2.5, important frameworks are summarised. 
No Frameworks Originators / Focal Point 
Authors 
Pyramid of Donaldson Brown Explicit hierarchical structure, linking 
I financial ratios and DuPont cousins measures at different organisational 
in 1912 levels. 
Performance categorises measures as being `cost' or 
2 Measurement Keegan et al. (1989) `non cost', and `external' or `internal', 
Matrix reflecting the need for greater balance of 
measures across these dimensions. 
SMART (Strategic internally and externally focused 
3 Measurement and Lynch and Cross measures, cascading measures down the 
Reporting (1991) organisation so that measures at 
Technique) department and work centre level reflect 
pyramid the corporate vision 
classified measures into two basic types; 
4 Results and Fitzgerald et al. relating to results (competitiveness, 
Determinants (1991) financial performance) and to 
Framework (RDF) determinants of those results (quality, 
flexibility, resource utilisation and 
innovation). 
Macro Process Clear links between five stages in a 
5 Model of the Brown (1996) business process, Inputs, Processing 
Organisation Systeme, Outputs, Outcomes and Goals, 
and their performance measures; 
identifies and integrates four different 
6 Balanced Kaplan and Norton ways of looking at performance 
Scorecard (1992 and 1996). (Financial, Customer, Internal Business 
and Innovation and Learning 
Perspectives). 
establishes a hierarchy of interrelated 
7 Tableau de Bord A French PM system measures and cascading measures to 
different organisational levels, forcing 
functions and divisions of an organisation 
to position themselves in the context of 
the-company's overall strategy. 
stakeholder centric view of performance 
The Performance measurement. In addition to stakeholders 
8 
Prism 
Neely et al. (2000) like, shareholders investors, customers, 
employees and suppliers the Prism also 
considers regulators and pressure groups. 
Table 2.5: Important performance measurement frameworks (tabulated by the PhD author) 
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In the early 1990's, authors such as Fitzgerald et al, (1991) and Kaplan and 
Norton (1992) began criticising the traditional emphasis on financial measures of 
performance like profit margin and return on investment (ROI). These advocates 
of a multidimensional PMS argued that financial measures promoted short- 
termism which might endanger long term sustainability of a business 
organisation. They therefore argued for expanding the notion of performance by 
dissecting it into its constituent elements such as results and determinants under 
Fitzgerald et al and drivers of performance under Kaplan and Norton's Balanced 
Scorecard. Yet another push for expanding the notion of performance came from 
the advocates of stakeholder theory. Freeman (1984) argued that many groups 
and individuals (besides shareholders) can affect an organisation, and thus there 
was a need to respond effectively to all those groups and individuals21. The 
stakeholder approach influenced many disciplines including management 
accounting as Neely et al. (2000) propose the `Prism framework' which draws its 
inspiration from the stakeholder theory and argues that an organisation's results 
(stakeholder satisfaction) are a function of determinants (the other Prism 
facets)" 
21 Admittedly the stakeholder theory has not met with universal approval and many critics 
continue to express their preference for shareholders as the only legitimate Principal and contend 
that the accounts should reflect the shareholders' views of performance (e. g. Sundaram and 
Inkpen , 
2004). However the theory has left an impact upon various disciplines of strategic 
management. 
22 The authors propose five facets of performance prism in the form of following questions: 
" Stakeholder Satisfaction - who are our key stakeholders and what 
do they want and 
need? 
" Strategies - what strategies do we have to put in place to satisfy the wants and needs of 
these key stakeholders? 
" Processes - what critical processes do we need to operate and enhance these processes? 
" Capabilities - what capabilities do we need to operate and enhance these processes? 
" Stakeholder Contribution - what contributions do we require from our stakeholders 
if 
we are to maintain and develop these capabilities? 
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It follows from the preceding sections that the NPM model of private sector 
managerial practices rests on a firm belief that in the private sector performance 
is improved with the use of accounting practices. However even within the body 
of literature related to private sector there is a recognition of the fact (as indicated 
by multi dimensional performance frameworks, and the accounting theories 
inspired by the stakeholder theory) that performance is a contested notion and 
maybe construed differently by various stakeholders of an organisation. 
Interestingly NPM steers clear of such debates on the efficacy of using 
accounting information in the private sector. Many writers have referred to the 
complexities and limitations related to using the accounting information as a part 
of an accountability system. For instance Roberts and Scapens (1985) contend 
that a better understanding is required of the way in which accounting systems 
become embodied, through use in organisational systems of accountability. It is 
therefore interesting to examine how performance measurement works as a 
mechanism of accountability in the case of public sector where stakeholders are 
more numerous and the resulting accountability system more complex (Brignall 
and Modell, 2000). The case of HMCE is also interesting as the main service (i. e. 
tax collection) is viewed differently by various stakeholders. The notions of 
accountability, performance, performance measurement, and performance 
indicators need to be viewed from the perspectives of both the tax collectors and 
tax payers. In order to develop a framework for analysing the evidence in the 
case of HMCE the most important theoretical underpinnings of the PhD research 
are discussed next. 
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2.3.1 The Theoretical Underpinnings 
This PhD research collects evidence from various textual sources and then 
analyses it to answer the main research question. In order to develop analytical 
tools the research has drawn insights from a few theoretical frameworks. The 
importance of stakeholder theory with respect to accountability system of a 
public sector organisation has already been mentioned in. the previous section. 
The other important theoretical underpinnings of this research have been 
obtained mainly from institutional and structuration theories and the principal- 
agent model of accountability. 
Earlier it was argued that the sceptics question the assumptions of normative 
writers with regards to NPM-inspired accounting changes. For instance, Lapsley 
(1996) is not very convinced by the checklists of Likierman (1993) for designing 
and implementing PIs and regards their usage as clumsy which do not address 
the finer requirements of professional value systems of the public sector 
organisations. 
Both sceptic and rationalist authors have used the theoretical framework of 
institutional theory to analyse the process of accounting changes in public sector 
organisations. While the sceptics (e. g. Kurunmaki et al., 2003) have used the 
institutional theory based frameworks to challenge the claims of NPM regarding 
accounting as a force of change, the rationalists (e. g. Collier, 2001, Bums, 2000) 
have used the framework for analyzing the process of accounting changes and 
the resulting reactions from the managers and other employees of an 
organisation. 
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`Institutional theory' itself is not a single theory but is rather an umbrella term for 
the contributions of various authors from different disciplines (Scott, 1987). The 
theory tries to dig deeper into the foundations of social structures. It looks into 
the processes by which structures, including schemas, rules, norms, and routines, 
become established as authoritative guidelines for social behaviour (Scott, 2004: 
p 408). The various variants of institutional theory23 like `Old Institutional 
Economics' (OIE), `New Institutional Economics' (NIE) and `New Institutional 
Sociology' (NIS) have their roots in different disciplines like economics, 
political science and sociology (Burns, 2000: p 571). Kondra and Hinings (1998) 
refer to the variety of guises of Institutional, theory and identify the central thrust 
of the NIS is to explain the isomorphism of organisational fields (i. e. 
organisations in a particular field gradually become similar) and the 
establishment of institutional norms. While the historical past of an organisation 
accounts largely for `institutions' of an organisation, the NIS writers argue that 
some external pressures ensure conformity to norms. They identify these 
pressures as `coercive isomorphism' (the pressure comes from a superior 
organisation), `mimetic isomorphism' (where an organisation, finding itself in 
doubt, copies what the perceived leaders of the field are believed to be doing) 
and `normative isomorphism' (where an organisation, is heavily influenced by 
23 Scott (2004), one of the proponents of institutional theory, provides a good description of how 
the theory has developed over the years. He encapsulates the theory in the following lines: 
"institutional theory is broadly positioned to help us confront important and enduring questions, including 
the bases of organisational similarity and differentiation, the relation between structure and behaviour, the 
role of symbols in social life, the relation between ideas and interests, and the tensions between freedom and 
order" (p 2) 
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norms set by an external body) (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). 
This PhD research analyses the NPM-inspired accounting reforms aimed at 
bringing about a fundamental change in the ethos of HMCE. The NIS framework 
was, therefore, found to be the most relevant one as various external factors can 
be examined and analysed for their influence upon the accounting based 
accountability relations in HMCE. 
`Institution' is a key concept of many fields of social sciences. Scott (1995: 33) 
defines the focal term as used in sociology as: 
"Institutions are social structures that have attained a high degree of resilience. [They] are 
composed of cultural-cognitive, normative, and regulative elements that, together with 
associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life. Institutions 
are transmitted by various types of carriers, including symbolic systems, relational systems, 
routines, and artefacts. Institutions operate at different levels of jurisdiction, from the world 
system to localized interpersonal relationships. Institutions by definition connote stability 
but are subject to change processes, both incremental and discontinuous"... 
Scott in the above definition identifies three pillars of institutions which he also 
presents in the form of a table as: 
Regulative Normative Cognitive 
Basis of 
compliance 
Expedience Social Obligation Taken for granted 
Mechanisms Coercive Normative Mimetic 
Logic Instrumentality Appropriateness Orthodoxy 
Indicators Rules, laws, 
sanctions 
Certification, accreditation Prevalence, isomorphism 
Basis of legitimacy Legally sanctioned Morally governed Culturally supported, 
conceptually correct 
Table 2.6 Three pillars of institutions (source: Scott, 1995: p 18) 
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Powell and DiMaggio (1991: 8) provide the NIS based description of 
'institutions' which carry some commonality with the more general definition but 
has a greater focus upon explaining a social phenomenon by referring to many 
external factors: 
"The new institutionalism in organisation theory and sociology comprises a rejection of 
rational-actor models, an interest in institutions as independent variables, a turn toward 
cognitive and cultural explanations, and an interest in properties of supra-individual units of 
analysis that cannot be reduced to aggregations or direct consequences of individuals' 
attributes or motives". 
It is argued that organisational environments "... are characterized by the 
elaboration of rules and requirements to which individual organisations must 
conform if they are to receive support and legitimacy ... 
" (Scott and Meyer, 
1983: 149). 
The main contention of the institutional theorists is that the taken for granted 
norms24 and values of an organisation define the operational life of an 
organisation. How are those norms developed? Answering this question 
Stinchcombe (1965) popularised the notion of organisational imprinting as he 
argued that organisations formed at one time typically have a social structure 
which gets imprinted on the organisational psyche. The notion of organisational 
imprinting as a process by which organisations tend to maintain certain practices 
adopted at the time of origin of that organisation is important for HMCE and will 
be used for analysis in the later chapters 
24 According to Hinings and Greenwood (1988): 
'... institutional norms deal with appropriate domains of operation, principles of organizing, and criteria of 
evaluation. Structures and processes are institutionally derived and may even be idiosyncratic to the 
organisational field" 
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2.3.2 Responses to Accounting Changes 
When the sceptics apply the institutional theory lens for analyzing accounting 
changes they consider such changes as an exercise in gaining legitimacy. A very 
good example of this approach can be found in Kurunmaki et al. (2003) where 
the authors pitch the analysis of the accounting changes in the healthcare as a 
contrast between accountingisation and legitimation. Carpenter and Feroz (1992) 
also use this theoretical lens to view adoption of GAAP in the public sector as an 
attempt to be seen legitimate and modern. Power (1997: 67) refers to the 
cosmetic nature of accounting changes and contends that: 
"through the creation of compartmentalized organisational units for dealing with external 
assessment, audit and evaluation can be rendered ceremonial in such a way as to deflect a 
rational questioning of organisational conduct". 
While the sceptics term this phenomenon as `decoupling', rationalists point out 
the norms distorting effects of accounting changes basing their analysis on the 
dictum that `what's measured gets done'. They term it the `colonising' effect 
where formal audit based accountability may penetrate deep into the core of 
organisational operations creating `new mentalities, new incentives and 
perceptions of significance' (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1998: p 405). Pollit 
(1995: 142), for instance, argues that quality audits of academics has resulted in 
academics reluctantly resorting to some least desired actions like cutting per 
student class contact times, teaching much larger classes, reducing the number or 
length of written assignments, sacrificing time for research and scholarship and 
so on. Broadbent and Laughlin (1998) conducted semi-structured interviews of 
teachers and head teachers in 24 schools and staff of 34 GP practices for an 
analysis of their coping strategies in the wake of performance reporting changes. 
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They reported that while decoupling occurred in the case of GP practices, 
colonising effect was visible in the case of schools. 
Scott (2004) himself recognises the weaknesses of a two-fold simplistic view of 
responses towards organisational changes (including accounting changes). Many 
writers using insights of institutional theory have tried to improve the robustness 
of the NIS based analytical tools. For instance, Collier (2001) shows how 
accounting in the form of devolved budgets facilitated `loose coupling', by 
accommodating both institutional and technical demands. He claims that the 
devolution of budgets in West Mercia Police was accompanied by a shift in 
power that helped to reconcile the interests of those pursuing a legitimating 
accountability with those who prioritized operational policing. 
Roberts and Scapens (1985) and Macintosh and Scapens (1990) emphasise the 
importance of `structuration theory' of Giddens (1984) in understanding the 
social context of management accounting in organisations. Structuration25 theory 
is concerned with understanding the relationship between the activities of 
knowledgeable human actors and the structuring of social systems (Giddens, 
1979,1984). It can be argued that Giddens' structuration theory attempts to 
synthesise the views that either consider social phenomena as determined by the 
influence of objective social structures (determinism) or consider social 
phenomena as products of human agents as they subjectively interpret the world 
(voluntarism). For Giddens, social systems comprise discernibly similar social 
25 According to Giddens (1984:: 376) `structuration' is "the structuring of social relations across 
time and space, in virtue of the duality of structure". 
45 
practices which are reproduced across time and space through the actions of 
human agents, while structure refers to the structuring properties which provide 
for the "binding" of those social practices into social systems' (Macintosh and 
Scapens, 1990: 457) It is only through action and interaction that structures are 
themselves reproduced. This is Giddens' notion of the duality of structure 
whereby structures are both the medium and the outcome of interaction. 
structure signification domination ...... 
legitimation 
modality interpretative facility norm 
scheme 
interaction communication power ....... sanction 
Fig 2.6 : Giddens' Structuration Framework (Giddens, 1984: p 29; 
Source: Macintosh and Scapens, 1990) 
According to Macintosh and Scapens (1990) management accounting provides 
managers with a means of understanding the activities of their organisation and 
allows them to communicate meaningfully about those activities therefore 
management accounting systems can be thought of as a modality of structuration 
theory. As such insights from structuration theory are helpful in developing a 
framework for analysing the accountability system of HMCE. 
Laughlin (1991) uses insights of institutional theory and structuration theory to 
present effects of changes (such as accounting changes) in terms of responses by 
managers of an organisation. He conceptualizes organisations as being an 
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amalgam of "interpretive schemes", "design archetypes" and "sub systems". The 
nature and relationships between these is shown in Figure 2.7 
Interpretive 
schemes 
Design 
archetype 
Subsv, stems 
Beliefs. values and norm b 
Lovo-I $ 
Miss i n/purpose 
. 
£vol 
Me'tarules 
Organization structure. decision 
pro s, es, rnrntmicationn systems 
Tangible organizations elements 
Intr g ble 
oe 
e 
Tangible 
Fig 2.7: A model of organisations (Source: Laughlin, 1991: p 211) 
The figure shows that the interpretive schemes of Laughlin's framework are 
shaped by assumptions or beliefs which organisations tend to maintain as they 
are imprinted from the times the organisation was founded and as such they are 
taken for granted set of shared values and beliefs (Hinings and Greenwood, 
1988: p 4). Referring to the Habermesian Critical Theory, Laughlin (1991) 
categorises different constituents of an organisation along a continuum of 
tangible to intangible elements. The tangible elements (e. g. buildings, people, 
machines, finance and the behaviours and natures of these elements) are those 
about which inter-subjective agreement is possible and the less tangible ones are 
those which give direction, meaning, significance, nature and interconnection to 
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the more tangible elements and about which inter-subjective agreement is very 
difficult. This less tangible part is divided into two progressively less visible 
parts: 
"a design archetype and 
" interpretive schemes, 
Both of them are created and sustained by the past and/or current organisational 
participants. The definition for a design archetype is borrowed by the author 
from Hinings and Greenwood (1988: 4): 
"... compositions of structures and (management) systems given coherence and orientation 
by an underlying set of values and beliefs" 
The underlying set of values and beliefs are termed interpretive schemes. 
Drawing upon works of many scholars of organisational change, Laughlin (1991) 
conceptualizes four possible pathways which any change initiative may follow. 
The first two pathways have been termed First-order changes and include 
Rebuttal and Reorientation. In the case of Rebuttal there is a repulsion of the 
disturbance such that, while the eviction may involve some change in the 
organisational arrangements, these are very temporary. Reorientation, on the 
other hand, aims to internalize the disturbance, through often permanent 
organisational changes, but in such a way that the interpretive schemes remain 
untouched and undisturbed by the alteration. The next two reactions are 
categorised as Second-order changes comprising Colonization and Evolution. 
When a change results in colonization the change is deep-rooted as the design 
archetype, the subsystems and the interpretive schemes of the organisation all 
undergo complete transformation. This change in the interpretive schemes results 
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in a totally new underlying ethos for the organisation as a whole. Evolution on 
the other hand, involves deliberately chosen change in the interpretive schemes, 
with subsequent shifts in the design archetype. Thus such a change results from 
general acceptance by all the organisational participants freely and no external 
coercion is involved. 
Laughlin stresses that these four possibilities are simply heuristic devices to 
provide a framework of possibilities and suggests that actual pathways of change 
may move dynamically and will not necessarily follow a linear, one-directional 
course. There may be oscillations on a pathway, or different sections of an 
organisation may progress at different paces, on different pathways, or in 
contradictory ways (Broadbent, 1992). 
Oliver (1991: 152) also provides a continuum of responses to institutional 
pressures, which is used by Modell (2001: 440) for analysing accounting based 
reforms. 
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The responses can vary from very low to very active resistance to accounting 
reforms. At the low resistance end of the continuum the strategy will be of 
acquiescence while at the active resistance end the strategy will be of 
manipulation. 
From the preceding discussion on institutional theory three important insights 
can be drawn. First, an organisation is given coherence and stability by 
institutions (which are internalized definitions of how routines should be done, 
and how events are interpreted by the managers and employees of an 
organisation). Second, pressures upon an organisation to undertake reforms can 
emerge from a regulating authority (coercive pressure), from a norms-setting 
body (normative pressure), or from leaders of the field (mimetic pressure). Third, 
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how managers respond to such pressures for reforms can vary from simple 
acquiescence to manipulation. 
Institutional theory has been applied to case study-based research by some 
authors (e. g. Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; Kikulis, Slack, and Hinings, 1995). ). 
However, many authors have argued that given the importance of the 
institutional theory, it is still underutilized. For instance, Collier (2001) refers to 
the calls for studies of accounting in the context in which it operates (e. g. 
Hopwood and Miller, 1994, Hopwood, 1990,1987,1983; Burchell et al., 1980) 
to justify the choice of institutional theory as the framework for his study. 
Brignall and Modell (2000: 282) regard the neglect of the insights of institutional 
theory in the context of the public sector as `unfortunate' and call for shifting the 
attention to "the power and pressures exerted by different groups of stakeholders 
and how these affect the use of performance information in organisations ". This 
PhD study addresses such calls by employing insights drawn from institutional 
theory for analysing the NPM-inspired performance measurement changes which 
aim to alter accountability relationships in HMCE. 
Earlier it was. stated that the main thrust of NPM can be identified as redefining 
accountability in terms of `customer-focus'. It was also stated that in the case of 
a `tax administration' the notion of `customer-focus' is not well developed. In 
order to develop such a notion `social exchange' theory (with its origins in 
anthropology and sociology) (Ekeh, 1974; Turner, 1982) is very helpful. Alford 
(2002) makes a good review of the theory as to how it can resolve some of the 
problems associated with the adoption of a private-sector-style customer-focus in 
the public sector. The author argues that the interactions between public-sector 
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organisations and their clients differ from the private-sector customer transaction 
and offers a typology of these interactions. The notion of `exchange' in the social 
exchange theory has two important features. First, it acknowledges that it is not 
only tangible items such as money or goods and services which can be 
exchanged, but rather a broader set of exchangeable things such as friendship, 
respect, or affirming fairness. Second, `social exchange' can involve more than 
two parties and more complex forms of `reciprocity'. As against "restricted 
exchange" occurring between only two parties in the private sector, Levi-Strauss 
([1949] 1969, p: 220) identifies another form as a "generalized exchange", which 
involves actors who benefit each other indirectly" (Ekeh 1974, p: 48). 
Alford (p 341) further states that these two aspects of social exchange typically 
entail more diffused and deferred reciprocity than a simple economic exchange. 
After explaining the notion of social exchange, the author offers a typology of 
organisation public relationships based on a primary distinction between 
`citizens', who receive public value from the public sector organisations and 
`clients' who have their private value affected and with whom an organisation 
deals directly. as part of normal business operations. Within that category, a 
secondary distinction is drawn among three roles: `paying customers', 
`beneficiaries', and `obligatees'. The author states that in this typology, only the 
paying customer seems to conform to the private-sector market model but that 
role is always mixed with some other that does not conform. The broadened 
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conception of exchange suggests recognition of beneficiaries and obligatees as 
clients, even though they are not the same as paying customers26 
The obligatee as a non-paying customer identified by the author is important for 
the case of HMCE as this type of client usually receives what he or she 
reasonably regards as `bads' under social exchange theory. A prisoner, the author 
illustrates, mainly receives the restraint of liberty. Since a prison is not seeking to 
obtain repeat business, therefore achieving satisfaction of inmates as the first 
objective and thus calling obligatees clients may appear misplaced. However 
referring to the social exchange notion, the author contends that an obligatee 
provides not money but compliance which is essential for the organisation's 
requirements. The organisation is seeking not repeat sales but ongoing 
compliance, without which it cannot effectively function. Even though 
compliance can be obtained through coercion, such a course is often very costly, 
especially if the obligatees are wilfully resistant. 
"The challenge, therefore, is to elicit from them some degree of cooperation with the agency. 
This means understanding obligatees' needs and rights and seeking to satisfy them to the 
extent it can do so, given its primary responsibility to impose legal obligations" (p 343) 
Citing the need for fairness and justice as a primary desire of obligatees, the 
author claims that considerable research evidence suggests that most people will 
comply with legal sanctions, even if they are personally disadvantaged by doing 
26 The author illustrates the point by using welfare payments as an example. He states that 
beneficiaries, e. g. welfare recipients, receive benefits from the agency not because the agency 
will get money in return, but rather to fulfil a mandate endowed upon it through the political 
process by the citizenry. The citizenry receives public value in return for the authority and 
resources it bestows on the agency. First, it receives a kind of social insurance by feeling 
reassured that a safety net is present. "It also receives a mitigation of negative externalities in that 
people who have some form of income support are less likely to engage in theft or to sleep in the 
doorways of middle-class taxpayers. " Refraining from acts of rebellion on the part of recipients 
and affirmation of normative and symbolic values like human rights of the under privileged are 
cited as some other examples of values received by the citizenry (p 342) 
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so, if they regard the manner in which those sanctions are applied as fair (Tyler 
1990; Ayres and Braithwaite 1992). 
The author recognizes that there will always be some proportion of obligatees 
who are wilfully resistant, requiring use of coercive powers against them. 
However that falls outside the scope of exchange; the obligatees don't receive 
anything valuable, but rather find the value they enjoy diminished27. Using the 
prison example, the author argues that very rarely a specific person is solely a 
beneficiary or an obligatee as quite often such a person plays both of these roles 
at the same time. For instance, the welfare recipients in one way are 
beneficiaries, but at the same time they are also obligatees because services to 
beneficiaries are rationed using eligibility criteria, which the welfare department 
has to enforce. To the extent they are subject to these rules, benefit recipients are 
also obligatees. While the agency can apply coercive powers, such as inspections 
and prosecutions, to detect and punish "welfare cheats. " but it is also desirable to 
understand the factors that make it difficult for some beneficiaries to comply- 
such as lack of information or complex procedures-and by addressing them try to 
make it easier for clients to comply. The author concludes from the example that 
compliance can be elicited from beneficiaries and obligatees by treating them 
27 It is argued by the author that by engaging with those who are not wilfully resistant in the 
process of exchange, the agency also participates in exchange with the citizenry. The author 
contends that in return for their authority and resources, the agency provides them with public 
value. "In general, this public value consists of compelling members of society to act consistently 
with laws, which are usually enacted in order to enhance public value. It also includes providing 
the means to punish breaches of such laws ". From the operation of a prison, the citizenry 
receives a guarantee that its laws have teeth, as well as reassurance that dangerous offenders are 
kept out of the community while they are a threat to society and the prospect of rehabilitating 
them. It also receives normative value in the form of affirmation that its prisons exhibit the 
attributes of a fair and just society in the manner of their operation. Thus, the prison agency is 
engaged in exchanges both with the citizenry and with its inmates (p 343) 
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like customers. This theme will be used while analysing the PMS of HMCE with 
the help of Results and Determinants Framework (RDF) in the later chapters. 
2.4 Theorising Accountability 
Earlier, accountability was defined as `giving and taking of reasons for conduct'. 
Since accountability itself is an abstract notion, some authors have proposed 
graphical presentation of how it operates. The principal-agent model was referred 
to in earlier sections. The principal-agent model originated as a theoretical 
construct in the new economics of organization to examine contractual and 
hierarchical relations between actors within the firm. It not only continues to be 
an important framework for the analysis of a broad range of relationships in 
economics (Moe 1984: 739) but has often been applied for analysing 
accountability relationships in the public sector as well (Mayston, 1993). 
Laughlin (1996) presents the principal-agent model of accountability in a simple 
diagram (Fig 2.8) where the principal provides resources/responsibilities to the 
agent and thereafter places demands upon the agent for information as to how the 
resources were utilised or responsibilities performed? The agent in compliance 
supplies the information on his activities so that the principal is satisfied with the 
performance of agent and the accountability relationship remains intact. 
55 
Context and Underlying Structure of Accountability Relationships: (e. g. contractual / 
communal, bond / link of accountability; signification, legitimation, domination) 
Demands for information on actions, activities, etc. 
PRINCIPAL I Transfer of resources or responsibilities y AGENT 
with expectations as to actions, activities etc /' 
Supply of information on actions, activities, etc. 
Bases and types of accountability relationships 
(e. g. probity / process/ performance/ programme/ policy, 
ex post/ ex ante) 
Fig: 2.8: A summarised Picture of Theoretical insights (Laughlin, 1996: p 76) 
Mayston (1993) reviews the significance of the principal agent model in the case 
of public sector organisations. According to him, the basic premise of the model 
is the perceived clash of interests between the principal and agent with respect to 
the utilisation of resources. The process of accountability aims to minimise the 
costs of agency to the principal. He, therefore, stresses that accountability is not 
an end in itself but a means to achieve another end which is improvement in 
performance of the agent. Using the principal-agent model, as a theoretical lens, 
has, therefore, an important consequence. Increasing accountability can only be 
justifiable if it leads to improved performance results. In economic terms, 
increasing accountability is only justifiable if the improvement in performance is 
greater than the costs of increasing accountability. 28 The limitations of the 
principal agent model in the context of complex public sector organisations are 
28 Mayston summarises the main themes of the theory. It is stated that three costs are important 
in the model. First binding costs which are incurred by the agent to assure the principal of his 
worthiness so that the principal doesn't use the powers of "incapacitation" or "deterrence". 
Second, the monitoring costs which are incurred by the principal to operationalise the act of 
taking accounts. Third, residual costs which result from agency relationships due to a clash of 
interest. Thus an increase in accountability can only be justified if it leads to a reduction in 
residual costs as against monitoring and bonding costs (ibid: 1993). 
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also discussed in the literature. For instance, a special issue of Annals of Public 
and Cooperative Economics considers usefulness of the principal agent model 
with respect to the UK regulated utilities, and all the authors from different 
disciplinary backgrounds identify important limitations to the model (Kassim and 
Price, 2005). This PhD research applies and adapts the basic principal agent 
model to the relationships of taxpayers, tax collectors and government. 
Robinson (2003) takes a generic view of the system of accountability in a 
democratic state (i. e. Canada). He identifies the public, provinces and federal 
government as the main actors. The public provides tax money to provinces and 
federal government. The federal government transfers payments to the provinces. 
Thus both provinces and federal government are agents for the public which is 
acting as a principal. The public requires reports of performance and exercises its 
accountability powers through electoral process. Provinces also provide reports 
to the federal government for utilisation of the monetary resources provided by 
the federal government. 
Fig 2.9: A simple model of accountability and performance reporting for Canadian government 
(Robinson, 2003: p 174) 
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Brignall and Modell (2000) draw insights from stakeholder theory and principal 
agent model to analyse organisational level accountability and PMS. They argue 
that the PMS of an organisation is shaped up by the pressures exerted by various 
internal and external stakeholders. They identify funding bodies and purchasers 
of services/products as the external stakeholders while the professional groups 
within the organisation as the internal stakeholders. Since for funding bodies, the 
main concern is how well the resources are utilised therefore they will be 
interested in using financial results and resource utilisation related performance 
measures as the basis of accountability. The purchasers' pressures will emphasise 
quality, resource utilization and competitiveness as dimensions of performance 
while the professional groups will consider quality and innovation as the main 
dimensions of performance. 
Professional groups within 
provider organisation: 
Innovation 
Quality 
Purchasers: 
Quality 
Resource utilization 
Competitiveness 
Fig 2.10: The influence of different stakeholder groups on the performance dimensions 
emphasised in the PMS of the focal organisation (Brignall and Modell, 2000: p 291) 
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Funding bodies: 
Financial results 
Resource utilization 
From the preceding examples it emerges that some authors have tried to theorise 
the relationships between accounting, accountability relationships and 
stakeholders and present the insights with the help of simple models. Given the 
complexity of accountability relationships and PMSs such models do not explain 
the whole phenomenon. They however do highlight some important aspects of 
the accountability relationships. 
Drawing inspiration from such models and using insights from stakeholder 
theory and performance measurement informed accountability literature, a 
simplified accountability model is proposed for the purpose of this PhD. The 
model will help in organising the analysis of the evidence and will be further 
developed as a result of insights drawn from this PhD study. 
It was noted earlier that managers in a public sector organisation work under 
different types of accountability relationships. They have to respond to the 
expectations of different stakeholders through public, managerial and legal 
forms of accountability. The relationship under principal agent model requires 
that if the agent breaches the terms of agency relations the principal must have 
some powers to hold the agent accountable. Elster (1999: 255) provides a three- 
fold classification in this regard. If A is the agent of B, then in case of breach, B 
may dismiss A without punishing him further, punish him while retaining him as 
his agent, or dismiss him with additional punishment. The author terms the actual 
use of this remedial power by the principal as `incapacitation'. However when 
it 
is not actually used but the threat of its use in future remains then it is called 
`deterrence'. It is obvious that the principal, i. e. B, can exercise these two forms 
59 
of powers if he knows well whether the level of performance of A was up to his 
expectations or not? `Performance measurement' can therefore be seen as a 
device which helps the principal use the powers of `incapacitation' or 
`deterrence' in an effective manner. It can therefore be concluded that 
performance measurement operationalises accountability relationships in any 
given organisation. When there are complex accountability relationships, it is 
important to examine the performance measures with a view to knowing as to 
which form of accountability relationship do these measures operationalise? 
These insights will be of primary importance when the PMS of HMCE is 
examined in the later chapters. 
In order to develop a framework for analysing the multiple forms of 
accountability relationships and performance measurement in the public sector a 
simplified model of accountability relationships is proposed in the Fig 2.11 
Citizens 
Government Managerial Public sector 
Accountability organisation 
Fig: 2.11: A framework of multiple accountabilities in public sector management 
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Three main actors (or stakeholders) identified in this triangular relationship are 
Government, Public sector organisations, and Citizens. The arrows show the 
direction of accountability. The framework is built around the fact that a 
government provides services (and goods) to the citizens through public sector 
organisations which are the operational arms of the government. 
Managerial accountability exists between the Government and a public sector 
organisation. It can be argued that through this accountability the central 
government exercises control over the public sector organisations with the help 
of performance measurement. This form of accountability is characterised by a 
formal PMS as the public sector organisation reports its performance against 
policy based quantitative targets on a regular basis. 
The accountability relationship between the Government and Citizens can be 
termed as Political (or Public) as the Government is expected to fulfil the 
desires/demands of citizens who elected the government for that purpose. The 
government is therefore accountable to the citizens for performance on its 
election manifesto and other promises that it made with them. In the city states of 
ancient Greece, the government officials would render accounts of their 
performance directly to the gathering of citizens. But in the modern democracies 
this direct form of accountability is not possible as the citizens are too dispersed 
and heterogeneous to act as an effective principal29. The citizens in modern 
29 Many authors view the efficacy of this public accountability with scepticism. For instance, 
Ferejohn (1999: 132) points out at least three serious limits to accountability within democratic 
institutions. First, the presence of electoral heterogeneity makes it possible for officials to play 
off some voters against others. Second, the officials have opportunities to avoid electoral 
responsibility for particular actions by grouping unpopular with popular actions. 
Third, the 
elected officials enjoy an immense informational advantage over voters 
in the wake of 
complexity of modern government. The author asserts that these three 
imposing impediments 
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democracies, therefore, allow parliamentary committees to do accountability of 
the government on their behalf. The quantitative and textual accounts of 
performance provided by the senior officials of governmental organisations are 
scrutinised by the parliamentary committees. The print and electronic media (e. g. 
T. V channels, newspapers, and journals) also help this accountability process by 
making the performance of the government and its officials more visible. In 
order to provide more credibility to this form of accountability, the parliament 
has deputed a few organisations specialising in the audit skills [e. g. National 
Audit Office (NAO)] to carry out audit of governmental departments. 
Citizens are the recipients of the goods and services provided by the public sector 
organisations. The public sector organisations (like the Government itself) are 
accountable to the Citizens. The accountability relationship is of political and 
legal nature. The senior officials of public sector organisations are called to 
account by parliamentary committees, media and courts to explain their conduct. 
Here the performance measurement takes place through both textual and 
quantitative data as the senior management often uses both forms to highlight its 
achievements and defend against criticism. 
operate together to place a severe limitation on the possibility of a fully accountable democratic 
rule. In an empirical study involving change of governments due to economic performance, 
Cheibub and Przeworski (1999: 225-229) argue that "Rulers are accountable if the probability 
that they survive in office is sensitive to government performance; otherwise they are not 
accountable". The study included all types of rulers like Presidents, Prime Ministers and 
aristocratic despots all over the world. The results of the study are termed as "surprising and 
dismaying" as the authors conclude that the survival of prime ministers is weakly sensitive to the 
growth of unemployment but the survival of presidents appears to be completely independent of 
economic performance. 
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The simplified framework has two important points to highlight. First, the public 
sector managers are under multiple accountability pressures. They have to 
provide performance reports sometimes directly for their own performance and 
sometimes they stand for the government. Second, consequently performance 
measurement of an organisation reflects such accountability demands. Since the 
accountability powers of all stakeholders are not equal (Brignall and Modell, 
2000) the PMS of an organisation will contain mostly measures and indicators 
for that stakeholder which is able to exercise maximum pressure. Traditionally 
the resources provider is the most powerful stakeholder. Therefore if the public 
want to exert pressure upon the organisation, they have to adopt an influence 
strategy (Frooman, 1999). They will have to pressurise the resource provider to 
act on their behalf when placing accountability demands upon the organisation. 
Therefore, by examining the PMS of an organisation for a period of time, it is 
possible to analyse changes in multiple accountability relationships. The 
simplified framework will be used as an analytical tool to analyse the case of 
HMCE and will be further developed with the help of the evidence generated by 
this PhD case study. 
2.5 Conclusion 
A review of the NPM based published literature establishes that enhancement of 
accountability with the help of PMS is one of the central issues. The debate on 
efficacy of multidimensional PMS in the public sector is inconclusive. The 
sceptics use NIS to question the claims made by the advocates of NPM in 
believing accounting to be a force of change. The rationalists on the other hanare 
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more interested in improving our understanding of performance measurement 
and accountability systems with the help of case studies. There is a growing 
emphasis that the institutional theory framework deserves more prominence in 
the accounting research. The need for conducting research in organisations 
having entirely new context is also well documented. No research has so far 
considered the issues specific to the performance measurement and 
accountability system of a tax administration. This PhD therefore fills the 
obvious gap in the literature. The published case studies on accountability 
systems have addressed the issue of enhancement of accountability or the tension 
between various forms of accountability relations. However there is no research 
which addresses the question as to how accounting changes mediate between 
competing accountability relations when two stakeholders demand and give 
accounts to each other on a reciprocal basis. The case of a tax administration 
provides an opportunity to address this gap in the literature. 
The insights gained with the review of the literature in this chapter will be used 
to analyse the evidence relating to HMCE so that the less researched aspects of 
accountability in the public sector are highlighted. 
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Chapter 3 
Research Design and Methodology 
Introduction 
A review of the published literature suggested that improving organisational 
performance with devices of accountability is one of the most important NPM 
inspired concerns. In the general management accounting literature the issue has 
been examined through various case studies (Ahrens and Chapman, 2002). It was 
noticeable in the literature review that the NPM has advocated the private sector 
practice of using performance measurement for enhancing accountability along 
with an increasing emphasis upon linking it more effectively to an organisation's 
overall strategic objectives. It was also noted that many scholars of the field (e. g. 
Collier, 2001; Broadbent, 1999; Broadbent and Guthrie, 1992; Hopwood, 1987, 
83) have made calls for more case studies where the process of implementing 
accounting changes is critically examined. This PhD research aims to provide a 
rich description of such accounting changes in a completely new context, i. e. tax 
administration. In this chapter the methodology adopted by the PhD research 
with regards to gathering of evidence and analysis is explained. 
3.1 Importance of Research Area 
The need for case studies in the area of `alternative research' was argued in the 
previous chapter. This PhD research focuses upon HMCE -a tax administration, 
which being a new contextual research site provides an opportunity for new 
insights into the process of implementation of accounting changes. The interest 
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in the field of tax management is inspired by the fact that tax authorities, despite 
their different context, have been required to adopt the NPM-inspired reforms in 
much the same way as other departments. However despite the importance of 
taxation matters in the overall functioning of business organisations, very little is 
published on tax administration issues in the mainstream journals. An empirical 
analysis of the data on published articles in academic journals was referred to in 
the previous chapter. Interestingly, no paper on performance measurement issues 
in the public sector is related to a tax administration. 
It is this evident gap in the literature that prompted Tomkins et al. (2001) to 
express their concern over the fact that much public debate takes place about the 
calculation and incidence of different taxes but little academic research addresses 
the management problems that are specific to national taxation regimes. 30 The 
authors argue that tax authorities as public management sites are quite distinctive 
because of the interplay of so many different socio-political pressures emanating 
from external stakeholders. 
The relative neglect of the tax authorities as research sites is all the more 
significant because these are also implementation locations of the NPM's 
"customer service" ideal where considerable re-conceptualisation of 
departmental aims and day-to-day services has occurred, arguably more than in 
other sites of NPM implementation (Hoskin et al., 2001). This is in contrast to 
many other public sector research sites like the NHS, local authorities, and the 
police which have received greater attention of researchers who have applied a 
30 Lamb and Lymer (1999) also point out that research on taxation practice as it involves features 
of accounting - measurement, reporting, and analysis of financial performance - is under- 
researched. 
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variety of research methods ranging from extensive qualitative research (e. g. 
Collier, 2001; Broadbent and Laughlin, 1998) to analytical quantitative 
frameworks like data envelopment analysis and fuzzy set theory (e. g. Sun, 2002; 
Rangone, 1997). The call of Tomkins et al. (2001) has, however, failed to alter 
the research scene in a big way as the empirical survey revealed that during the 
last ten years only two articles have appeared in the academic journals which 
discussed managerial issues pertaining to HMCE. In view of the changes during 
last three to five years, the contents of those articles have little relevance now. It 
follows, then, that the absence of research on performance measurement in a 
huge and important public sector organisation like HMCE is potentially a 
significant gap in our understanding of public sector management, in general, 
and accountability through performance measurement, in particular. 
The proposed PhD research, therefore, aims to investigate the ways in which 
PMS works as a tool of enforcing, enhancing or modifying accountability 
relationships in HMCE. The central research question which guides the course of 
PhD research is: 
How are accountability relationships defined and operationalised with the help 
of performance measurement in the case of a tax administration and to what 
degree NPM inspired accounting changes alter such relationships? 
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3.2 Ontological and Epistemological Foundations 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) popularized the oft-quoted framework of four 
juxtaposed paradigms31 within the social theory. 
Society in conflict 
Radical humanist 
Foundational change from the inside out 
Subjectivist reality 
Interpretivist 
Radical structuralist 
Foundational change from the outside in 
Functionalist 
Incremental change from the inside out 
Objectivist reality 
Incremental change from the outside in 
Ordered society (regulation) 
Fig 3.1: Four paradigms of social science research (Burrell and Morgan, 1979: 25) 
The matrix is based on four main debates in sociology: 
0 is reality given or a product of the mind? 
" must one experience something to understand it? 
0 do humans have "free will", or are they determined by their environment? 
31 The authors identify four paradigms represented by the quadrants of the matrix. First, the 
`Functionalist Paradigm' (objective-regulation) has remained the dominant paradigm for 
organisational study. Assuming rational human action it shares a belief that one can understand 
organisational behaviour through hypothesis testing. Second, `Interpretive Paradigm' (subjective- 
regulation) explains the stability of behaviour from the individual's viewpoint. Third, `Radical 
Humanist' Paradigm (subjective-radical change) is mainly concerned with releasing social 
constraints that limit human potential. They see the current dominant ideologies as separating 
people from their "true selves". They use this paradigm to justify desire for revolutionary change. 
And lastly `Radical Structuralist' Paradigm (objective-radical change) sees inherent structural 
conflicts within society that generate constant change through political and economic crises. This 
has been the fundamental paradigm of Marxists. 
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" is understanding best achieved through the scientific method or through 
direct experience? 
The authors encapsulate the aforementioned debates into two fundamental issues 
that form the axes of the two by two matrix: 
" social theories emphasizing regulation and stability as against those 
which advocate radical change 
0 theories built upon subjectivity (individualistic) as against theories based 
on objectivity (structural) 
Referring to the approving silence after the publication of Burrell and Morgan's 
(1979) book on paradigms, Willmott (1993: 691) argues that it escaped critical 
examination, perhaps because it could pass as a textbook rather than as a 
distinctive and highly influential contribution to the development of its field. 
Admitting that the publication reflected and reinforced a growing disaffection 
with the dominant, functionalist orthodoxy, the author calls for breaking the 
dogma because if the claimed division of paradigms is taken seriously, it would 
unnecessarily constrain the process of theory development within polarized sets 
of assumptions about science and society. This PhD researcher follows the 
advice and, therefore, the ontological and epistemological foundations of the 
PhD research are influenced by the insights drawn from Critical Realism and 
Laughlin's (1995) `middle-range' thinking. 
Authors (e. g. Mingers, 2000; Bhaskar, 1998) advocating Critical Realism as the 
basis of social research argue that social structures do not exist independently of 
the activities they govern. Social structures are thought not to be universal but 
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localised in both space and time. On the epistemological side, the possibilities of 
measurement are thought to be limited since intrinsically the phenomena are 
meaningful and meanings can not properly be measured and compared but only 
understood and described. 
Laughlin (1995: 64) states that 1980s generated a wide range of empirical studies 
in accounting from various theoretical and methodological approaches which 
resulted in increased tension in the literature between different proponents of 
various approaches. Referring to Burrell and Morgan's schema of paradigms he 
argues for a simpler classification based in terms of choices ranging from low to 
maximum made on three dimensions of theory, methodology, and change as 
shown in Fig 3.2. Laughlin advocates `middle range' thinking, wherein the 
conceptual models are always "skeletal" requiring empirical "fleshing out". 
According to Laughlin, these empirical insights do not necessarily attempt to test 
a theory but rather aim to amplify and refine it. It is further argued that with 
current levels of understanding, it is impossible to use the models either to 
predict exactly how the organisational arrangements will look in specific 
instances or which pathway will be followed from any actual disturbance. The 
author, therefore, advocates "middle range" (Fig 3.2) as all theories continually 
require amplification and refinement through empirical examples. 
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Them y choice: level 
of prior theorization 
High 
Methodotogi i 
Choice: level c Medium t eo etic l nature 
cri methods 
Low 
Fig 3.2: Choices under Middle Range Thinking (Laughlin, 1995: p 68) 
The PhD research followed this advice of Laughlin by proposing a skeletal 
framework of accountability with the help of stakeholder and institutional 
theories informed principal-agent framework of accountability. The framework is 
then fleshed out by the evidence collected from the research. 
3.3 Research Approach 
The PhD research adopted the case study approach as it desired to study the 
accountability for performance in HMCE in its bounded context. A case study is 
often associated with qualitative research however it maybe based upon 
quantitative techniques as well. According to Denzin and Lincoln (1994: 2), 
qualitative research is multi-method in its focus, involving an interpretive, 
naturalistic approach to its subject matter. They argue that the qualitative 
researchers study things in their natural settings in order to make sense of 
phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them. Merriam (1985: 4) 
characterises qualitative research as an umbrella concept covering several forms 
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Change oho oe: level of emphasis 
given to critique of status quo 
and need for change 
a ghlr di r Mlow) 
of inquiry that help to explain the meaning of social phenomena with as little 
disruption of the natural setting as possible, and in which the focus of the study is 
on interpretation and meaning. Padget (1998) has tabulated the differences 
between qualitative and quantitative forms of research. 32 
Qualitative Quantitative 
Inductive Deductive 
Naturalistic; in vivo Scientific Method 
Decontextuali sing 
Uncontrolled Conditions Controlled Conditions 
Open Systems Closed Systems 
Holistic; Thick Description Particularistic 
Dynamic Reality Stable Reality 
Researcher as Instrument of Data Collection Standardised Data Collection Instruments 
Categories result from Data Analysis Categories Precede Data Analysis 
Table 3.1: Distinctions between Qualitative and Quantitative Research: 
(Source Padget, 1998: p 14) 
3.4 Case Study as a Research Method 
The importance of research methods in production of knowledge can not be over 
emphasised (Pinsonneault and Kraemer, 1993)33. As the name suggests, a case or 
cases are studied in case study form of research. Stake (1995) calls the `case' an 
"integrated system", Smith (1978) uses the term "bounded system", and Miles 
and Huberman (1994) refer to the case as "a phenomenon of some sort occurring 
in a bounded context". Despite the popularity of case study as a research method, 
defining case study is not always so simple. For instance, Lincoln and Guba 
(1985) state: 
32 It is argued that qualitative research is often concerned with a reality that is dynamic and hard 
to be understood fully with mere numerical analysis based on questionnaires. The researcher 
collects data by becoming a part of the environment that is studied. Thus theory is therefore 
induced in the case of qualitative research unlike quantitative research which is based on 
deductive method. 
33 Benbasat and Weber (1996, p. 392) state that "Research methods shape the language we use to 
describe the world, and language shapes how we think about the world". 
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"While the literature is replete with references to case studies and with examples of case 
study reports, there seems to be little agreement about what a case study is. " (p. 360) 
Yin (1984: 23) in his definition of a case study identifies three important 
qualifications as he terms it as an empirical inquiry that: 
(a) investigates a contemporary, phenomenon within its real-life context; when 
(b) the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; 
and in which 
(c) multiple sources of evidence are used. 
Yin (1994: 9) suggests that a choice between case studies and other empirical 
methods might be rationally made against three conditions: 
(a) type of research question being posed; (If the question is of exploratory nature 
which desires to study a phenomenon in detail then case study is the desirable 
choice) 
(b) extent of control a researcher has over actual behavioural events; (If there is 
little control then case study is the favourable choice) 
(c) degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events; (For 
studying contemporary phenomenon in detail case study method is a desirable 
research method) 
3.5 Appraising Case Study as a Research Method 
Yin (1989) compares strengths and alleged shortcomings of case study method. 
The most important advantage of case study research is stated to be its ability to 
provide rich understanding of reality by laying emphasis upon detailed 
contextual analysis. The alleged weaknesses are enlisted as lack of rigour, sloppy 
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investigation and equivocal evidence. It is also alleged that bias is more 
frequently encountered and less frequently overcome in case study method. 
Becker (1991) suggests that researchers may have "feelings" for the subjects and 
that conclusions that are drawn suffer from a lack of reliability. 
Oversimplification or exaggeration of a situation is another possible weakness 
leading the reader to distorted or erroneous conclusions about the actual state of 
affairs (Guba and Lincoln, 1981). Labour-intensiveness of the method also 
makes it less popular with many researchers. Lack of generalization and lack of 
rigour (Yin, 1989; Guba and Lincoln, 1981) are two most important alleged 
shortcomings of case study research method. Therefore both are briefly discussed 
next. 
i. Generalising from Case Studies 
Some authors (e. g. Eisenhardt, 1989) have tried to defend the power of case 
study in theory building. Others like Lincoln and Guba (1985) are less apologetic 
and responding to the issue of generalisability argue that since every human 
organisation is context specific therefore no generalisable laws can ever be 
effectively deduced. 
Stake (1978: 5) describes the generalisability of case studies as `naturalistic', that 
is, context-specific and in harmony with a reader's experience, and thus `a natural 
basis for generalization'. This means that case study findings often resonate 
experientially or phenomenologically with a broad cross section of readers and 
thus facilitate greater understanding of the phenomenon in question. 
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Jensen and Rodgers (2001) argue that a case study desires to question 
generalization to a larger population by focusing on a single entity. Keating 
(1995: 68) refers to the definition of theory by Sutherland (1975) as "an ordered 
set of assertions about a generic behaviour or structure assumed to hold 
throughout a significant range of specific instances". Keating claims that a case 
study can make significant contribution towards theory development. They 
identify three stages of the process of theory development where a case study can 
make such contribution. Those are theory discovery, theory refinement, and 
theory refutation. The authors argue that these three stages provide relatively 
natural categories for classifying case study research and researchers usually 
focus their attention on one of the three stages, although some case studies span 
more than one stage of development (p 84). 
According to Stake (1995), previously unknown relationships and variables can 
emerge from case studies and lead to a rethinking of the phenomenon. He 
contends that the knowledge learned from case study is more concrete and 
contextual, resonating with the reader's experience because it is more vivid and 
sensory than abstract. 
Yin (1989,1993) proposes developing formal explanatory propositions 
(including rival propositions) to be tested via data collection and analysis against 
criteria relevant to their acceptance or rejection. On the other hand Eisenhardt 
(1989) argues that a priori formal propositions can inhibit exploration of the 
cases and development of novel propositions, and supports the development of 
tentative theoretical constructs to inform the study, and an iterative process that 
links data to the emerging theory. 
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In this PhD research both Laughlin (1995) and Eisenhardt (1989)'s advice has 
been followed with regards to use of a priori specification of theoretical 
propositions. While insights were drawn from stakeholder, principal agent and 
institutional theories, the empirical evidence was collected and analysed without 
any stringent attachment to any single theoretical framework. Following Jensen 
and Rodgers (2001), this PhD research selected a single case study because a tax 
administration has contextual features of its own and needs to be studied in its 
entirety. The case study is expected to make its contribution towards theory 
refinement (Keating, 1995), as it will improve our understanding of the process 
of implementing accounting changes and modification of accountability 
relationships. 
ii. Lack of Rigour 
In order to overcome this objection on case study research some authors propose 
the use of combined or multiple methods, e. g. triangulation techniques. Denzin 
(1984) identifies four types of triangulation: 
" data source triangulation, when the researcher looks for the data to remain 
the same in different contexts; 
" investigator triangulation, when several investigators examine the same 
phenomenon; 
" theory triangulation, when investigators with different viewpoints 
interpret the same results; and 
0 methodological triangulation, when one approach is followed by another, 
to increase confidence in the interpretation. 
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By using a combination of observations, interviewing, and document analysis, 
the fieldworker is able to use different data sources to validate and cross-check 
findings (Patton, 1990). In order to ensure rigour this PhD research also paid 
attention to the need of triangulation. The textual data was, therefore, acquired 
from different sources which were entirely independent of each other. The 
interviewees were also selected from two different regions and belonged to 
various levels of seniority in the organisation. In this way data triangulation was 
achieved in terms of Patton (1990)'s definition. Different theoretical frameworks 
(e. g. social exchange theory, NIS, Results and Determinants Framework) were 
applied to the research evidence which therefore resulted in achieving theoretical 
triangulation as well. 
The research question of this PhD study meets the qualifications cited by Yin 
(1989) with regards to a choice between case studies and other empirical 
methods. Since HMCE is a central government department where culture of 
secrecy is well documented (Gillman, 1987: p 8), permission for a questionnaire- 
based survey would have been impossible without compromising the 
researcher's independent and critical analysis. Moreover, accountability is an 
abstract notion, and customer focus related notions are not well developed in the 
case of a tax administration, therefore, in-depth interviews helped in constructing 
reality which would not have been possible with simple survey based research. 
Therefore, the case study method based on qualitative data was the most 
appropriate research method for this PhD research. 
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3.6 Case Study Research and Management Accounting 
In the accounting discipline, the case study method has won widespread support 
after calls were made for more qualitative research in accounting. For instance, 
Otley and Berry (1994) support the use of case study approach in accounting by 
claiming that case study research is a vehicle by which theories can be generated 
and modified in the light of data. They believe that the case study method 
provides a more holistic approach where existing theories are inadequate or 
incomplete, or explain only a subset of the phenomenon of interest. 
With a view to finding guidance from the earlier published research in the 
relevant research fields of accounting, the articles published in various journals 
were reviewed by this PhD researcher and it was found that the methods used 
were quite diverse. The research methods depended both upon the scope of the 
research and the nature of the researched entity. However the use of qualitative 
research methods like semi- structured interviews was found to be a recurrent 
feature. For instance, Malmi (2001) in a study on balanced scorecard usage 
adopted the method of semi-structured interviews, terming it `the most suitable 
method' for that kind of study. Similarly, Kloot and Martin (2000) investigated 
strategic performance management in local government by using a qualitative 
methodology of interviewing councillors, the CEO, executive directors and 
managers of Victorian local government. In an earlier reported research, Kloot 
(1999) also adopted the semi-structured interviews method to examine 
performance measurement practices in 23 of Victoria's 78 local governments. 
The researcher contends that field studies and interviews provide richer data than 
can be gained from survey research, and can explore causal effects. 
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Moon and Fitzgerald (1996) studied the characteristics of the PMS of a courier 
company; TNT. They used semi-structured interviews together with an 
examination of internal documents and non-participatory observation of 
company practices, including company meetings. In somewhat similar research, 
Brigham and Fitzgerald (2001) carried out a detailed, in-depth case study of a 
large UK water company, which provides clean water and sewerage services. 
They used semi-structured interviews and documentary sources in the public 
domain for gathering textual data. Broadbent and Laughlin (1998) conducted 
semi-structured interviews of teachers and head teachers in 24 schools and staff 
of 34 GP practices for an analysis of their coping strategies in the wake of 
performance reporting changes. 
Otley and Berry (1994) review the role of case study methods in management 
accounting research by referring to four published case studies on management 
accounting and organisational control. Despite different methodological stances 
by the researchers in the different studies, there was a striking similarity in the 
methods of data collection adopted. These included documentary evidence 
concerning formal control systems, design and use; semi-structured interviews 
with managers, generally at levels both above and below the level of central 
interest; the observations of meetings wherever possible; and collection of 
information on the external context in which the company operated. 
Many case studies have considered the impact of NPM upon various public 
sector organisations. For instance, Christensen and Yoshimi (2001) use NPM as 
a framework for their analysis of performance reporting regimes of Australia and 
79 
Japan. 34 Modell (2001) studies the NPM inspired performance measurement 
reforms of the public health care sector in Norway from an NIS perspective by 
examining the responses of senior management and staff. Robinson (2003) 
examines the adoption of performance measurement as a tool of accountability 
by the Alberta government to highlight the unintended consequences of the use 
of scientific managerialist techniques in the public sector. Kurunmaki et al. 
(2003) carry out a comparative study of management accounting changes in 
intensive care units in the UK and Finland where they draw upon the institutional 
theory. Collier (2001) describes the introduction of management accounting 
change in the form of local financial management in a police force using an 
ethnographic study. 
In view of the preceding merits of case study research, the PhD research was 
based upon a carefully designed case study of HMCE which is discussed in the 
next section. 
3.7 Research Design 
Emphasis upon good research design for a case study research is well 
documented (e. g. Stake, 1995; Yin, 1989). It is argued by Goetz and Lecompte, 
(1984: 228) that while survey based researchers hope to find data to validate a 
theory; it is often a case with qualitative researchers that they hope to find a 
34 Using Hood (1995)'s articulation of NPM as a set of 7 doctrines, the authors observe that the 
doctrine no 6 of using performance measurement as a managerial tool is of central importance to 
NPM framework. The authors claim that the primacy of accounting in NPM has received 
attention in the literature leading to improved terminology resulting in the phrase `new public 
financial management' (NPFM): 
"development of a performance measurement approach, including techniques such as financial 
and non-financial performance indicators, league tables, citizen's charters and program 
evaluations" (Olson et al. 1998, p 18) 
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theory that might help explain their data by inductive methods. However, no 
research can advance in a complete theoretical vacuum. Yin (1993) advocates a 
more positivist model of case study. His requirements for formulating a case 
study are the capability to deal with a diversity of evidence, the ability to 
articulate research questions and theoretical propositions, and the production of a 
research design. He advises use of triangulation for greater reliability and 
validity. Laughlin (1995) also advocates some skeletal theorising before the start 
of research so that the data analysis contributes to the process of theory 
development. In the formulation of this PhD research design the advice of both 
Laughlin and Yin was followed. The essential ingredients of a good case study 
research as proposed by Yin (1989) are discussed next with regards to this PhD 
research. 
i. Research Questions 
As stated earlier, this PhD research is guided by the following main research 
question: 
How are accountability relationships defined and operationalised with the help 
of performance measurement in the case of a tax administration and to what 
degree NPM inspired accounting changes alter such relationships? 
It was established in an earlier section that there is not a single paper published in 
the academic journals on accountability through performance measurement in the 
case of a tax administration. The non-academic sources such as annual reports of 
the organisation do provide information on organisational activities. But 
limitations of such reports in providing a satisfactory answer are obvious as 
Phillips and Hardy (2002) argue that in a discourse analysis a researcher does not 
simply focus on an individual text but rather refers to bodies of texts because it is 
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the interrelations between texts, changes in texts, new textual forms, and new 
systems of distributing texts that constitute a discourse over time. 
Since accountability in terms of a process can be defined as giving and taking of 
accounts, four elements can be identified in the process of accountability with 
reference to the principal-agent model: 
" The Principal who provides resources and who demands accounts 
" The Agent who controls the resources and provides accounts 
" The Accounts 
" Remedial powers 
(adapted from Sherer and Kent, 1983) 
Applying this identification to the research question the following constituent 
elements become important: 
1. Who is (are) the principal (principals) in the case of a tax administration? 
2. Who is (are) the Agent (agents) in the case of a tax administration? 
3. What is the format of accounts and what are its contents for the purpose 
of performance measurement and reporting? 
4. What are the remedial/control powers available to the principals? 
These questions helped in organising analysis of the evidence regarding official 
attempts at using accounting changes for modifying accountability relationships. 
In addition to the preceding questions, the following set of questions suggested 
by Otley (1999) for defining performance management of an organisation was 
also used for guidance. 
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1. What are the key objectives that are central to the organisation's overall 
future success, and how does it go about evaluating its achievement for 
each of these objectives? 
2. What strategies and plans has the organisation adopted and what are the 
processes and activities that it has decided will be required for it to 
successfully implement these? How does it assess and measure the 
performance of these activities? 
3. What level of performance does the organisation need to achieve in each 
of the areas defined in the above two questions, and how does it go about 
setting appropriate performance targets for them? 
4. What rewards will managers and other employees gain by achieving these 
performance targets or, conversely, what penalties will they suffer by 
failing to achieve them? 
5. What are the information flows feedback and feed-forward loops that are 
necessary to enable the organisation to learn from its experience, and to 
adapt its current behaviour in the light of that experience? 
When performance measurement is used strategically, it is always a part of the 
overall performance management system of an organisation, as can be seen from 
Otley's (1999) framework. While the emphasis of this PhD study is on 
performance measurement of HMCE, it benefited by remaining attentive to 
Otley's framework. The insights drawn from stakeholder theory, private sector 
performance measurement frameworks and institutional theory were also used to 
critically examine the evidence collected by the PhD evidence. 
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iv. Research Design 
A good research design is an essential element of a case study research as 
suggested by Yin (1989). This PhD research was designed after a careful 
consideration of both research requirements and ground realities. Being a PhD 
research project, the monetary constraints were considerable. The research 
concerned a central government department with approximately 22000 
employees in a wide variety of work patterns as explained in Chapter 4. The 
primary data was therefore collected by focusing upon VAT administration of 
the department as it not only represents almost 60% of the total tax collection of 
HMCE but also employs the highest proportion of employees. Face-to-face in- 
depth interviews were held with middle and operational-level employees where 
the discussion centred on the notion of accountability for performance. The 
purpose of interviewing employees at different levels of responsibility was to 
find evidence of the effects of implementing accounting changes. The basic 
premise was that if the changes were successful, the effect would be noticeable in 
the discourse of the personnel of HMCE. Another purpose of these interviews 
was to array the notions of performance measurement in the employees discourse 
against the officially described notions and practices. 
Since the top management of a government department is not normally expected 
to deviate from the official policy guidelines, an innovative use of parliamentary 
committee reports was employed by this PhD research. In these select committee 
hearings the senior managers of government departments are obliged to answer 
all sorts of probing questions. 
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An interview instrument (Annex 3.1) was designed which helped to keep a focus 
upon main research question during the interviewing sessions. The semi- 
structured extensive interviews were tape recorded with the permission of the 
interviewees, however anonymity was guaranteed. Therefore alphanumeric 
symbols have been used instead of their names and rankings. The interviews 
were later transcribed and page numbered. All the letters, emails and documents 
received from the department during the course of research were also numbered 
and titled in the same way (Annex 3.2). 
Miles and Huberman (1994) stress that textual data analysis should follow a 
structured pattern so that reliability of the conclusions drawn is robust. They 
suggest that the data analysis should be done in a structured manner, such as 
`first-level' coding, `pattern' coding and `memoing'. The authors define codes as 
`tags' or `labels' for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential 
information35 compiled during a study. The first-level coding involves reviewing 
the transcripts `to dissect them meaningfully while keeping the relations between 
the parts intact.... ' (ibid: 56). 
This PhD author used underlining and colour highlighting of the interview 
transcripts, archival documents and parliamentary source material to do first 
order coding. 
Miles and Huberman (1994) state that after initial coding, the textual data may be 
35 These can be attached to "chunks" of varying size - words, phrases, sentences, or whole 
paragraphs, connected or unconnected to a specific setting. 
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pulled together into categories. According to the authors, this `pattern coding' is 
a way of grouping those summaries into a smaller number of sets, themes, or 
constructs' (p. 69). They further suggest that the pattern coding be followed by 
`memoing' to help in organising the themes and categories which should lead 
towards more general concepts36. Following Miles and Huberman (1994), this 
PhD author also used `pattern coding' by making categories and sub-categories 
of codes assigned to the textual data. The emerging discourse was then critically 
analysed for obtaining answers to the research questions. 
iii. Diversity of Evidence 
Textual data for the purpose of analysis was acquired from diverse sources. Each 
source on its own would have been insufficient in providing satisfactory answers 
to the research questions however when they are interrelated, it was possible to 
generate a discourse providing more credible answers. The following sources 
formed the basis of analysis: 
1. Primary Sources 
a. Preliminary Interviews with Tax Advisors/Tax Researchers 
Three university academics well known for their research in the field of tax 
administration were interviewed at the very outset of the research in mid 2002. 
36 According to Miles & Huberman, (1994, p. 72) `memoing' refers to the theorising write-up of 
ideas about codes and their relationships as they strike the analyst while coding.... It can be a 
sentence, a paragraph or a few pages ... they tie together 
different pieces of data into a 
recognisable cluster, often show that those data are instances of a general concept.... It is one of 
the most useful and powerful sense-making tools at hand. 
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Two tax practitioners were also interviewed one of whom represented the VAT 
practitioners group in early 2003. Twenty written replies were obtained on 
questions pertaining to perception of HMCE among the tax practitioners in late 
? 004. The purpose of interviewing tax advisors and obtaining written replies was 
to acquire insights into the perceptions held by those who interact most with the 
tax officials. 
b. Conferences 
Two conferences where HMCE made official presentations were also attended 
by the researcher at an early stage of the research in 2002 to gain extra 
opportunity of observation and data gathering. 
c. Interviews with Personnel of HMCE 
Twenty semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with the personnel 
of HMCE in small intervals in 2003. The number of interviews was not extended 
because an analysis of the twenty interviews transcripts revealed considerable 
core evidence. The interviewees represented various levels, places and work 
patterns. Two belonged to senior management level, five to HQs, seven to 
middle level regional management and six to the field/operational level. Five 
others dealing with performance related issues corresponded through posts and 
emails. 
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2. Secondary Sources 
d. Annual and Spring Reports 
The reports contained useful information on departmental activities and results of 
those activities. By employing a longitudinal analysis of the reports during 1997- 
2003, significant insights were gained regarding organisational and accounting 
changes in the organisation. 
e. Departmental Strategy Papers and Other Reports 
High level policy papers of the department provided insights into the strategic 
level thinking of the organisation. Many other special reports also provided 
useful information on areas of importance to the organisation (Annex 3.3). 
f. Policy Papers of Central Government 
The policy papers of the central government helped in understanding the external 
context of the performance measurement of HMCE and related issues (Annex 
3.4). 
g. Tax Administration Policy Papers of OECD 
The policy papers issued by OECD also helped in further understanding of 
external environment, and practices in many other tax authorities. 
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h. Reports/Evidences before Parliamentary Select Committees 
The senior management of HMCE, like all other departments, presents oral and 
written evidence before the parliamentary committees, especially, Treasury 
Select Committee (TSC). Since the managers are interrogated intensely by the 
members of the committee, the data source was important for gaining access to 
the views of the top management of HMCE on important organisational matters. 
3.8 Conclusion 
It was noted in Chapter 2 that rationalist and sceptic writers (termed `alternative 
research' by Broadbent and Guthrie, 1992) consider `context' of an organisation 
very important. Since HMCE was an organisation with a historical tradition of 
veiling itself in a cloak of secrecy, interviews with HMCE personnel and a 
review of its internal and external documents helped in understanding the context 
of this organisation. The primary textual data also helped in investigating the 
effect of accounting changes implemented by HMCE during the period of 
analysis. By analysing the textual data obtained from diverse sources (interviews, 
official publications and documents, parliamentary committees reports) and the 
course of events the aim is to answer the research question. In the next chapter 
the organisation is explained in detail so that the `veil' on HMCE gets raised 
somewhat and its context can be understood for the purpose of analysis of 
evidence in the later chapters. 
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Chapter 4 
Her Majesty's Customs and Excise- an Overview 
Introduction 
In this chapter the department of HMCE (HMCE) is introduced. The historical 
origins of the department are also discussed in detail so that the ethos of the 
organisation can be clearly understood. This understanding will be of primary 
importance when the accountability system and nature of accounting changes are 
analysed in the subsequent chapters. 
4.1 The Department 
The HMCE is a central government department. In the official Annual Report, 
2002 HMCE is described as the department which is responsible for "collecting 
indirect taxes and enforcing Government requirements relating to the movement 
of goods into and out of the UK. ", and whose job is "managing certain major 
risks on behalf of the Government and the public (HMCE, 2001a: p7). This 
deceptively simple portrayal of the department fails to bring forth the 
heterogeneity and complexity associated with the functions performed by the 
department. The official publications of the department are not without 
references to this ironic misperception: 
"Most people know us as the uniformed officers who check your bags at ports and airports, 
or as "The VAT Man" but we do a lot more than this" (HMCE, 2002a). 
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It can be argued that the difficulty in understanding the true profile of the 
department is attributable to two main reasons. First, unlike majority of other 
public sector departments, HMCE has largely remained a closed organisation, 
having kept itself at a distance from the prying eyes of external analysts and 
researchers. 
"The Customs and Excise are one of Britain's longest-established institutions, with their 
activities recorded in Magna Carta ... 
They are also one of the more closed bodies of British 
society, whose inner workings are only rarely exposed to the glare of publicity, if at all" 
(Gillman, 1987: p 8). 
In addition to this self-professed isolationism of the department, the second 
reason is the highly technical and professional nature of the work performed by 
the employees of the department which often acts as an enormous barrier for the 
external analysts and researchers. No wonder one comes across very little 
academic work on the various managerial issues confronted by HMCE. 
The HMCE is primarily concerned with collection of indirect taxes and 
enforcement of anti-smuggling laws, as is evident from the following 
pronouncement which appears on the official website of the department: 
"HMCE exists to collect over a third of central Government revenue from indirect taxes and 
duties, to prevent smuggling and tax fraud, and to collect and analyse trade statistics" 
(HMCE, 2003a) 
It takes pride in introducing itself as the organisation which contributes the major 
chunk of revenue to the central government: 
"We raise nearly half of central Government revenue" (HMCE, 2002a). 
The split of revenue collected is shown in the following fig 4.1: 
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Other duties 
(E4.7) 5% 
Alcohal Duty 
(E6.6) 6° 
Tobacco 
(E7.6)' 
Hydrocarbon ' 
Oil Duty ( £22.6) 
22% 
Other taxes 
(£2.2) 2% 
VAT, (58.6) 
58% 
Note: All figures are net. Total VAT collected was £101.2 bn. Repayments totalled £42.6 bn. 
Fig 4. I: Total revenue collection by HMCE (Source: NAO, 2002: p 1) 
However, the department performs more than mere tax collection function. Thus 
a more comprehensive classification of all the functions of the HMCE drawn 
from the official sources of HMCE (mainly HMCE, 2001 a, b, 2002a, b and 
LSLO, 2000) is as following: 
i. Revenue Collection 
The first category is based upon the traditional role of revenue collection as 
already mentioned. However the emphasis upon facilitation and friendliness as 
opposed to pure enforcement is evident from inclusion of many enabling roles in 
this category. Those include helping people "to get their taxes right first time". 
National Advice Centres and the official website are cited as the prime examples 
of this concern of the Department. Other functions manifesting the same 
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customer (tax payers) care concern are delivering its services electronically and 
helping international trade run smoothly by minimising red tape. 
ii. Law Enforcement 
The second category of functions pertains to crime prevention and law 
enforcement. These include fight against tax fraud and evasion evidenced by 
policies which aim at minimising the shadow economy and drugs trafficking, 
fight against money laundering, excise fraud and child pornography and 
providing protection to wildlife by fighting illegal trade in endangered species. 
The extent of enforcement work is reflected by the fact that the Solicitor's office 
of HMCE is the largest Crown Court prosecutor outside the Crown Prosecution 
Service (LSLO, 2000: 6). 
iii. Advisory Functions 
The third category of duties is advisory in nature. These duties include supply of 
statistical information about international trade that the Government and the 
European Union require for forming economic and taxation policies, and UK 
businesses for making their trading decisions. The Department also provides 
policy advice to ministers in connection with important decisions on taxation, 
revenue and other related policies. HMCE also remains engaged in promoting 
good practice in customs and tax matters around the world by having long- 
standing links with over 60 overseas taxation authorities, providing them advice 
and technical help. 
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In view of lack of proper understanding of the profile of the department and 
dearth of relevant published material, this chapter is devoted to defining a clearer 
profile of the department by linking the modern day HMCE with its historical 
origins. 
4.2 Historical Background 
The revenue historians admit their inability to trace the exact origin of the 
Custom duties, describing them to be levied from "time immemorial" (Atton and 
Holland, 1967: p 1). However, a customs system is deep rooted in the ancient 
history of the United Kingdom, as a reference to "the ancient and rightful 
Customs" is found even in the Magna Carta (ibid: p 4). What all historians are 
unanimous upon is the fact that customs system is one of the most important 
historical legacies of the United Kingdom. Hoon (1968: p 1) observes that the 
English customs system inherited by the modern day HMCE served two 
purposes in the eighteenth century. First, as one of the most important cash 
generators, it brought vast sums into the Treasury. Second, it also enforced trade 
policy upon which protection and encouragement of industry and commerce 
depended. It can therefore be said that the pre-modem customs system, was an 
instrument for putting mercantile policy into effect at the British ports. 
In the next sections the origins of the three mainstream taxes collected and 
enforced by the department have been briefly investigated 
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i. Customs System 
Custom duties are the earliest of the indirect taxes administered by HMCE. In 
early days the term 'customs' applied to customary payments or dues of any kind; 
regal, Episcopal or ecclesiastical; until it became restricted to duties payable to 
the King upon export or import of certain articles of commerce (Carson, 1972, p 
16). In those early times no uniform system existed for the collection of the 
customs revenue. The system was administered privately by the general practice 
of `farming', which meant giving an enterprising merchant or courtier the right 
of collecting the `duties' in return for a specified annual sum (ibid, 1972: p 17), 
while in other cases the revenue was collected by officers appointed by the 
Crown or a local borough (Hoon, 1968: p5). 
The origin of a nation-wide customs system in England can be traced back to the 
Winchester Assize of 1203-4 when it was directed that the 'customary dues at the 
ports', should be accounted directly to the Exchequer, payable to King John 
rather than given to the local lords (Carson, 1972: p 16). Consequently, all sea- 
borne trade, both foreign and coastwise was properly recorded, with a sufficient 
description of the goods, the date of shipment and the name of the merchant 
concerned (Hoon, 1968: p 75). The next major development came in 1506 when 
a "book of rates" was established, which can be seen as the fore-runner of the 
present day Customs tariff (Carson, 1972: p 26). 
By ordinance on 21 January 1643, the regulation of the collection of customs was 
entrusted to a parliamentary committee whose members were appointed 
commissioners and collectors of customs, forming a Board of Customs. This and 
succeeding committees appointed by Parliament until 1660, and thereafter by the 
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Crown, functioned until 1662, when those who had been serving as 
commissioners became themselves lessees of a new farm of customs. This 
continued until 1671, when negotiations for a new farm broke down, and a Board 
of Customs for England and Wales was created by Letter Patent (Hoon, 1968: p 
6-7). 
In 1809, a revenue force was established called the `Preventative Waterguard', 
which brought the inland and offshore Customs officers together under the same 
wing. It was a collective term for the uniformed officers who searched ships and 
other transport as well as travellers' baggage (HMCE, 1983: p 28). 
ii. Excise System 
The Excise Service originated in 1643 with the imposition of the first beer duty. 
Supposed to be only a temporary measure, called `New Impost' , to provide 
funds to continue the then civil war, it however soon became permanent (Carson, 
1967 :p 40; HMCE, 1983: p 7). Charles II took the English Excise out of `farm' 
and placed it under a Board of Commissioners of Excise in 1683 (HMCE, 1983: 
p 5). At first they covered a wide range of commodities, but when the duties 
were extended beyond the districts which parliament controlled to cover the 
whole country, they were confined to alcoholic liquor. Modelled after the Dutch 
Republic, the excise duty was settled by statute despite widespread protest in 
1660. Excise duties spread to other commodities such as salt, paper, soap, 
candles and home produced spirits (NDAD, 2003). 
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iii. VAT System 
The political change that not only transformed the work of Customs and Excise 
officers but also their public perception was the introduction of VAT. 
"On the first day of April 1973 all the lights at the front of the newly built Alexander House 
in Southend were doused. Then at a given signal switches were pulled and three gigantic 
letters blazed forth to lighten the surrounding darkness. The letters were VAT, and they 
proclaimed the introduction of a new tax. That tax was to change the image of HMCE 
(HMCE, 1983: p 65) 
VAT is considered to be a European tax, not only because it originated there, but 
also due to the fact that it is one of the vehicles of harmonisation in the hands of 
economic policy managers with regards to the European Union. In France, a 
VAT had been introduced in April 1954 as part of the general tax reforms of 
1954/55. Around the same time, the 1957 Treaty of Rome established the 
European Economic Community, thus materialising the idea of creating a single 
European market in the post-war Europe. Article 99 of the Treaty deals with 
taxation in particularly calling for harmonization of taxation in the interest of the 
common market, and Article 100 of the treaty authorizes the council of minister 
to issue directives for achieving harmonization (Ernst and Young, 1995: p 8). 
In 1967, the council of minister adopted two directives which resulted in the 
implementation of VAT by all member states. The first directive provided that all 
member states replace existing cumulative sales tax system with a non- 
cumulative VAT system. The second directive introduced the basic concept (e. g., 
definition of taxable person, supply of goods and services etc). Further 
harmonization was however required to provide the European Union with its 
own financial means, as well as to eliminate fiscal frontiers in the future and 
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promote greater freedom of movement of people, goods, services and capital. 
That led to the Sixth Council Directive on VAT, effective as of May 1977, which 
provided for a uniform basis of taxation. The process of harmonization is helped 
by the work of the VAT committee of the EU established under article 29 of the 
sixth directive (ibid: p 9). 
The French VAT of 1954 did not comply with the EEC Council's Directives 
because it applied to the transactions of manufacturers and wholesalers only and 
did not extend to the retail stage and services which were separately taxed. In 
January 1968 France, together with West Germany, introduced a full system of 
VAT complying with the Directives of the Council. A few months before this, in 
July 1967, Denmark, although not a member of the Common Market had 
introduced her own VAT. In January 1969, Sweden also introduced a VAT 
which was virtually at a single rate. Norway also followed suit in January 1970 
by adopting a single rate structure VAT (Sandford et al., 1981). 
VAT's Introduction in UK 
VAT replaced Purchase Tax and Selective Employment Tax (SET)37 on 1 April 
1973. Throughout its existence SET remained a controversial tax and the 
37 Purchase Tax, a war-time levy (1940), applied to a wide range of consumer goods for the home 
market on wholesale stage, and was contributing some 9% of central government revenue from 
taxation. One objection to the multi-rate structure of the tax was the arbitrariness of the 
classification on the basis of being `luxurious' or not; another was that such arbitrary 
discrimination resulted in distortions. Being a wholesale tax, services remained outside its scope 
and so it could not provide uniformity across the board. SET, introduced in 1966, required every 
employer to pay the Ministry of Social Security a weekly sum for each employee in addition to 
the National Insurance contributions, the self-employed were excluded. Employers in 
manufacturing activities subsequently received a refund of payments, plus a premium. A second 
group of industries consisting mainly of agriculture, transport, mining, quarrying and 
fishing 
received a refund but no premium, while construction, distribution and service 
industries, 
received no refund; it was therefore on this latter group that the impact of the tax was primarily 
felt (Sandford et al., 1981: p 6). 
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Conservative Party was pledged to its repeal when it came to office in 1970. The 
first official body to examine the possibility of a VAT in the United Kingdom 
was the Richardson Committee. The Committee which reported before the 
introduction of SET, was asked to consider the replacement of either Purchase 
Tax or profits tax by VAT. Opposing both the changes, the Committee found 
VAT to be intrinsically much more cumbersome as a means of consumer 
taxation. However, Report of the National Economic Development Office 
(NEDO, 1969) and the Green Paper issued by the Conservative government in 
1971, expressed its support for adopting VAT claiming that it would help 
improve the efficiency of resource use in the economy and do away with the 
shortcomings of Purchase Tax and SET. Although Conservative Ministers argued 
the case for VAT on its merits and held that they would have introduced it 
anyway, an essential background factor was Britain's impending membership of 
the EEC, which required the adoption of VAT as the Community's form of 
turnover taxation. Thus in 1972 the Conservative government passed legislation 
to bring VAT into effect from 1 April 1973 in place of Purchase Tax and SET 
(Sandford et al, 1981: p 7). 
iv. Other Taxes 
In addition to administering VAT, custom duties, and excise duties on alcohol, 
oil and cigarettes, HMCE is responsible for other numerous types of indirect 
taxes too (Annex 4.1 sets out details of those taxes, while Fig 4.1 provides a 
break-up of revenue for the major categories of taxes). 
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4.3 The Problem of Definitions 
HMCE is a large central government department employing 23000 workforce on 
average during last five years (See Annex 4.2 for various cadres' levels in the 
department). In order to understand the nature of HMCE as a public sector 
department it is necessary to first mark the distinction between the often 
interchangeably used terms like `public sector', `civil service' and `executive 
agencies' which in turn would enable us correctly understand the place of 
HMCE within the central government hierarchy. 
a. Distinction Between Public and Private Sector 
By the term public we generally mean that part of the economy which is 
concerned with providing basic government services. However defining the 
phrase `the public sector' is problematic as identified by Broadbent and Guthrie 
(1992) as well. The definition of "public sector" varies from one country to 
another and, indeed, varies over time within states. The broad definition of the 
public sector given by Massey (2002) is: 
"anything in which the state has an interest and public money follows, but this would include 
many voluntary (not-for-profit) and private sector organisations which receive public money 
and deliver services on behalf of central and local government". 
The more restrictive meaning of the term `public sector' can however be found 
by making reference to the governmental level accounting practices. For 
instance, Black et al (2002: p 40) outline the official distinction between public 
and private sector for government's balance sheet purposes as: 
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Public sector 
This comprises general government, public non-financial corporations and the Bank of 
England. 
Private sector 
This comprises private non-financial corporations, financial corporations other than the 
Bank of England (and Giro bank when it was publicly owned), households and the NPISH 
(non-profit institutions serving households) sector. 
The definitions of the sectors comprising the public sector as mentioned in the 
above definition have also been elaborated in the publication. For sake of clarity, 
relevant sections have been reproduced in Annex 4.3 
As per official statistics, the public sector in the U. K accounts for approximately 
17% of the total employment on head count basis. Civil service which is a part of 
the public sector accounts for 2% of total UK employment, and 10% of the 
public sector. 
VIA, 111 'I'll E URLW AND NAT. SE(T : K. 
K 31 : 21 
Empioyeejobs -he count basis 
Ci eil Service 2"Y 
Public Corporation or S% 
Local Government 90, 
Rest of Central 
Government 1' 
Private Sector 3 
SOURCE: iiA14DATE, DEPARTMENT LRETURNS AND E O. t. llCTRENDS 
Fig 4.2: Public Sector as % age of total UK workforce (source: Cabinet Office, 2002a: p 4) 
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b. Distinction Between Civil Service and Executive Agencies 
Historically the Civil Service has grown out of the administrative staffs of royal 
households from Anglo-Saxon times onwards, however the organisation that is 
recognised as the modern civil service took shape between 1850s-1920s (Pyper, 
1995: p 5-6). The Civil Service in 1980s had grown into a unitary organisation 
which was characterized by its adherence to certain key percepts like 
permanency, neutrality and ministerial responsibility (ibid: p 12). 38 
The `executive agencies' were introduced by the Thatcher government as a result 
of recommendations made by a report titled "Improving Management in 
Government: The Next Steps" (Ibbs Report, 1988). 39 The report recommended 
that decentralized agencies should deliver executive functions of government 
"within a policy and resources framework set by a department". The report also 
recommended that under new arrangements the Departments should maintain 
their traditional policy support role offered to ministers but would have to 
develop new roles establishing and managing a policy and resources framework 
with agencies. 
The New Labour government did not dispense with the plan as is evident from 
the foreword to the Next Steps report, 1997. 
"I have watched with interest the development of the Next Steps Project since its launch 
ten years ago. The Project represented an attempt to reorganise the way in which the Civil 
Service does business around sound principles of delegated management, and the Labour 
38 The Civil Service comprises all government departments and executive agencies in Great 
Britain and includes the Diplomatic Service (Cabinet Office, 2001a: p 2). 
39 The report produced by a committee comprising Kate Jenkins, Karen Caines, Andrew 
Jackson, 
on behalf of Efficiency Unit of the Prime Minister's Office had concluded that the existing civil 
service, due to its unitary and centralized structure, was geared towards prioritizing 
its policy 
responsibilities towards ministers at the cost of service delivery to the intended users. 
The report 
thus had proposed a split between policy formulation and service delivery. 
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Party was therefore happy to support it in Opposition as well as now in Government" 
(Next Steps Report, 1997). 
Therefore it can be seen that executive agencies are part of the Civil Service. But 
they have delegated authority to employ their own staff and organise service 
provision in ways best suited to meet customer needs. They have to work under 
the terms of individual framework documents and subject to overall budgets 
agreed with their parent department and/or the Treasury. Agencies are headed by 
chief executives who are personally responsible for day-to-day operations. They 
are normally directly accountable to the responsible minister, who in turn is 
accountable to Parliament. Almost 76 per cent of civil servants now work in Next 
Steps agencies (Cabinet Office, 2001 a: p 4). 
As on 1 April 2001 there were 93 executive agencies in the Home Civil Service, 
while four departments operate on Next Steps lines. HMCE is one of them, while 
the remaining three are Crown Prosecution Service, Inland Revenue and Serious 
Fraud Office (ibid). 
The difference and similarities between a department and executive agencies 
have been made clear in this section. The understanding helps in stating now that 
HMCE is a Department of State which works on agency lines. The department 
started to work on Next Steps lines on 1 April 1991. 
c. Relationship with HM Treasury 
HM Treasury is responsible for formulating and putting into effect the UK 
Government's financial and economy policy. The Treasury has a strategic 
oversight of banking, insurance and financial services and is responsible for the 
Government Accountancy Service which brings professional accountants in 
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government together. The Treasury is also the lead department on government 
statistics, which are independently produced by National Statistics. In addition to 
these functions, the Treasury is also entrusted with promoting a fair and efficient 
tax and benefit system. Direct taxes are collected by the Inland Revenue, while 
the indirect taxes, as already mentioned, fall within the responsibilities of HMCE 
(HM Treasury, 2003a). 
The Treasury is headed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer who has overall 
responsibility for the work of the Treasury. He is assisted in his managerial work 
by Chief Secretary to the Treasury, Paymaster General, Financial Secretary and 
Economic Secretary. The Paymaster General looks after strategic oversight of 
taxation as a whole, including overall responsibility for the Finance Bill, closer 
working between Inland Revenue and HMCE (including with other 
departments), and European and international tax issues. He is also the 
Departmental Minister for Inland Revenue and the Valuation Office. 
The Economic Secretary is the Departmental Minister for HMCE. The Treasury 
in its annual report sets out the performance of seven Departments which report 
to the Chancellor or his ministerial colleagues. However HMCE and the Inland 
Revenue, being larger departments produce separate reports (ibid). 
4.4. Organisational Structure 
i. Medieval Days 
In 1275 Edward I imposed what was referred at the time `new custom'. The 
`farm' for these levies was allocated to the merchants of Lucca (Carson, 1972: p 
17). The `farmers' would appoint their own officials in the port who were known 
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as 'collectors'. The three principal Crown officers in the medieval days were the 
customer, controller, and searcher, who were originally appointed by the King or 
by the Chancellor, Treasurer, King's Chamberlain, Barons of the Exchequer, and 
others, and their term of office was during pleasure only (Hoon, 1968: p 5). The 
king's officials acted as a check upon the account of goods. 40 `Customers' were 
set up in 1297 who were required to receive monies transmitted to them by the 
collectors and to make payments as directed by the Exchequer. The office of 
`searcher' was established two year afterwards with duties of assisting bailiffs in 
arresting persons, examination of export goods and preparation of accounts (ibid: 
p 18). 
Hoon (1968) highlights the administrative muddle in which the customs system 
had descended before the start of 18th century. With the end of the practice of 
farming in 1671, the `collector', originally the servant of the `farmer', became a 
Crown officer. The office of collector was thus gradually introduced and 
extended over the whole department, and to the collector was also given 
complete responsibility for the collection of duties in a port and for the return of 
money and accounts into the customs office. With the controller, he had the 
general superintendence of the port as well. The customer, who then no longer 
had charge of the collection of duties, remained, it appears, mainly for the 
purpose of returning into the Exchequer the accounts required of him and of 
directing the coast business in which the farmers had no concern. The controller 
continued to act as a check on the collector. The activities of the searcher became 
confined entirely to the export business (Hoon, 1968: p 7) 
ao The account used as a check on the collector's account was made on a counter roll, thus the 
officials began to be called `comptrollers' or `controllers' (Carson, 1972: p 
17). 
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ii. Modern Day HMCE 
In the official publications HMCE is presented as a single department 
administering indirect taxes. The senior management structure as outlined in 
such publications also fails to underscore the heterogeneity and complexity in the 
work of the department. From the review of historical background of the 
department it must be clear that the existing department is made up of three 
different work regimes which were distinct departments in the past. A 
memorandum submitted to the Select Committee on Treasury also refers to this 
concealed reality: 
"The first thing that the Committee must recognise is that there are three Customs & Excise 
Departments administering three different taxes (hereafter referred to as Customs, Excise 
and VAT). There are vast differences between the administration, collection, enforcement 
procedures, compliance and legal statutes affecting each Department. This makes it very 
difficult for the Departments of HM Customs & Excise to work under one umbrella and 
closer co-operation and a more integrated approach to trade and the public are issues that are 
constantly under examination" (TSC, 2000a) 
A senior level manager also points to this fragmented profile of the department. 
"we are a strange outfit, as much Customs and Excise is strange as it doesn't have a single 
HQs like many organisations do; there are offices like the one in London where the Board 
sits, the VAT operations in Liverpool, and in Manchester which is our Excise operations 
hub, and Southend which is where International trade and Customs have their hub" (SO1) 
"the approach is mirrored, if you like, in all functions, so there is an Excise performance 
team in Manchester; of VAT in Liverpool and also of Customs and International trade, a 
similar one" (ibid) 
It is therefore helpful to remember that the department essentially comprises 
three distinct work patterns, i. e. customs, excise and VAT even in its regular 
revenue collection role. On the law enforcement side two major categories can 
be 
identified. First, crime prevention related activities like anti-drugs, anti-money 
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laundering etc and second, anti- evasion of legitimate revenue related activities 
e. g. preventing Missing Traders Fraud or smuggling of dutiable items. 
HMCE was reorganised in 2001 along functional lines. But before the existing 
structure is explained, first the structure before those reforms is discussed. 
a. Before Re-organisation of 2001 
Operational work for the purpose of local control and collection of Customs and 
Excise was carried out by several geographical regions, known as Collections 
(Executive Units). In 1970 there were 30 such regions but these were gradually 
reduced, and in 1995 a major reorganisation of HMCE resulted in the number of 
regions reduced to 14 geographical regions in the United Kingdom. 
41 A 
Collection was divided into a number of districts, depending on the concentration 
of customs and excise work. Four Headquarter sites dealt with policy and some 
centralised operations. Each Collection was under the control of a Collector who 
was the Board's personal representative in that Collection. 
42 The Waterguard, 
administered separately before 1971, enforcing revenue control on the flow of 
ships and aircraft, and their passengers and crews, in and out of the UK, was also 
amalgamated with the Collections (NDAD, 2003; Simpson and French, 1998). 
41 The Collections consisted of Northern Ireland, Scotland, Northern England, 
North West 
England, Eastern England, Wales, the West & the Borders, Central England, Anglia, Thames 
Valley, London Airports, London Central, South London & Thames, Southern England and 
South East England. 
42 The Collector was supported by a team consisting of a Deputy Collector and 
Assistant 
Collectors, each of whom headed an operational division dealing with a specific geographical and 
/or functional area. 
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b. Structure in 2003 
On 17 January 2001 the new Chairman of the department, Richard Broadbent, 
announced significant changes in the organisation and senior management of 
HMCE, to be fully implemented from 1 April 2001. The intended purpose of 
those changes was to reflect the changes in the approach to management, HR and 
resource allocation. It was claimed that the reforms intended to create greater 
clarity and focus around how the department performs its core activities, simpler 
and more empowered management structures and a clearer relationship between 
its support activities and the front line (HMCE, 2001 a). 
The department was reorganised into two main operational arms, Business 
Services and Taxes and Law Enforcement, which are served by Support 
functions- Finance, Legal, Logistics and Human Resources (HR). The two main 
operational arms have separate regional management arrangements, detailed 
below. 
i. Business Services and Taxes (BST) 
Business Services and Taxes manage dealings with legitimate businesses, being 
responsible for the administration, collection and policy of all business taxes, 
international movements and trade services. It has approximately 13,000 staff. 
Most services though continued to be delivered regionally, but some (such as 
services to large traders) were, for the first time, managed centrally. 
BST is further made up of four units 
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Policy Group consists of two Directorates - Customs and Tax Practice and 
Policy Development. The Group is managed as a single entity. Both the Joint 
VAT Consultative Committee and Joint Customs Consultative Committee fall 
within this Group. 
Tax and Customs Practice maintains policy by framing rules; designing technical 
legislation and defending it against avoidance and litigation; providing clear and 
timely guidance to operational staff; and developing professionalism through 
technical training and standards. It contains most of the former VAT Policy 
Divisions and new Divisions made up from the former Excise Policy Group and 
from Trade Policy. 
The Tax and Customs Practice management team looks after International Trade, 
VAT Commercial, VAT Supply, Professional Standards Service Standards, 
Environmental Taxes Regime, Alcohol, Tobacco & Gambling Regimes, 
Compliance Framework 
Policy Development is responsible for the development of policy for Business 
services and taxes. It works closely with Ministers, Government Departments, 
and others, including the business community, and in the international arena, 
including the EU. It consists of a new Tax Strategy Division, International 
Division, two new Policy Divisions created from the former Excise Policy Group, 
and VAT Social. 
The new Customs and International Trade Division brought into Policy Group 
some work from the former Enforcement Directorate on restricted goods, and 
from Delivery on customs procedures. And some cross-cutting tax work (for 
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example, on penalty regimes) got concentrated in the new Compliance 
Framework Division in Liverpool, which spans excise, VAT and customs, and 
supports the two operational Directorates in BS&T: Large Business Group and 
Regional Business Services. 
Large Business Group is managed from the centre, and is responsible for the 
collection and control of UK taxes and duties from the largest businesses in the 
UK. It is also responsible for Closer Working with the Inland Revenue. The 
Group consists of five large business regions, computer audit, and a Large 
Business National Office. 
Regional Business Services is responsible for all aspects of those business 
services which are delivered regionally (i. e. those other than for large 
businesses), including operational policy, resourcing, guidance and delivery. 
RBS includes all VAT and excise assurance staff (except those in Large Business 
Units); VAT sift teams, including risk managers; cash and shadow economy 
teams; entry processing units; operational policy; guidance; risk analysis; 
credibility and resourcing formerly in Delivery Directorate; credibility formerly 
in Logistics; contact centres; business education and liaison. 
There is also a Business Design directorate, which is responsible for systems, 
controls and managing major changes in business structure and organisation. 
Business Design consists of three teams, responsible respectively for large 
business change projects (e. g. Debt Management and Registration / 
Deregistration); working with the rest of BS&T and with Logistics Directorate to 
develop the strategy for the implementation of the new systems for an e-business 
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environment; and supporting the management team to ensure a smooth transition 
from the current systems to the new environment. 
ii. Law Enforcement 
The other operational arm of the department, Law Enforcement contains all 
investigation, intelligence and detection activities (both national and regional), 
along with their supporting business operations and policy functions. Its focus is 
on fraud or other breaches, where any business activity that exists is incidental to 
the main (unlawful) purpose of the activity. It has approximately 8,000 staff. 
Law Enforcement consists of five units: 
Investigation, comprising all investigation resources, both national and regional, 
including investigation staff previously in Collections (such as LFUs) and Task 
Completion Units. Intelligence, comprising all intelligence resources that were 
formerly in Collections and in Central Intelligence. 43 Detection, consists of anti- 
smuggling staff, Excise Verification Officers, red point staff, freight examination 
staff and Road Fuel Testing Units. The Regional Detection management team 
consists of heads of regional offices. Policy, which identifies law enforcement 
priorities for strategic analysis and research, and develops strategies for the 
delivery of anti-fraud outcomes and targets, working closely with the key 
external policy agencies. 
43 The Intelligence management team, consists of Head of Regional Intelligence, Head of 
Operations & International Intelligence, Head of Intelligence South, Head of Intelligence North, 
and Head of Intelligence Central 
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Business Design, which is responsible for systems, controls, the definition of 
business requirements from support and management of business change 
processes. It consists of a single unit, based in London. 
iii. Support Functions 
The two operational arms of the department are served by four central support 
functions: 
Logistics comprise all technology staff, both national and regional; e-business, 
corporate services; information management; banking; projects; estates and 
purchasing. Finance & Strategy comprises finance and planning; accounting; 
analysis; communications; internal audit; internal investigations; governance and 
structure; business design; and a new command covering cross-cutting legal and 
parliamentary issues. Human Resources (HR) covers personnel management; pay 
and industrial relations; training and development; personnel advice and services. 
It also took over management of the former HQ personnel management units and 
training & development units. 
The composition of, and management arrangements for legal services (The 
Solicitor's Office) remained unchanged (see Annex 4.4 for a diagram of 
organisational structure). 
[Sources : HMCE intranet, Minutes of JVCC, 2001, HMCE, 2001, a, b, c] 
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4.5 The Board and Senior Management 
i. Evolution of the Board of HMCE 
From very early times and more particularly from the reign of Henry VI, the 
customs establishment had been under the governance of the Lord High 
Treasurer but during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, at such times as 
the Treasury was put into commission and after 1714, when the Treasury was 
permanently in commission, the Lords of the Treasury took over the control of 
the organisation. The Treasury formed a connecting link between the Customs 
Board and Parliament, the Council, and other departments of state. By the patent 
which created the Board of Customs, the Commissioners were directed to follow 
the directives given by the Lords of the Treasury or the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer when the Treasury was not in commission (Hoon, 1968: p 46-50) 
The Board of Customs Commissioners which was instituted by patent in 1671 
consisted of six Commissioners though the number was increased to seven two 
years later and varied between five and nine during the first hundred years of the 
history of the commission. An important development of the eighteenth century 
was the gradual, almost imperceptible, evolution of the Board of Commissioners 
as the fountain of all authority within the department (ibid: p 56-60) 
The number of Commissioners who attended the Treasury varied. The 
chairmanship of the Board was determined in 1705 by the Commissioners 
agreeing to act in rotation, an arrangement that apparently was continued until 
1788 when two warrant chairmen were appointed to preside at all meetings of the 
Board, to be relieved only Mondays in the winter and Saturdays and Mondays in 
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the summer by other Board members in rotation. This would appear to have been 
the first step towards the establishment of the permanent chairman of modem 
times (ibid: p 73) 
Cooperation between the Customs and Excise Boards was a necessity. There 
were several foreign commodities, notably tea, coffee and brandy which were 
subject to excise duties as well as customs duties, and the officers of both 
departments were employed in their collection. It was upon the cooperation 
between the practical officers of both services that the relationship of the Excise 
and Customs Boards depended. However despite the best efforts of the 
Commissioners of both departments wrangling between the two departments 
over seizure powers continued without end. The Custom Board's direction to one 
collector "to enjoyn & recommend it to all the officers of your Port to behave 
decently and to live in unity and harmony with the Officers of Excise" betrays 
well the situation which then prevailed (ibid: p 86-88) 
In 1833 a Royal Commission on Excise was appointed by Letters Patent to 
inquire into the establishment of the Board of Excise, and into the management 
of a collection of excise revenue in all branches throughout the UK. Its twentieth 
and final report was issued in July 1836. In 1849, the Board of Excise combined 
with the Board of Stamps and Taxes to become the Board of Inland Revenue 
(NDAD, 2003). 
In 1908, the management of duties of excise and of the relevant powers and 
duties of the Commissioners of Inland Revenue were transferred to the 
Commissioners of Customs. The Commissioners of Customs were thenceforth 
called The Commissioners of Customs and Excise. The Customs and Excise 
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Services were amalgamated as an order in Council from 1 April 1909, and were 
administered by the Board of Customs and Excise and became known as Her 
Majesty's Customs and Excise (NDAD, 2003) 
The Chairman of the Board of Commissioners is the head of the Department. The 
1979 Customs and Excise Management Act (CEMA, 1979) consolidated the 
collection and management of revenue of customs and excise. The Act neither 
mentions nor specifies any statutory functions to the Board. The day to day 
management of the Department is the statutory responsibility of the 
Commissioners along with other statutory functions. 
The Chairman, Director General (Law Enforcement), Director Intelligence (Law 
Enforcement), Director General (Business Services & Taxes), Director (LBG), 
Director (RBS), Director (Logistics & Finance), Director (Information & e- 
Services) and The Solicitor as the executive Directors, and five non-executive 
Directors together comprise the Board. Assisted by three sub-committees 44 , the 
Board meets once a quarter to review the strategic issues facing the Department 
and to provide advice and guidance. 
as In a simplified structure put in place in April 2000, these sub-committees replaced a large 
number of formal and ad hoc committees. 
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Chairman 
Executive Directors 
Law Enforcement Support Functions Business Services & 
Taxes 
1. Director General 
2. Director Intelligence 
3. The Solicitor 
4. Director (Logistics & Finance) 
5. Director (Information & e- 
Services) 
6. Director General 
7. Director LBG 
8. Director RBS 
Ms, 
5 Non-executive Directors 
Fig 4.3: Composition of the existing Board of HMCE (HMCE, 2002d: p 12) 
BOARD 
Chairman 
Audit Committee Management Committee Appointment Committee 
i 
Director Director, Director, law Director, Regional 
Director Director 
General LBG Enforcement Business Services 
Logistics Finance 
& Strategy 
Fig 4.4: Board level existing committee structure of HMCE (NAO, 2002c: p R9) 
The Chairman of the Board of Customs and Excise corresponds in rank to that of 
Permanent Secretary, and the Deputy Chairman to that of Deputy Secretary. The 
Commissioners, whose rank corresponds to Under Secretaries, and form the 
Board of Customs and Excise, have a corporate responsibility, but are each 
responsible for an assigned segment of work. They are all directly responsible to 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer (NDAD, 2003). 
As a part of restructuring all regional Committees were abolished and instead a 
single Regional Management Committee comprising the heads of the 13 regions 
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plus the Chief Investigation Officer of National Investigation was set up which is 
responsible to the Management Committee. The stated objectives of the Regional 
Management Committee are to improve communication and co-ordination 
between the centre and regional management and to act as a single channel for 
initiatives from the centre to the regions. The Solicitor is responsible and 
answerable to the Chairman and to the Board. He is not a member of the 
Management Committee, but attends its meetings when legal questions or issues 
which concern his Office arise. The reorganisation included setting up a single 
national unit responsible for all the indirect tax and customs affairs of the UK's 
largest businesses numbering around 1,000 and accounting for over half the total 
revenue collected by the Department. The regional formations were to deal with 
businesses other than those included in the large businesses unit (TSC, 2002a). 
4.6 Conclusion 
The analysis of historical origins of the indirect taxes and the organisations 
which administered them establishes that complexity of functions is a historical 
legacy of HMCE. Moreover, the law enforcement origins of HMCE explain the 
present day ethos of the organisation as the organisation is generally perceived as 
a law enforcement organisation. In the NPM inspired literature, `customer-focus' 
is the focal notion where customer is the recipient of services. But, interestingly, 
in the case of HMCE, `customer' used to be a tax official in the medieval days. 
The `customer-focus' in its modem sense is not a well developed policy concern 
in HMCE. How this ethos was desired to be changed by NPM inspired 
accounting changes is the central theme of next chapters. 
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Chapter 5 
Accountability for Performance in a tax administration 
Introduction 
In this chapter a general framework of classifying accountabilities and PMSs of 
tax authorities is drawn. This is done with the help of referring to performance 
measures used by various tax authorities for reporting their organisational 
performance. The PMS of HMCE before 1997 is then analysed and its 
positioning on the proposed continuum is identified. This positioning is 
important as the accounting changes discussed in the subsequent chapters aim at 
moving the PMS from one type to another. 
5.1 Performance Measurement in a Tax Administration 
It was noted in Chapter 2 that `performance' is a notion which can be interpreted 
differently by different stakeholders of an organisation (Otley, 1999). So before 
performance is measured it is important to ascertain how it is conceptualised by 
the management of the organisation. If performance measures are viewed as the 
`constructs' of the notion of performance, these can be used to answer how 
performance is visualised by the management. It is therefore important to gain 
some understanding of different ways in which performance can be 
conceptualised in the case of tax authorities before the specific case of HMCE is 
analysed. For that purpose three examples of how performance is officially 
reported by different tax authorities in the world are briefly reviewed 
here. The 
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review is then used in proposing a categorisation of PMS used by tax authorities. 
But before a categorisation is proposed it is important to define a few key ideas 
and terms related to the analysis. 
The 3Es (economy, efficiency; and effectiveness) model is the most talked about 
framework of public sector management. The model is based upon a simple 
input, process (or actil'ity) and output model of organisations (Boland and 
Fowler, 2000; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000; Flynn, 1997; Rouse, 1999; Carter et 
al., 1995). Input resources are identified by Boland and Fowler (2000: p 419) as 
physical, human (staff and clients/cases) and financial where financial inputs are 
argued to be the most important as acquisition of other resource types usually 
depends upon the funds available. The authors argue that measures commonly 
used in public sector organisations are based on derivatives of this `economy' or 
input oriented perspective, which are usually expressed in terms of cost, budget 
and staffing totals. It is also argued that any change in these performance 
measures (e. g. cost per case, cost per service type, numbers and categories of 
staff involved) simply reflects the `economy' with which the organisation is 
using its resources but provides little information about the operational processes 
within the organisation, apart from some crude benchmarking. Outputs of 
organisations can also be easily measured in quantifiable terms and the authors 
give examples such as `patients treated', `crimes solved', `students gaining 
various qualifications at different grades', `children placed in 
foster care'. The 
ratio of input to output is defined by the authors as a measure of organisational 
efficiency where an increase in the number of outputs, for a given 
input, simply 
demonstrates how efficiently an organisation is converting its inputs into outputs. 
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Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000: p 12) define `process' as the activities which take 
place inside the organisation in order to generate outputs. 
Boland and Fowler (2000: p 420) contend that public sector organisations are 
created to meet some perceived societal need. 'Outcome' 45 is defined by the 
authors as the impact that outputs have in meeting the perceived societal need, 
while `effectiveness' is defined as the extent to which outputs meet such needs 
and requirements 46 . Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000: p 12) state that outputs interact 
with the environment to produce `outcomes' and distinguish between 
`intermediate outcomes' and `final outcomes'. The former are termed `results' 
while the latter are termed `impact'. The authors present the 3Es model as 
input/output model reproduced as Fig 5.1 
45 The authors identify three main reasons for making measurement of `outcome' 
difficult. First, 
`outcome' is generally thought of in qualitative terms. Second, the process is also 
frequently 
complicated by the length of time it takes for such impacts to be identified. Finally, the 
impact of 
outcomes arising from the actions of other agencies, working in related policy areas, adds 
further 
complexity, e. g. welfare services and health. 
46 The authors argue that it is much more difficult to assess effectiveness, 
let alone measure it and 
that it is debatable whether simply increasing the number of, and measurement of, outputs, will 
automatically result in the meeting of such needs? 
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Final 
outcome 
(Impact) 
Needs Socio-economic 
problem 
-L- 
F 
Intermediate 
outcome 
(Results) 
Organisation or Programme 
Relevance 
Objectives 1 --- l Inputs 100 Activities Outputs 
Efficiency 
Effectiveness 
Utility and Sustainability 
Fig 5.1: Input/Output Model (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000: p 12) 
The key terms like inputs, outputs, process, outcomes and effectiveness with 
regards to public sector organisations have been defined. Now a generic 
classification of PMS of tax authorities is proposed with the help of a brief 
review. The review begins with the performance reporting of the organisation 
where this PhD researcher has worked i. e. the Central Board of Revenue (CBR), 
the tax administration of Pakistan. 47 The organisational performance in CBR is 
reported solely in terms of meeting revenue collection targets and cases of anti- 
47 The PhD author has himself seen and experienced the importance of this traditional form of 
performance reporting. In fact many chairpersons of the tax department of Pakistan lost their jobs 
prematurely because the revenue figures were not met. 
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evasion48. The nature of performance reporting can be judged from the following 
lines appearing in one quarterly report 
"CBR has achieved the revenue target of the first nine months of the fiscal year 2002-03. The 
July-March net collection stands at Rs. 310.3 billion against the target of Rs. 310.1 billion. 
The task of achieving the revenue target for the first three quarters of current financial year 
has been accomplished in a forthright and straightforward manner" (CBR, 2004: p 4). 
The media coverage given by the department on its performance is also in terms 
of revenue collection. For instance "Rs 62.4 billion taxes collected in two 
months" is the headline of a report published in the widely read national daily 
The Dawn and the financial daily The Business Recorder, on 1-9-2004. Similar 
reports keep on appearing in the national press on monthly basis. 
This type of PMS can be termed as the `traditional' form as `performance' is 
reported with the help of revenue collection figures, which are the direct and 
immediate outputs of the activities of a tax administration. This can be compared 
to sales and profit figures which have been traditionally used by the private 
businesses to measure and report their performance. 
In Chapter 2, performance was defined by Brumbach (1988) in terms of results 
and behaviour. Good results can be achieved with either good or bad behaviour. 
If good results are caused by good behaviour `performance' is termed a positive 
success, while performance is termed a negative success when the same results 
are achieved with a negative behaviour. Tax authorities also learn that good 
revenue collection figures can be achieved with either good or bad behaviour. 
While negative success may be good in the short term, it can lead to lack of trust 
and good relations between the tax collectors and tax payers which is detrimental 
48 The department publishes quarterly and annual reports of performance, which can also be 
accessed at its official website tvK, w. cbr. gov. pk 
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for revenue collection figures in the long run. Arguably, when a tax 
administration considers `positive success' more important than mere good 
revenue figures, it adds performance measures/PIs in the formal performance 
reporting system relating to behavioural aspects. However, the traditional output 
measure of `revenue collection' remains the most important measure of 
organisational performance. Examples of these additional measures are Citizen 
Charter standards 49 like Number of calls returned within 3 working hours, 
Number of full replies within 10 working days, Number of appointments kept 
within 10 minutes of the agreed time. HMCE's performance reporting before 
1998 is a good example of this form of performance reporting which will be 
discussed more in the next section. 
The case of Swedish Tax Authority leads us to identify another form of PMS in 
tax administration (OECD, 2001: p 6). As the tax authorities are exposed to 
greater strategic management approach, they start thinking in terms of strategic 
goals of the organisations. They also define the `outcomes' which a tax 
organisation aims to achieve. In terms of 3E model, there is greater recognition 
of, and emphasis upon the third `E' i. e. effectiveness. The important change is 
that revenue collection figures are not reported as the measure of performance. 
Instead PIs which reflect performance with regards to `outcomes' are used for 
performance reporting. It is possible that revenue collection or its derivatives 
may remain one of the outcomes. But what is important is that performance 
becomes a multi-dimensional notion where revenue collection is one of the 
dimensions of performance. For a long time, the performance of the tax 
administration was reported in the form of an Annual Report which remained 
49 For a complete list of Charter Standards of HMCE see Annex 5.1 
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focused on a few performance indicators. In 1994, upon the government's 
directive, the National Tax Board redefined its performance. The Board termed 
the new PMS as Performance Measurement Model (PMM) which was built 
around the input-activity-output-outcome sequence discussed earlier in this 
section. Three basic performance criteria were defined in the new PMS: 
productivity, quality and effectiveness. The first outcome of total productivity is 
defined as output over input. Output is defined as a weighed total of tax returns, 
field audits and corrections due to desk audits, while inputs are defined as cost 
and work hours. The second outcome of quality has two definitions; quality 
according to legal and professional standards and quality according to taxpayer 
perceptions. The former is assessed by frequency of certain errors, timeliness, 
standard of quality assurance systems etc, while the latter is measured using 
taxpayer surveys. The third outcome of Effectiveness has been defined as the tax 
administration's impact on the tax gap. The tax gap50 was then divided into 
collection losses (taxes billed but not collected) and assessment error (theoretical 
tax minus the total tax bill). 
The three examples of different types of PMS in tax authorities show that 
performance reporting in the context of tax authorities can be seen as ranging 
from pure traditional form (i. e. revenue collection) to multidimensional outcomes 
reflecting some semblance of Results and Determinants of Fitzgerald et al. 
50 The Tax Gap is the difference between the amount of tax that is due on a given volume of 
economic activity if taxpayers comply with both the letter and the spirit of the law and the 
amount of tax we actually collect from that economic activity both routinely through the 
operation of the normal tax collection processes and subsequently through various kinds of 
recovery activities - pursuing inquiries, chasing up unpaid tax etc (HMRC, 
2005). 
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(1991) or Balanced Scorecard (BSC) of Kaplan and Norton (1992). 51 It is 
important to remember that terms like `results', `outcomes', `effectiveness' and 
`quality' do not have standardised meanings and one tax administration can use 
these terms entirely differently from the way another tax administration defines 
them. However, informed by the examples of different types of PMS included in 
this section, a generic classification of PMS can be proposed in the form of the 
following figure. 
ABC 
Traditional Behaviour Outcomes 
Fig 5.2: A classification of PMSs of tax organisations 
At one extreme (point A) are the tax authorities that measure only revenue 
collection figures (and cases of anti-evasion) for reporting organisational 
performance. Such a PMS can be termed as `Traditional' because revenue 
collection has remained the traditional definition of organisational performance. 
In terms of accountability relationships, it can be argued that such organisations 
consider the resources provider (i. e. government) as the only dominant 
stakeholder. Since no data is made available to the taxpayers which can help 
them assess the organisational performance from their perspective, their ability to 
exercise accountability powers are seriously curtailed. Of course, the taxpayers 
can use other channels of influence, e. g. print and electronic media, and pressure 
groups. But the fact remains that PMS itself does not act as a tool of 
51 This theme will be further picked up in later chapters. 
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accountability for the taxpayers in such a type of tax administration. In this form, 
the tax authorities view performance as a one-dimensional notion. If tax 
collection figures are up, and/or revenue targets met, then performance is viewed 
as good. Not only issues of quality (e. g. taxpayers' satisfaction) are not included 
in the PMS but even `productivity' is not measured and reported. The case of tax 
administration of Pakistan (i. e. CBR) cited earlier is an example of this category. 
At the other extreme of the categorisation (i. e. point C) labelled `outcomes' are 
the PMSs which, arguably, reflect the influence of NPM. In such organisations 
the performance measures/PIs are based on clearly defined `outcomes'. Their key 
distinction from the `traditional' PMS is that the `outcomes' targets and PIs not 
only relate to the concerns of tax collectors but they also accommodate the 
concerns of taxpayers as well. The PMS comprises measures/PIs related to 
revenue collection or its derivates (reflecting traditional notion), to `productivity' 
(reflecting resources provider's concerns) and `quality' (reflecting taxpayers' 
concerns). The notion of performance, therefore, becomes more multi- 
dimensional in this form of PMS. The PMS of Swedish Tax Authority can be 
seen as an example here. 
Between the two extremes (at point B), labelled `Behaviour', are located the tax 
authorities which define organisational performance primarily in terms of 
revenue collection but add a few behaviour related PIs as well. The concerns of 
resources provider may also be included by measuring `efficiency' or 
`productivity'. The case of HMCE before 1998 is a good example here. The 
targets and measures are all in terms of clearly identifiable outputs like revenue 
collection, productivity and charter standards. 
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The categorisation proposed in Fig 5.2 will be helpful in locating the position of 
HMCE after various rounds of accounting changes that were introduced during 
the period of analysis of this PhD research. 
5.2 Accountability for Performance in HMCE 
In the previous chapter the historical origins of HMCE established that it had a 
past which was deep rooted in law enforcement. This has arguably defined and 
shaped the ethos of the organisation. It is therefore not surprising to find 
references to this ethos in the discourse and traditional accountability system of 
the organisation. For instance, one interviewee referred to this risk management 
role in day to day operations: 
"..... all SMEs will be under my area but obviously we would look at them we would break 
those down for our own purposes into the larger ones that the officers might visit; the very 
small ones which maybe some of the more junior officers might visit etc; and it's on the 
basis of risk, on the basis of amount of tax which is actually at risk.... " (MM 1: p 3) 
Another manager refers to this risk management role as the deciding factor for 
allocation of staff: 
"Yes; the numbers will change, because the numbers of officers that we get are allocated to 
us in each region is based on the risk; the department would negotiate with the Treasury for 
a certain number of staff to actually allocate them to the regions as they need it to best 
address the risk" (MM1: p 4). 
An NAO report also refers to the risk management role of HMCE in the wake of 
possibilities of fraud and evasion. 
"... All taxes are subject to the risk of fraud and evasion, including smuggling. Given the 
need to balance countermeasures with the need for goods to flow freely, total prevention is 
not realistic and some loss is inevitable. There are no reliable estimates of the total level of 
loss from outward diversion fraud. Nevertheless, to tackle fraud, Customs seek to allocate 
their resources based on broad assessments of the risks" (NAO, 2002b: p 1) 
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Prior to the accounting changes introduced by the New Labour government in 
1998, HMCE reported its organisational performance as a part of Next Steps 
Report 52. The report helps in understanding the traditional form of performance 
reporting reflecting the law enforcement ethos of the organisation. For instance 
in the Next Steps Annual Report, 1997 the opening statement of the Chancellor of 
Exchequer is as follows: 
"Customs and Excise's annual Management by Outputs agreement with me supports the 
move towards a more strategic overview of its main functions. The Department's 
performance in meeting the agreed targets is monitored in-year and reported in subsequent 
agreements. The agreement develops annually as part of the Resource Management 
programme, keeping pace with the improved information on costs, activities and outputs that 
will become available" (Next Steps Report, 1997a) 
It clearly refers to accountability for performance through monitoring of the 
outputs based targets. The emphasis upon revenue collection based output targets 
is evident from the following description of performance of HMCE in the same 
report. 
"In 1996-97 Customs and Excise achieved or exceeded almost every operational target for 
collecting the due amount of tax and duty and, in doing so, collected net receipts of £82.4 
billion. This represents 43% of central government taxation and an increase of 4.9%, in real 
terms, on receipts for the previous year. The Department also exceeded its target for the 
prevention of the importation of drugs" (ibid) 
In addition to revenue collection, productivity (or efficiency) is cited as another 
indicator of performance in the report: 
"The cost of each £1 of tax collected was O. lp for excise duties, 0.7p for VAT, rising to 7.7p 
for customers duties (though much of that expenditure arises from non-revenue regulation of 
imports and exports). This generally compares favourably with the figures for 1995/96, with 
an improvement in the cost of collecting VAT and a small increase in the cost of collecting 
customs duties" (ibid) 
52 As explained in Chapter 4, by Next Steps initiative in Thatcher's era agencies were created 
which acted independently but reported their performance to the parent ministry 
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The exhaustive list of performance indicators in the Next Steps report, 1997 
contained 78 targets belonging to 12 categories. The outputs targets represented 
almost all spheres of activities that came under the control of the department (see 
Annex 5.2). 
No Category No of targets 
1 UK Revenue 1 
2 VAT, APD, IPT and Landfill Tax 2 
3 VAT, IPT and Landfill Tax 1 
4 VAT and IPT 2 
5 VAT 13 
6 EXCISE 12 
7 VAT, IPT and Excise -customer service 1 
8 Protection of society 12 
9 Imports 12 
10 Facilitation 7 
11 Trade Statistics 11 
12 Overseas Activity 4 
Table 5.1: Measures/PIs appearing in the Next Steps report 
(Tabulated by the PhD author from Next Steps Report, 1997b) 
If the targets are categorised they can be presented in the following way: 
No Measures Category % of total 
measures 
1 Revenue collection and compliance 
measures 
61 
2 Good Behaviour related measures 13 
3 Operational/HR/ Efficiency related 
measures 
7 
4 Other measures 19 
Table 5.2: Categories of measures listed in Next Steps Report, 1997 
(Tabulated by PhD author from Next Steps Report, 1997b) 
It can be seen that while the greatest bulk of measures remained traditional 
revenue collection and law enforcement related, we do notice inclusion of 
measures which can be classified as non-traditional. However all the PIs and 
targets are outputs-based which are easy to define and report. Therefore, in terms 
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of the categorisation proposed earlier in the chapter, the performance reporting of 
HMCE can be positioned near point B i. e. `behaviour'. In this type of PMS, there 
is some information regarding `behaviour' aspect of performance, however, the 
traditional dimension of revenue collection retains its superior place in the 
hierarchy of these measures. For instance, the opening paragraph about the 
performance of HMCE in the Next Steps Report, 1998 bears the signature and 
photo of Gordon Brown. It can be seen that the emphasis on traditional targets of 
performance has not changed in this report: 
"In 1997/98 Customs and Excise achieved or exceeded 90 per cent of its targets. These 
covered the whole range of the department's operational activities, including UK revenue 
collection, deterrence and detection of smuggling of prohibited goods, ensuring compliance 
with international customs obligations and supply of trade statistics. The department 
collected 42% of central government taxation, equating to net receipts of £90.1 billion. The 
cost of collecting each £1 of revenue was 0.1p for excise duties, 0.6p for VAT and 8.8p for 
customs duties. These costs represent an overall improvement with the cost of collecting 
excise duties remaining static, VAT collection falling and that for customs duties rising 
slightly (largely as a result of continuing reductions in tariff rates)" (Next Steps, 1998). 
5.3 Conclusion 
In the preceding sections a framework for classifying PMSs in the context of tax 
authorities was developed. With the help of actual examples of how performance 
is measured and reported in three different countries, a three point categorisation 
was proposed. It ranged from traditional to outcomes based PMS. The PMS of 
HMCE, prior to implementation of accounting changes by the New Labour 
government, was then positioned on this categorisation by examining the then 
PIs used. The empirical analysis of the measures/PIs established that 
accountability for performance was mostly traditional, but some emphasis upon 
good behaviour was also noticeable. It was, therefore, concluded that HMCE's 
traditional accountability is for revenue collection where a few additional 
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dimensions of performance (efficiency and Charter standards) were also 
included. The PMS of HMCE before 1998 was therefore positioned on point B of 
the proposed categorisation. But NPM inspired reforms do not advocate mere 
`accountigisation'. What it stresses most is that accounting should flow out of a 
clearly defined outcomes-based strategy and thus should play the role of a 
strategic tool of change management. For instance, Osborne and Plastrik (1997) 
caution that: 
"We have not listed performance measurement as an approach because we do not 
believe that the act of measuring itself has enough power to force fundamental change in 
most public organisations. It is a critical competence organisations need if they are to 
use the consequences strategy.. . 
But some public organisations have measured 
performance for years, with virtually no impact" [p. 132, their emphasis. ] 
So it can be concluded that the traditional form of performance measurement and 
reporting as reflected by The Next Steps Reports did not qualify the NPM's 
desired use of accounting. Therefore, the accounting changes introduced by the 
New Labour government were applied to HMCE in order to bring about a 
fundamental change in the ethos of the organisation. In the next chapter the 
changes are examined critically to find out their desired effect and what actually 
happened to the ethos of the organisation. 
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Chapter 6 
The Environmental Pressures and HMCE 
Introduction 
In this chapter the external environment of HMCE is reviewed because 
institutional theorists (e. g. Powell and DiMaggio, 1991) believe that often 
organisational changes are implemented due to various pressures emanating from 
the external environment. The external environment of HMCE is made up of 
various components. Being a Governmental department it is affected by the 
policies of the central Government. Being a tax administration, it is also affected 
by the discourse about best practices adopted by other taxation regimes and 
promoted by world bodies like IMF, OECD etc. Therefore, in the next sections 
these external environmental factors are analysed. 
6.1 The Norms Setting Environment 
From time immemorial monarchs have used tax revenues to run government, 
fight wars and pay for their own lavish lifestyles. They were, by and large, not 
accountable for the manner in which money was used. For instance, an account 
sheet on display in the HMCE National Museum, Liverpool shows Nell Gwyn, 
the king's mistress, receiving a regular income from the Crown. However, it is 
equally true that taxation has remained one of the most contentious issues in the 
human history. With the renaissance in Europe many influential authors started 
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writing about the features of a good tax system53. Adam Smith's celebrated 
maxims of taxation are still regarded as the canons of a good tax system. In 
chapter 2 Book 5 of Wealth of Nations, he advocates that taxes should be: 
9 Equitable, i. e. the taxpayers should contribute in proportion to their 
respective interests. 
" Certain, i. e. the tax liability should not be worked out in an arbitrary 
manner. 
" Convenient, i. e. it should not be cumbersome for the taxpayers to pay 
their taxes 
" Economical, i. e. should not result in high administrative and/or 
compliance costs. 
Despite prolific writings of many authors on taxation with roots in political 
science and economics, Cook (1952: p 627)'s observation is still valid: 
"For some 600 years mankind through some of its ablest minds, has sought to solve the 
problems of raising these funds in the most effective and least painful manner, but none of 
the methods devised has been able to disguise the fact that the money has to come out of 
somebody's earnings, directly or indirectly. " 
This reality may account for two important and overriding concerns with regards 
to desirable virtues of a tax system nowadays. First, there is a greater emphasis 
upon outcomes or results for the money sent on public services. Osborne and 
Gaebler (1992), who are considered to be the proponents of NPM, base their 
work on the premise that the taxpayers had become more assertive about how the 
53 Groves (1974) classifies such authors into four schools of thought. First, the rationalists 
(e. g. 
Adam Smith and J. S. Mill) consider ethical ends important and advocate the ability to pay as 
measured by income as one of the most primary concerns of a tax system. 
Second, the 
opportunists (e. g. John Ramsay McCulloch and Galbraith) consider administrative efficiency as 
the most important concern and advocate the famous metaphor 
"most feathers for least 
squawking". Third, the direct expenditure proponents (e. g. 
Fisher and Kaldor) extol 
encouragement of saving as the fundamental virtue of a good tax system. 
Fourth, the functional 
school proponents (e. g. Henry George and John Hobson) call 
for a tax system that would not 
affect production but targets windfall income. 
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tax revenue was spent (p 20). Thus, value for money is an important 
consideration in new public financial management. The second concern is about 
trust building by respecting taxpayers' rights54. Daunton (2001) argues that lack 
of trust in any relationship results in non compliance and increases the need for 
greater compliance enforcement55 
The tax authorities all over the world also seem to be paying heed to the 
importance of trust building as the foundation of tax policy. For instance, 
Williams (2001) states that the Australian Tax Office is moving away from a 
purely deterrent regulatory framework towards a graduated suite of responses 
that are tailored to compliance behaviour. Similarly the Secretary of the 
Commonwealth Institute of Taxation, U. K who was interviewed by this PhD 
researcher termed self-assessment as the defining feature of tax policy during the 
last decade or so. The PhD research compared the contents of speeches made by 
the three heads of tax authorities of Canada, Australia and UK at different forums 
and found some striking similarities. All the three tax authorities underwent 
reforms and reorganisation and achieving goodwill of the taxpayers was 
considered to be the driving force behind all reform initiatives56. The tax heads 
sa Through a working papers series, the Centre for Tax System Integrity of Australian National 
University, Canberra emphasises the importance of taxpayers' perceptions about the ways in 
which they define their relationship with institutions and, more specifically, how they align 
themselves with social policy (e. g. Braithwaite et al., 2001). 
ss Daunton (2001) mentions three tiers of trust based relationships in a `fiscal state', (i. e., the 
modern state which can raise revenue by taxation or borrowing). First, does the taxpayer trust 
other taxpayers to pay for public action? Second, whether the state was using funds for the 
intended purpose and revenue was not wasted? Third, can the state trust taxpayers to make their 
payments? 
56 For instance, the head of Australian Tax Office (ATO) says: 
"..... Equally, adoption of a self-assessment system reflects the reality that effective tax 
administration is not about collecting every last dollar payable under our tax laws; it is about 
optimising collections under those laws in a way that instils community confidence that the 
system is operating properly" ATO (2002). 
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also mention the supporting role of accounting information in the reforms 
process. The UK and Canadian heads refer to the `Balanced Scorecard' while the 
Australian chief refers to the Taxpayers' Charter standards. These are important 
evidences of NPM inspired change initiatives where accounting is considered to 
be an important tool for reforming public sector management around customer 
needs. 
There is no recorded academic research on using performance measurement for 
accountability in tax authorities. However the OECD carried out a review of the 
performance measurement practices in its member countries. This report has its 
limitations as it only refers to OECD countries and thus a generic classification 
of tax authorities can not be induced. The report (OECD, 2002) however is 
informative as to how performance measures are used in the OECD countries. In 
the report performance measures are classified into three groups: first, measures 
that relate output to input i. e. productivity; second, measures of quality and 
taxpayer satisfaction; and, third, measures of outcome with respect to revenue 
and compliance i. e. effectiveness. The main input measures identified by the 
survey are cost and labour (expressed in work hours). 57 Typical output measures 
Same concern for image management is noticeable in the speech of Canadian counterpart: 
"While our name will change, as will many of our internal functions, our value system will 
remain intact - fairness, integrity, professionalism, respect, cooperation, and customer 
service" (CCRA, 2000). 
The head of Inland Revenue, U. K strikes almost similar notes as he terms customer service as the 
most important attribute of reforms: 
"With these challenges has come the growing recognition that the function of the Inland 
Revenue must be to enable as well to regulate...... It means laying a greater emphasis on 
making it as easy as possible for taxpayers, whether companies or individuals, to understand 
what they owe us by way of tax and to pay it" (IR, 2002). 
57 In some countries such reports cover all activities, in others only specific areas, e. g. audits. The 
purpose is to attribute input (measured as work hours or direct labour cost) to different activities, 
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were found to be related to the workload (number of taxpayers or tax returns) or 
to tax control (number of audits or verifications). 58 It can be seen that the 
`outputs' are derivatives of revenue collection figures. Therefore, in terms of the 
proposed categorisation of PMS of tax authorities in chapter 5, these would lie 
close to the `traditional' form where the revenue collection figures themselves 
are reported as outputs. 
The OECD study found that productivity development is reported regularly by 
most tax authorities. Productivity is the ratio between output and input, 
depending upon the distinction between output and outcome. Output is normally 
expressed in physical terms, while input can be expressed either as costs or as 
work hours. 59 There are fewer standard practices reported in OECD countries for 
the evaluation of outcomes. Given that the OECD input-action-output-outcome 
model places great emphasis on outcome recognition and evaluation as essential 
to the effectiveness, and therefore performance, of tax authorities, the paucity of 
research on practices in this area of performance measurement is significant. 
Three aspects of quality measurement are identified by the report. First, quality 
can be measured in terms of timeliness, like average processing time for 
applications. Second, quality can be identified with respect to legality and 
professional standards, which can be assessed by inspections or review of 
selected files. Third, quality can be expressed in terms of client satisfaction, 
functions, processes, programmes or outputs. This information can also be used to apportion 
overhead cost to the appropriate offices or functions. 
58 Some countries were found to include taxpayer contacts in the form of telephone enquiries and 
visits to tax offices in their output measures. Most countries also seem to regard revenue, at least 
additional revenue recovered by audits, as output although it can also be regarded as outcome. 
59 There is a variety of productivity measures depending on different definitions of output. A 
common measure is cost per taxpayer. When revenue is included in output, productivity is 
typically expressed as administration costs as a percentage of total revenue. 
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which can be studied by taxpayer surveys. Most tax authorities carry out such 
surveys and some do so regularly. There are many other ways to get feedback 
from clients: for example focus groups, exit surveys, letterboxes for suggestions 
and complaints etc. Some countries measure quality against published standards 
also known as taxpayers' charters. 
According to the OECD report, all tax authorities measure and report collected 
revenue, which, when set as a target, is an important aspect of performance for 
tax authorities. Much attention is also focused on the direct revenue effects of tax 
control, and in several countries audit programmes are expected to achieve 
certain targets in terms of additional tax revenue. Moreover, it is also common 
practice to relate additional revenue to direct costs to get a measure of audit 
efficiency. The main function of tax control, however, is to prevent and deter tax 
evasion. In some countries attempts have been made to measure the deterrent 
effect of tax control. 
The OECD report suggests that overall effectiveness of the tax system can be 
expressed as the ratio between actual tax revenue and the theoretically correct 
yield - the difference between the two being commonly referred to as the tax gap. 
Several tax authorities have reported to be involved in studies of the black 
economy. However, it is contended by the report that generally, such studies 
have not been found to provide much practical guidance as no tax administration 
in the survey reported to carry out such studies regularly. 
6.2 Political Environment 
HMCE is a central government department and has to follow and implement the 
policy instruments of the government. The New Labour Government announced 
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its public sector reform agenda through a white paper Modernising Government. 
As is clear from the foreword of Minister of Cabinet, the document is the basis of 
the public sector reforms initiated by the Government: 
"Modernising Government is an important statement for the Government. It is a programme 
of reform for the future. And it is a series of new measures which the Government will 
implement now" (Cabinet Office, 1999b: p 5). 
Three aims are cited by the white paper as central to the modernising agenda: 
" Ensuring that policy making is more joined up and strategic. 
" Making sure that public service users, not providers, are the focus, by 
matching services more closely to people's lives. 
" Delivering public services that are high quality and efficient. 
The language used by the strategy paper clearly reflects the ideals of NPM. 
Terms like `customer focus', `quality' and `efficiency' are very closely 
associated with the NPM literature. 
The NPM literature advocates making customer focus ideal of the private sector 
the cornerstone of the public sector reforms (e. g. Araujo, 2001: p 617). The 
phrase customer focus has become an important element of faith in the official 
publications of the new Labour government as well. This is also clear from the 
increased proportional usage of the term customer in the annual and spring 
reports of HMCE for the last two years. A textual analysis of the four documents 
presented in Table 6.1 supports this observation: 
HMCE 2002 
spring report 
HMCE 2002 
annual report 
HMCE 2003 
spring rep ort 
HMCE 2003 
annual report 
Word or phrase Hits Hits Hits Hits 
Total words count 9,601 52,357 13,076 60,740 
Customer 25 25 28 61 
Table 6.1: Usage of the phrase `customer' in HMCE reports 
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Not surprisingly customer focused `accounting' features prominently in the 
performance reporting of HMCE after 1998. 
The official document which articulates what `customer focus' means for the 
New Labour Government was produced by Lynton Barker, a senior consultant of 
PricewaterhouseCoopers who was contracted by Public Services Productivity 
Panel of the PM office for the said purpose. The aim of the publication as stated 
by the Chief Secretary to the Treasury in his foreword is to take "a new look at 
customer focus, in particular the need to radically shift the whole of an 
organisation - strategy, policy and front line delivery - to face its customers" 
(Barker, 2001: p 1)60 
If customer focus is about refocusing service delivery around the needs of the 
recipients of public services then the need for measuring success in satisfying 
customers is understandably important. In the private sector clients/customers 
surveys are carried out regularly for feedback purpose. To imitate the same, in 
1998, the Cabinet Office's Modernising Public Social Services Group 
commissioned MORI, the market research company, and Birmingham 
University's School of Public Policy to set up a People's Panel which was made 
60 The document articulates what `customer-focused' government means and what is required to 
focus, at organisational as well as individual level, on the public as the ultimate customer. 
Recognising the debate on choice of words for recipients of goods/services, the writer of the 
report contends that `customer' is preferable because `citizen' is too focused on political identity 
and `stakeholder' is not always seen to include ordinary members of the public. The publication 
emphasises that "Customer Focus" in the public sector is about refocusing services around the 
needs of the citizen as a customer of public services, rather than the problems of those who 
provide the services. It signifies an organisational culture that aims to address the needs, 
expectations and behaviours of the public, and then adjusts every aspect of the organisation to 
align with customer values. This includes the entire delivery chain from policy-making through 
to front-line services - including strategy, organisational design, business processes, performance 
measures, information systems and support processes. 
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up of 5,000 members of the public. It had a profile that was representative of the 
'HAT DOES GUSTO R-FOCUSED GOVERNMENT LOOK LIKE? 
overall 
a Clearer: outvdard focus and vision for pub 4c servar3tr and their Ministers 
  Deeper, shared understanding of mats customers 
" information is organised by customer groups, across government whete required 
  Higher stakeholder satisfaction 
  What is measured and rewarded is dryen bywl at customers value 
  Better alignment of resources to objectives 
  Different staff motivation and improv d morale, 
Policy Service delivery 
  Proactive, out vaid driven policy process w th " Services are designed and delivered around 
high stakeholder and public engagement customer needs and interests 
  Clear approach to defining tie'publicinterest' IN Common definition and information about 
terms of customer needs customer segments is shared across 
a Ministers are iiiv lvcd in structured process of organisations from lic y to del k, -ery 
customer identification and management #F ffe. -t rn channel ät I (management of 
a t misters and officials at all 3evýeIs seek to different methods of communicating and 
faster a team approach to understanding and transacting Nfith customers e, . telephone, 
meeting customer needs web, paper, face-to-face) 
a Staff have particular relationship manatem i a Policy teams use abstracted operational data 
d/or customer re resentat . roles 
fron, delivery systems 
  Promotion is based on n%vvalues and skills a IT and e1 e nment projects are embedded in 
s Risk management focused on customer values 
wider transformational projects which address 
and concerns people, processes and performance 
  Closely managed l emirs rsfa a as and exchanges 
r anagýnt 
a Large IT projects achieve measurable gains in with Eý? Lterna organisations 
effectiveness, 
Pore tos that ar re ore l key to workable 
and athiece their objectives, 
Fig 6.1: Official elaboration of customer-focused government (Source: Barker, 2001: p 6) 
UK population in terms of age, gender, region and a wide range of other 
demographic indicators. MORI recruited the Panel from a random sample of 
addresses across the UK between June and September 1998. The system came to 
an end in January 2002, after three satisfaction surveys were conducted (wave 1 
1998; wave 5,2000 and wave 6,2002) of the members of the panels. 
In order to implement the customer focus ideal in service delivery the 
Government initiated many changes. Along with many structural reforms like 
electronic delivery and Private Finance Initiative (PFI), the Government also 
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used accounting changes for implementing its agenda. It is this aspect of reforms 
which is of interest to the PhD study. In fact the belief that accounting 
information is an effective change management tool (Miller, 1990) is deep- 
rooted in official rhetoric. For instance, the HM Treasury issued a special 
publication, jointly authored with the Cabinet Office, National Audit Office, 
Audit Commission, and Office for National Statistics which aims to guide the 
central departments, HMCE inclusive, in implementation of the accounting 
changes as part of the overall change agenda of the Government. The key official 
publication uses the acronym of FABRIC to lay down the essential 
characteristics of a good PMS: 
" Focused on the organisation's aims and objectives, 
" Appropriate from all stakeholders' perspectives, 
" Balanced in terms of coverage of all work areas, 
" Robust so that it can withstand any changes and not depend on 
any particular staff members, 
" Integrated into organisation's business activities and not as a 
standalone data compilation activity, and 
" Cost effective (HM Treasury, 2001a: p3) 
The publication stresses the need for maximising the gains in performance as 
against the cost of implementing a PMS (p 16). It is further stressed that the 
measures should avoid any perverse consequences, and that they should be 
relevant, attributable in terms of accountability, well defined, timely, reliable, 
comparable and verifiable (p 17). 
Reflecting the influence of Balanced Scorecard, the publication lays down the 
strategic planning framework with performance measurement having a pivotal 
role in it (p: 6). The model prescribed by HM Treasury places organisational 
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objectives at the top, giving rise to carefully thought-out performance measures 
and targets. It is stressed that the measures and targets should be owned by the 
employees, so that they feel accountable for their performance. The performance 
review is also stated not to be a standalone process but must be rigorous enough 
to act as reinforcement for provision of targeted service. 
The same pivotal role of performance measurement is evident in the "Cascading 
Planning in the Public Sector" model (ibid: 7). Patterned on the model of Lynch 
and Cross (1991), this is also shaped like a pyramid: 
" Strategic Priorities, e. g. PSAs and local PSAs rest on the top. 
" The next layer of the pyramid is of More Detailed Aims and Objectives, 
e. g. SDAs, Best Value Performance Plans, and agency targets. 
" Next is The Organisation's Strategy, e. g. business plans for government 
departments. 
" Then comes the Business Group Plans, being internal plans and 
performance measures/standards. 
" The bottom most layer is that of Individual Staff Performance and 
Accountability Plans including staff performance development and 
performance appraisal. 
An NAO publication (2001) also gives a central role to performance 
measurement in identifying key stages for strategic public sector policy making. 
In the circular framework the performance measures are not only embedded in 
the strategic objectives but they also help refine the objectives themselves 
through monitoring and evaluation of results. The publication explains with the 
help of a diagram how 3Es model is to be applied in the U. K. The model 
is 
somewhat similar to that of Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000), referred to 
in the 
previous chapter and is based upon the inputs-process-outputs-outcomes 
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framework. `Inputs' are defined as the resources that contribute to production 
and delivery such as labour, physical assets, and IT systems. `Outputs' are 
defined as the final products, or goods and services produced by the organisation 
for delivery to the customer. `Outcomes' are defined as the impact or 
consequences for the community, of the activities of the government. 61 
Economy, efficiency and effectiveness represent the desired relationships 
between inputs, outputs and outcomes. An economy measure looks at the costs of 
acquiring the inputs to the programme. An efficiency measure looks at whether 
we are getting the maximum output for the inputs that go into the process. 
Finally an effectiveness measure looks at whether the outputs of the programme 
lead to the desired outcomes. 62 The overall framework is plotted in Figure 6.2. 
Aims and 
objectives 
DeNrtmeut/SetA tce ProvldLl r 
Processes 
Resources Inputs , Outputs 
Economy II Efficiency 
Cost effectiveness 
Other 
influences 
Outcomes 
(Intended & 
unintended) 
Programme 
Figure 6.2: Relationship between Inputs, Outputs, and Outcomes (NAO, 2001: 2) 
61 For example, in an NHS context "outputs" might be the number of effective medical 
treatments, or operations of the appropriate quality which take place in a hospital. In contrast, 
"outcomes" might be longer life expectancy and better health. A complete list of 
definitions 
provided by the NAO publication is appended as Annexure 6.1 
62 Again in an NHS context, an economy measure might look at the costs of acquiring 
drugs for a 
certain treatment. An efficiency measure might consider the relationship between given 
hospital 
facilities and standards of care, and how many patients are being treated. 
An effectiveness 
measure might consider estimates of the number of people giving up smoking 
because of an anti- 
smoking campaign, as an indication of the effectiveness of that campaign 
in improving people's 
health. 
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Value for Money (VFM) or `cost effectiveness' relates money resources to the 
final outcomes, while the Other influences on the final outcomes represent the 
factors which are beyond control of the organisation. 
6.3 The Accounting Changes 
The New Labour Government conducted a thorough review of departmental aims 
and objectives and a zero-based analysis of each spending programme to find the 
best way of delivering the Government's objectives. The Government's 
assessment of the economic and budgetary position for a medium-term of three 
year was concluded in July 1998 and was termed Comprehensive Spending 
Review (CSR). HM Treasury (2000a: 1998b) claims that the CSR forced the 
departments to take a more fundamental look at the effectiveness of spending, 
rather than just bidding for extra resources every year; to find cross-departmental 
solutions to achieving its objectives and to encourage joint working and that it 
allowed spending to be directed towards the Government's key objectives 
The CSR 1998 was followed by another Spending Review in 2000.63 The two 
reviews are linked by the HM Treasury (2000b) as: 
" The 1998 Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) set firm three-year public 
spending plans from scratch' for the first time ever and introduced a new spending 
control regime 
The 2000 Spending Review rolls forward the CSR plans, refines the control system 
and uses a new accruals budgeting system 
63 HM Treasury (2000a: p7) contains the following introduction of SR 2000: 
"The 2000 Spending Review, together with the Economic and Fiscal Strategy Report and 
Financial Statement and Budget Report contain the Government's assessment of the medium-term 
economic and budgetary position. They set out the government's tax and spending plans, 
including those for public investment, in the context of its overall approach to social, economic 
and environmental objectives. They will form the basis of submissions to the European 
Commission under Article 99 (ex Article 103) and Article 104 (ex Article 104c) of the Treaty 
establishing the European Union". 
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As a result of these spending reviews two changes are very important in terms of 
NPM's advocacy for a more strategic place for accounting tools. First, the 
Resource Accounting and Budgeting (RAB) and second, the Public Services 
Agreement (PSA). The RAB process can be traced back to the 1993 Budget 
speech of the then Chancellor of the Exchequer. 64 A White Paper in 1995 (HM 
Treasury, 1995a) announced that budgeting would indeed be on the RAB basis 
from the year 2000. According to the new system Parliament has to give 
approval for central government expenditure not on Estimates basis but rather on 
resource-based Estimates. Similarly the departments are also required to report 
its performance on RAB basis. i. e. from Appropriation accounts to resource 
accounts. Two important implications can be identified. First, while the 
Appropriation accounts were cash accounting based the Resource accounts 
follow the accrual basis and are more on the pattern of private sectors published 
accounts. Second, utilisation of resources is accounted for in terms of 
organisational objectives. The public sector organisation has to seek financial 
resources from the parliament by referring to organisational objectives the 
organisation desires to meet. 
The second important accounting change is the outcomes based PSA framework 
of performance measurement and reporting. The New Labour Government has in 
fact operationalised the public sector PM models cited in policy publications 
through the instrument of PSA. The PSA is complemented by Service Delivery 
Agreement (SDA). Each PSA sets out the aim of the department or programme, 
the supporting objectives and the related performance targets showing what will 
64 A Green (discussion) Paper (HM Treasury, 1994a) announced that the first RAB based 
reporting would be for the year 1998-99. It also announced that the first published set of accounts 
would be in 1999-2000 after which discussions would take place to see whether budgeting could 
move to a new basis. 
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be delivered. The accompanying SDAs set out how each PSA will be delivered 
together with key output targets that are critical to the delivery of the PSA 
outcome targets. They cover issues such as the quality of service, the 
development of new processes and progress towards general objectives such as 
those relating to ethnicity, procurement and the prevention of fraud. Another 
accompanying document Technical Notes provides more precise details of how 
targets are to be measured. They explain exactly what is being measured and 
clarify terms and data definitions used in the published PSAs (NAO, 2001). 65 
According to the Government PSAs are the vehicles of change, as is evident 
from a speech delivered by the Chief Secretary to the Treasury: 
".... The 1998 Comprehensive Spending Review PSAs were a revolution in this respect. And 
for our departments, I think they were something of a revelation too. PSAs challenged them 
for the first time to think about what were the outcomes they really wanted in each policy 
area........ 
... 
To conclude, I believe PSAs have been something of a revolution. Departments have 
recognised the real benefits for their own management of clear priorities and targets, and we 
will see further steps forward in the quality and clarity of the PSAs which come out of this 
spending review" (Treasury, 2000c). 
The Treasury monitors departments' performance against their individual PSA 
targets and provide quarterly reports to the Ministerial Committee on Public 
Services and Public Expenditure. The Committee periodically examines the 
progress that individual departments have made towards achieving their targets. 
Performance against PSA targets is made public in departmental reports. 
It is claimed that PSAs and SDAs are designed to promote joined-up 
Government as they not only focus on the achievement of targeted outcomes 
65 The PSAs for 2001-04, published in July 2000, were fewer in number than those produced 
following the Comprehensive Spending Review in 1998. The Agreements covered the 17 main 
government departments, four cross-cutting programmes, local government and the 
Northern 
Ireland Office. The PSAs were again refined in 2002, with greater emphasis on fewer outcomes. 
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under the responsibility of a given department or group but also enable the 
contribution of other departments and their priorities to be recognised and co- 
ordinated in support of high-level objectives (NAO, 2001). Figure 6.3 illustrates 
how PSAs and SDAs complement each other. 
A statement of who is accountable for the 
delivery of the PSA 
Department's aim providing an overarching 
summary of objectives 
Department's objectives - bold aspirations of 
what it hopes to achieve 
Performance targets for each objective. 
These should be SMART - Specific, Measurable, Achievable, 
Relevant and Timed 
Summary of the content of PSAs 
A Statement of who is accountable for 
the delivery of the SDA 
A statement of how the PSA targets will be 
delivered, including the structure in place to 
A statement of any key output targets that are 
critical to the delivery of PSA targets 
Shows how the Department will organise themselves to 
deliver the targets and improve performance, including 
action on Modernising Government 
Summary of the content of SDAs 
Figure 6.3: Comparison of PSA and SDA content (NAO, 2001: p 14-15) 
6.4 Conclusion 
In the previous chapter the notion of performance in tax administration was 
theorised as a categorisation ranging from traditional to outcomes based PMSs. A 
review of the norm setting environment in this chapter established that there has 
been a growing emphasis upon better customer-focus and productivity gains and 
that there was a shift towards outcomes based performance management in the 
OECD countries. The review of official publications establishes that the 
aforementioned norms are also reflected by the new approaches towards public 
sector management in the U. K. Accounting has received significantly important 
role, as evidenced by the formal implementation of PSA framework. Since 
HMCE has to follow and implement official guidelines, it logically follows that 
the department's accountability and PMS would exhibit these features. In terms 
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of institutional theory, the governmental prescription of PSA based 
accountability system would generate coercive pressure upon HMCE to change 
its PMS. 
In Chapter 2 reference was made to the works of NIS authors (e. g. Powell and 
DiMaggio, 1991). They argued that organisational reforms are often caused by 
normative, mimetic and coercive pressures emanating from the external 
environment. The review of norm-setting and political environment surrounding 
HMCE suggests that owing to these pressures HMCE should move towards the 
NPM inspired multi-dimensional outcomes based PMS. In the next chapters 
further evidence is examined to ascertain the extent of the NPM styled strategic 
shift and the role of accounting in facilitating it. 
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Chapter 7 
Breaking the Tradition - Accounting Changes in HMCE 
Introduction 
In this chapter the accounting changes introduced by HMCE after the New 
Labour government came to power are reviewed. These accounting changes were 
implemented in order to realize the PSA based strategic shift. A significant 
feature of the analysis is to notice the importance of context when accounting 
changes are used as a vehicle of change. 
7.1 HMCE and Organisational Reforms 
The restructuring of HMCE along functional lines was discussed in detail in 
chapter 4. Being one of the oldest public sector organisations, HMCE has seen 
many waves of reforms. A detailed description of such changes is outside the 
scope of this study. However many governmental reforms have affected the 
organisational structure and working of HMCE. For instance the five year 
Fundamental Expenditure Review that began in 1994 required "restructuring", 
"delayering", "staff cuts" and "cultural change" (Colville and Packman, 1996). It 
had its main thrust upon high risk, complex areas of Customs work rather than on 
routine, low risk areas. It was viewed as an opportunity to undertake a wide scale 
review of departmental activities to find the most effective way of providing 
services, involving moving resources away from compliant traders to the riskier 
end of the trader population. Similarly, local VAT offices were given more 
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authority to manage work in their area in the light of their judgment of local 
circumstances (Simpson and French, 1998; Hansford, 1997). 
Two official publications set the stage for implementation of accounting changes 
in the late 1990s. A White Paper (HM Treasury, 1998b) followed by an earlier 
publication (HM Treasury, 1998a) published new objectives for government 
departments along with measurable targets in the form of PSAs for all the 
departments. The foreword to the White paper is from the Prime Minister Tony 
Blair and sets the tone of the reforms: 
"Too often in the past, governments have only made commitments for what they put into 
public services - money, manpower and policies - not for what the public will get out in 
return. That is what really matters. People rightly expect modern services that work well, 
meet real needs, and use public money fairly and efficiently. That is why PSAs set out each 
department's aims and objectives and then show how much progress we expect to make and 
over what timescale, through concrete targets" (HM Treasury, 1998b: foreword) 
The shift to customer-focus is quite evident. The publication explains how each 
department would achieve the desired objectives. 
The second key document published in March 1999 by HM Treasury is titled 
"The Government's Measures of Success: Output and Performance Analyses". 
The publication (HM Treasury, 1999a: p 2) proudly claims that the OPAs 
"complete the picture by showing the indicators which will be used to measure 
and monitor success against those objectives and PSA targets. The publication 
terms OPAs as the basis for performance reporting to the public Admitting that 
OPA was still work in progress, the publication lays down the basic structure of 
OPA as: 
0 the department's objectives; 
9 the PSA targets for each objective; 
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" the indicators for measuring progress against the objectives and targets 
and outturn against them; 
" performance against the PSA productivity targets to demonstrate the 
efficiency of the organisation (ibid: p 2). 
The publication also contains the OPA of HMCE (p 103-109) and comprises two 
parts (Annex 7.1). Part 1 lists down six organisational objectives, the underlying 
policy targets and the quantitative targets to assess performance against those 
policy targets. Part 2 lists productivity related targets which continue to be the 
essential part of performance reporting since the Thatcher era. 
The first objective in OPA is: 
Objective 1: To secure the UK revenue yield from indirect taxes while 
minimising costs to businesses, as a key component of the Government's 
policy of ensuring sound public finances. 
If the Part 1 objectives are closely analysed one fact becomes quite noticeable. 
The traditional emphasis on revenue collection and fraud detection retains its 
supremacy in the new scheme of performance reporting. Under this objective two 
policy targets appear. The first reads: 
"The Department will collect each year amount of forecast UK Revenue yield from indirect 
taxes, subject to external factors outside the Department's control. The actual amount will be 
agreed annually with the Minister by April each year" (PSA target i). 
The OPA declares two measures of success for this dimension of performance. 
First, the Revenue receipts and second, % monthly arrears of the 12 month 
trader liability. Therefore, actual revenue collection figures and debt 
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management figures appear as the two most important quantitative measures of 
performance. 
The second policy target is given the heading of `Fraud'. It reads: 
"The department will agree targets for UK revenue evasion prevented by April each year, 
which will cover the prevention of civil and criminal fraud in both VAT and Excise. 
By 31 March 2002 the Department will achieve an increase of at least £80 million in the 
revenue value of detected alcohol and tobacco fraud, including from smuggling. This will be 
measured against the baseline of £76 million revenue value of excise goods detections in 
1997-98. (PSA target ii) 
These policy targets are to be assessed with the PIs of "Total UK Revenue 
evasion prevented", "Revenue value of detected alcohol and tobacco fraud and 
smuggling ", "Number of major excise smuggling organisations disrupted or 
dismantled". 
These measures of performance are also closely identifiable to the traditional 
notion of performance of HMCE. 
The second objective relates to anti-drugs and other contrabands smuggling 
operations. The policy targets and PIs also pertain to reducing availability of 
drugs in the U. K market and disruption of drugs smuggling organisations. 
Up to objective 2, it is a very traditional form of performance measurement and 
reporting. However with objective 3 there comes a break from the past. Even 
though the objective itself sounds quite traditional: 
Objective 3: To secure compliance with statutory, EU and international 
customs obligations in ways which facilitate global trade and help the single 
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market work thereby supporting the Government's aim to make the UK an 
attractive place to do business. 
However one of the underlying performance targets clearly intends to usher in 
the NPM inspired customer-focus ideal into the performance reporting of 
HMCE. The following policy target requires a 6% improvement in customer 
satisfaction: 
"The Department aims to go on improving its customer service performance in key areas 
which will be the principal focus of its modernisation programme. The Department's 
performance against this target will be measured by surveys at the start and end of each CSR 
period. By the end of the CSR period, the Department will aim to have achieved increased 
satisfaction of 6% in the areas of VAT, customs freight and excise, which are to benefit from 
the investment under the modernisation programme" (PSA target iv). 
The remaining objectives 4-6 deal with ancillary duties of the department like 
provision of trade statistics, assisting tax regimes of other countries and 
providing policy advice to the government. The long list of productivity targets 
under part 2 aims to improve customer service while ensuring reduction in costs. 
These include measures like national call centre besides other cost saving 
measures. 
The OPA framework is the first attempt on the part of the government to use 
accounting changes as a policy tool to implement the notion of accountability to 
the customers as the basis of the performance measurement and reporting. Since 
it was a public sector wide change, HMCE was also obliged to adopt the change. 
It is worth noting here that the customers-related targets were also present in the 
Next Steps form of reporting of HMCE. But what is different here is that 
customer-focus is measured directly in terms of customers' responses and not 
simply in the form of outputs. It can be noted that part I not only includes 
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traditional measures of performance but it also includes an explicit measure of 
customers' satisfaction as one of the strategic PIs. If the government is 
considered a trustee of taxpayers' money, the part 2 measures of performance on 
productivity dimension also reflect a concern for the customers' welfare. In terms 
of 3E model of public sector accountability (i. e. economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness) it refers to the concern for Value for Money accountability of 
HMCE. So it can be concluded that the OPA based PSA framework in 1998 is a 
significant step towards aligning customer focus based accountability relations 
along with the traditional system of accountability and performance reporting. 
Likiermann (2000) represents the positivist views on accounting changes by 
discussing the concerns on implementation of RAB and OPA and concludes 
affirmatively: 
"The commentary for output and performance indicators is one example of this. Such 
information will provide those who give informed comment outside, including 
Parliamentary Select Committees, the opportunity to question the figures and the basis on 
which they are used" (p 259). 
However, the move towards a new framework of performance reporting was not 
a very smooth one. The difficulties with regards to HMCE's PMS will be 
analysed in the next chapter, when OPA was finally subsumed into PSA 2000. 
However, even at a general public sector level, the potential difficulties were 
even recognised by the reformers themselves. For instance, the OPA document 
admits work in progress nature of the reforms: 
"Today's publication therefore shows work in progress. But it is an important milestone 
which allows the public to see the shape of future reporting and gives them the opportunity 
to comment on the work done so far" (HM Treasury, 1999a: p 2). 
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Talbot (1998: 4) criticises the fact that OPA was announced to be a separate 
document and not made a part of the Resource Accounts as per the original 
proposal. He attributes this decision to the fact that government department 
managers (e. g. chairpersons of tax authorities and permanent secretaries of 
central government departments) did not like their departmental performance to 
be scrutinised as the NAO would audit the Resource accounts. In a written 
memorandum to the Select Committee on Treasury Professor Talbot emphasises 
this point again: 
"There has been a deliberate decision to exclude Departmental performance information 
from audit (hence the separation between the Departmental Annual Report and Accounts and 
the OPA). The reason advanced is that performance measurement at this level (Departments) 
and of this type (outcomes) is sufficiently novel that audit would expose this delicate flower 
to unwarranted external castigation when the inevitable problems arise. 
On the other hand, the Comptroller and Auditor General apparently wants the NAO to audit 
both Departmental and other performance information (from Agencies, NDPBs, etc. ) 
routinely". (TSC, 1999a) 
In a supplementary memorandum to the same committee, Talbot makes two 
specific recommendations. First, he stresses the need for dropping the label of 
output performance and analyses66 and argues that: 
"... it be replaced by the term "Public Service Agreement-Annual Report". The detailed 
content of the document should then be brought fully into line with the content of the PSAs. 
It would remain an Annual Report, but incorporating cumulative data" (TSC, 1999b) 
The second recommendation is about audit of Departmental Public Service 
Agreement Annual Reports by the National Audit Office. 67 
66 Two reasons are cited for that in the memorandum. First, the terminology of `Output and 
Performance Analysis' is incompatible with either the content of the actual OPAs or the new 
emphasis on outcomes. Second, having a separate set of documents not clearly linked to PSAs 
seems somewhat anomalous and can potentially generate confusion. 
67 It appears from the format of PSAs after SR2000 that while the terminology of OPA was 
dropped as per Professor Talbot's recommendation, the audit of PSA by NAO is still a grey area. 
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7.2 Towards Outcomes Based PMS 
In year 2000, the Government published new PSAs for its departments under 
Spending Review in 2000 (SR 2000). The HMCE, in its CSR (1998) PSA, had 
six objectives, seventeen PSA targets and 46 performance indicators. In the new 
PSA (Annexure 7.2) HMCE had now fewer aims and key performance measures 
than the first PSA discussed in the previous section. The Department's new PSA 
which ran from 1st April 2001 for three years had now three objectives and eight 
key performance targets, though the actual number of total performance 
indicators against all the performance targets increased to 62. According to the 
department (HMCE, 2001a) the reorganisation of the department along 
functional lines was necessitated by the demands imposed by the new set of 
challenging outcomes based targets of PSA 2001-2004. The 2001 Spring Report 
of HMCE emphasises the importance of the new PSA: 
"The SR2000 PSA represents a major change for the Department, with a new overall aim 
and a sharper focus, as the targets are focussed on outcomes rather than outputs" (HMCE, 
2001b: plO) 
This marked reduction in key performance areas was welcomed by the then 
HMCE Chairman, Richard Broadbent, in a testimony before the Treasury Select 
Committee (TSC): 
"At a strategic level, if an organisation is trying to do more than really a handful of things 
it is going to fall over itself' (TSC, 2000b: para 52). 
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The TSC, however, remained sceptical and thought that "the problem of too 
mann targets, of uncertain rationale and status, has not yet been fully dealt with " 
(ibid). 
Despite this marked scepticism by the TSC members, the PSA 2000 was path 
breaking in three main ways. First, it was based fully on the notion of `outcomes' 
instead of `outputs'. Second, the departmental expenditure (resources) was to be 
reported according to key performance targets of the PSAs. So now being part of 
the Resource Accounts they could be discussed and examined by the 
parliamentary committees. Third and most important from HMCE's context is 
the formal attempt to relegate the traditional form of accountability and 
performance reporting and instead give greater prominence to the customer focus 
based accountability relationship. This will be further examined in section 7. 
With PSA 2000, the Government finally embraced outcome based measurement 
as the basis of PMS for the public sector organisations. Talbot (2000) analyses 
the move from outputs to outcomes measurement and argues that initially the 
terminology (e. g. outputs, intermediate outputs etc) was derived from formal 
economics. The shift to `outcomes' as the basis of performance measurement is, 
according to the author, a shift from formal economics definitions to those of 
public policy traditions. 
Together with this broad policy shift towards social/public policy based PMS, the 
refinement work of performance measurement and reporting also resulted in 
more explanatory documents in 2000. The PSAs of all department were now 
accompanied by Service Delivery Agreements (SDAs) and Technical Notes. The 
SDAs were published on 3 November 2000, and set out how each PSA would be 
157 
delivered together with key output targets that were critical to the delivery of the 
PSA outcome targets. Taking forward the Modernising Government agenda of 
the Government, these additional documents supported the PSAs and showed 
how departments would improve performance and how performance would be 
measured. 
It was noted in Chapter 6 that the PMS of HMCE is shaped by the high level 
strategic management policies of the central government which are spelt out in a 
number of policy documents. The influence of Lynch and Cross (1991) in such 
official publications was found to be quite evident. This pyramid like approach to 
performance measurement is evident in the design of SR (2000) PSA of HMCE 
as well, as shown in Fig 7.1. 
SR(2000) PSA 
Fig 7.1: The pyramid design of PSA of HMCE (figure developed by the PhD author) 
The over-arching "aim" of HMCE is: "to administer the indirect tax and customs 
control systems fairly and efficiently, and make it as easy as possible for 
individuals and businesses to understand and comply with their obligations" 
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(HMCE, 2002b: p 18). The three objectives of the Department have been outlined 
as: 
" "To collect the right revenue at the right time from indirect taxes". 
" "To reduce crime and drug dependency by detecting and deterring the 
smuggling of illegal drugs and other prohibited and restricted goods". 
" "To reduce the costs of international trade and improve the level of 
compliance with customs and statistical requirements" (ibid. ). 
When the management team responsible for performance measurement of VAT 
in HMCE was asked to comment upon the relationship between policy level and 
operational level performance measurement, the written official reply (EM 1) 
distinguished between PSA measures and operational level measures, where the 
former were said to be outcome based and cross-functional, reflecting the key 
aims of the Department. According to the reply, the operational level measures 
were more likely to be output based (although not always) and were linked to the 
PSA outcomes. 
The reply further informs that the PSA is broken down to: 
  high level business indicators that reflect the work of the function i. e. VAT business 
and show whether we are on track to achieving PSA outcome; and 
  operational measures, which look at aims, objectives and activities of each 
operational area, and link them to indicators and PSA target. We decide on the best 
way to measure their effectiveness/success, and set realistic, stretching targets using 
business experts and relevant data sources (ibid). 
7.2 The PSA 2000 
The PSA 2000 is in the form of policy targets with specific quantitative targets. 
Given below is a brief description of the targets that were part of the PSA. 
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Targets 1 and 2 of the HMCE PSA are to deliver year on year improvements in 
the compliance of businesses with their obligations, and to reverse the current 
trend in tobacco smuggling (so that by 2004/05 smuggled cigarettes represent no 
more than 18% of the market). 68 (see Annex 8.1 for estimates of tax fraud). 
These targets come under the first objective of collecting the right revenue at the 
right time from indirect taxes. Four key indicators for measuring improvement in 
compliance have been specified, each of which is to be measured separately with 
individual targets for each one of them. The indicators correspond to the key 
areas of compliance like registration; right tax at right time; 
assessments/voluntary disclosure; and the use of special schemes (HMCE, 
2002c)"69 
Target 3 of reducing the availability of Class A drugs by 25% by 2005 and by 
50% by 2008 specifically addresses the second objective of reducing crime and 
drug dependency by detecting and deterring the smuggling of illegal drugs and 
other prohibited and restricted goods. `Availability' is defined as the amount of 
Class A drugs available for distribution to the general population in the UK. This 
68 The market share of smuggled cigarettes is the percentage of the total amount of cigarettes 
consumed that is made up of smuggled cigarettes. This is measured using an internal statistical 
model (HMCE, 2002c). 
69 Baseline data for the timeliness of payments and declarations/returns and on trader debt was 
made available from existing internal systems from April 2001. HMCE had been developing the 
Compliance Testing Programme (CTP), to capture data on the accuracy of traders' 
declarations/returns. Through the CTP, information on numbers, values and type of error 
including both under and overpayments is gathered, via compliance questionnaires, from a 
statistically valid number of assurance audits. Once the information is collected it is analysed and 
assessed by the Department's statisticians and analysts who are independent of the business 
areas. Progress is reported on a quarterly basis (ibid). 
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in turn is dependent on the Department's successful disruption activity like 
seizures at entry and distribution points. 70 
Targets =8 come under objective number III which calls for reducing the costs 
of international trade and improving the level of compliance with customs and 
statistical requirements. The implied assumption behind this objective is that 
compliance can be improved if the taxpayers are provided with more efficient 
and customer focussed service. Target 4 aims at improving the level of 
compliance in connection with imports and exports. That also includes Intrastat, 
the collection of statistics on the movement of goods between member states 
within the European Community. Improvements are indicated by percentage 
improvements in the accuracy of frontier import and export declarations, 
fulfilling inland customs requirements and the timeliness of Intrastat 
declarations. 71 
Dealing categorically with improved provision of services, target 5 calls for 
electronic provision of 100% services by 2005 with at least 50% uptake by the 
users, target 6 calls for continued reductions in the businesses' compliance costs, 
target 7 requires achieving average annual productivity gains of at least 2.5% per 
year until 31 March 2004, without detriment to accuracy or customer 
satisfaction, and target 8 calls for achieving a 6% improvement in customer 
service from the 1999 baseline, as measured by the annual Customer Service 
Index (CSI), by April 2002. The CSI represents responses to a combination of 
Overall Satisfaction and Service Factors as asked in the Business Needs Survey 
70 Internal data capture systems were made available to record the weight of drugs seized; 
however, seizure data also came from the National Crime Squad and Home Office. 
'1 The information is derived from internal systems and the CTP. 
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1999. In addition to Overall Satisfaction, the factors enquired about are: 
communicates effectively; provides consistent service; understands commercial 
pressures on business; treats me fairly; and takes business needs into account. 72 
Table 7.2 below partially reproduces a four column table of performance outtums 
from the Spring Report, 2002. Column 1 lists the PSA outcome based target. The 
corresponding indicators for measuring this outcome are listed in column 2. The 
actual numerical target and quarterly performance against this target are listed in 
column 3 and 4 respectively (see Annexure 7.2 for full details). 
PSA Target Performance Indicator Target Out-turn Quarter 3 Out-turn 
1. Deliver year on year A percentage increase in the number 88% 87.08% 
improvements in the level of declarations/returns made on time. 
of compliance of 
businesses with their 
obligations. 
An increase in the value of payments 90.20% 90.22% 
made on time. 
An improvement in the accuracy of 79.7 84.1 
declarations/returns submitted. 
(Measured using CSI results from the 
Compliance Testing Programme. ) 
A reduction in the value of trader 1.41% 1.88% 
debt as a percentage of liability. 
Table 7.2: PSA Target Evaluation (HMCE, 2002d: p 16) 
7.3 An Appraisal of SR (2000) PSA 
In the earlier section three important changes with respect to SR (2000) PSA 
were identified. Of these the third one needs special mention. It relates to shifting 
emphasis to customer-focus based accountability from the traditional revenue 
collection and law enforcement based performance reporting. In chapter 4, the 
ethos of HMCE was identified as law enforcement defined. This conclusion is 
72 The Business Needs Surveys are carried out by external research companies. 
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not the result of personal judgement of this PhD author alone. In fact a TSC 
report refers to the law enforcement culture based ethos of the department: 
"Our key conclusion concerns the law enforcement culture which pervades all aspects of the 
work of Customs and Excise and which we argue must be altered in order for compliance 
costs to be minimised" (TSC, 2000c: para 88). 
When the then chairperson of the department claims that the department did give 
importance to customer focus, the TSC very unequivocally replied: 
"Dame Valerie Strachan's assertions that there are several discrete cultures within Customs 
and Excise and that "people in our advice centres do not look or sound like law enforcers" 
seem to us to underestimate the extent to which a common, underlying culture, based on the 
department's historical law enforcement traditions, pervades all aspects of the department's 
work. The considerable body of evidence we received complaining of the law enforcement 
culture of Customs and Excise, and the negative impacts this culture has on compliance, is 
too powerful to be dismissed. The law enforcement culture of customs work should not 
influence the collection of tax revenue from businesses" (ibid; para 133). 
A joke shared by a VAT consultant during an hour long interview with this PhD 
author is also an apt description of how the outsiders viewed the ethos of HMCE: 
"On a joint exercise by the Inland Revenue and Customs & Excise, investigating a tax case, 
they undertake a dawn raid on the premises of various taxpayers. Whilst waiting to enter the 
premises, the Inland Revenue Inspectors are sitting in their van discussing with their legal 
advisers what powers they have, what papers they can seize, who they can interview, etc. In 
another van, Customs & Excise officers are polishing their sledge-hammer! " (EM7). 
In view of the afore-mentioned examples it can be argued that the reorientation 
of the department along the NPM inspired customer focus would require basic 
transformation of the ethos of the organisation. The SR (2000) PSA can therefore 
be seen as a bold attempt on the part of reformers to transform the culture of 
HMCE with the help of accounting changes. This can further be analysed by 
examining the performance reporting under the new arrangements. 
The HMCE produces two reports about its organisational performance. The first 
one is of preliminary nature, called Spring Report, while the other is the final and 
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more detailed one and is called Annual Report and Accounts. With the 
implementation of RAB in 2001-02, like other departments, HMCE also started 
presenting resource accounts in its performance reports. What is important to 
notice is that the traditional measures of performance, i. e. revenue collection 
figures, are no longer in the PSA key performance measures. They are even not 
included anywhere in the resource accounts. Instead they are reported separately 
as a Trust statement. This relegation implies that revenue collection is considered 
not as a key performance measure but just as a trustee function of HMCE. 
It is important to note that while the traditional accountability (i. e. holding 
taxpayers to account) fails to get prominence in the new PSA based measures, 
the NPM inspired customer-focus based accountability has specific measures 
such as Customer Satisfaction Index (CSI) which required 6% improvement in 
taxpayers' satisfaction with HMCE's performance. Therefore, SR (2000) can be 
seen as a very bold and determined effort on the part of governmental reformers 
to use accounting changes to redefine dimensions of performance in HMCE. 
Whether such accounting changes transformed the ethos of the organisation? 
How did the organisation react to such changes enforced from the top? These 
questions need examination of further evidence which is presented in the 
remaining part of this section and will be carried through to the next chapters as 
well. 
Obtaining access to the head of a Government department like HMCE is not a 
realistic possibility for a PhD student. However the oral evidence he gave before 
the TSC members provided the PhD author with rich textual data for analysis 
purpose. The tensions the new framework of measuring performance under 
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SR(2000) PSA created for HMCE's top management are very clear from the 
conversation that took place in one of the hearings. For instance when the 
chairman of the department was asked as to why the desired level of 
improvement in customer satisfaction was not achieved, the chairman replied 
that: 
"... I think one of the things we are learning is the provision of service is not 
necessarily quite the same as satisfaction, and I sometimes ask myself whether, in a 
sense, taxpayers can be satisfied, if you like, by our providing more services. We 
have dealt with this target and I am sensitive to that .... 
I am probably personally 
coming to the conclusion that we will not do that by going on providing service 
innovations. We are going to have to get to grips with something much more 
fundamental 
... 
" (TSC, 2002: para 42). 
The frustration of the chairman with measuring customer focus through the 
measure of taxpayers' satisfaction is quite evident as he questions if taxpayers 
can ever be satisfied. Thus in the department's view the tax-payers satisfaction 
(measured by Customer Satisfaction Index, CSI) was a measure which was not in 
line with its traditional measures of performance. In the private sector customers' 
satisfaction is assumed to be a function of better service delivery. The chairman 
of HMCE distinguishes the tax department from service delivery organisations 
by expressing his doubts on the presumed causal link between taxpayers' 
satisfaction and improved service delivery. The department is declared not to 
have come to grips with this new measure of performance which places the 
department in an accountable position directly to the taxpayers. The Chairman 
makes an apologetic defence by claiming that the CSI measure did not reflect all 
the changes that had been introduced in the area of service provision. In the same 
oral evidence he argues that better customer satisfaction might be achieved by 
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concentrating upon the changes linked to e-technology and IT, which would 
transform the nature of the interaction of the taxpayers with the tax department. 
In response to this apologetic defence the chairman was asked by the TSC 
members if he would consider changing the target in the future. The Chairman 
replied: 
"... [W]e can go back, if you like, to output measurements which is easy. It was 
actually our idea, saying, "Let us go for an outcome, let us go for satisfaction", and 
we are learning now that it is quite difficult to measure, so I think we will try to 
replace it, but I would like to keep pushing to see if we can keep an outcome base 
rather than just going back to outputs, which are sort of Mickey Mouse, really" 
(ibid: para 43). 
It can be seen that the department was not very happy with using the outcomes 
based target for service delivery. The Chairman admits that measuring 
performance in terms of customer satisfaction is difficult in the context of tax 
administration. 
Another important measure of performance, productivity (or efficiency) was not 
entirely new however its measurement was based more on outcomes instead of 
traditional outputs. The measure is not directly customers related and reflects 
more the concern of Government as the funds provider. But since the funds come 
from the taxpayers' money so in a way the Government acts as a trustee and 
ensures on behalf of taxpayers that the HMCE uses all funds in the most effective 
way. So the measure can be viewed as indirectly customer related. 
The target for productivity gains in SR (2000) PSA was to achieve 2.5% 
increase. However the outturn was bizarre, - 8.9 %, which was noted by the TSC 
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members and the Chairman of HMCE was asked to explain this negative score 
on this important dimension of performance. 
In reply the Chairman once again puts up a very apologetic defence by 
attributing the reason of poor performance to the outcomes based measurement 
of productivity He argued that if the traditional measures of activity (e. g. the unit 
costs of collecting tax, tax collection and law enforcement activities) were 
considered the productivity would have been positive. He further elaborated that 
out of 60 PSA related performance indicators, only seven were included for 
productivity measurement; of which only five were paper-counting measures, 
like "Did you get the returns in? " The following excerpt from the oral evidence 
of the Chairman before TSC illustrates very clearly the department's frustration 
with outcomes based targets: 
"We got the target wrong. This again was an attempt to try and create an 
outcome based target, and I do not want to labour the point, but I think it is 
sometimes underestimated how different an outcome target is from an output 
target, how difficult to construct and how difficult to get an organisation to 
meet. ... 
So they have led me to look very carefully into why this target has this 
rather interesting result. The answer is this: that attempt to create an outcome 
target is calculated by taking only a small number of our PSA measures - 
because not all of them are very easily translated into outputs" (ibid: 44). 
The departments' problems with the outcomes based targets and measures did 
not end with the taxpayers' satisfaction and productivity. Another key measure 
of performance related to debt management. The poor performance on that 
dimension, the Chairman clarified, was caused by good performance on law 
enforcement dimension. The department had been successful in detecting 
missing trader fraud which led to a big increase in debt figures. The Chairman 
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terms the negative results on new measures of performance an illustration of 
"complexity" of outcome targets and call for carefulness in interpreting them. 
7.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter the important changes introduced by SR 2000 PSA in the 
performance measurement and reporting regime of HMCE were reviewed. It was 
found that with this spending review a complete shift from `outputs' to 
`outcomes' took place. More importantly, the NPM inspired customer-focused 
accounting changes relegated the traditional measures of performance in terms of 
law enforcement and revenue collection to secondary importance (i. e. in the form 
of Trust Statement) while the customer-focus based outcomes measures of PSA 
acquired primary importance. This resulted in tensions between the traditional 
form of PMS and the new customer-focused PMS. The empirical analysis of the 
measures used during the period of analysis helps in proposing a framework for 
analysing accountability relationships and PMS which will be discussed in the 
next chapter. 
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Chapter 8 
Theorising Accountability Relations in a Tax Administration 
Introduction 
In the previous two chapters the performance measurement of HMCE before and 
after the NPM inspired accounting changes were analysed. It was not surprising 
to find that the traditional PMS of an old organisation like HMCE reflected the 
law enforcement ethos of the organisation. It was noted that the SR (2000) PSA 
sought bringing about changes in the ethos of HMCE by giving greater 
prominence to customer-focused measures of performance. The tension created 
by these top down imposed changes was evident from the confessions made by 
the Chairperson of HMCE before the members of TSC. Earlier in chapter 2a 
simplified accountability framework for public sector organisations was 
proposed Analysing the evidence of performance measurement discussed in 
chapters 6-7 with insights from principal agent model of accountability, 
stakeholder theory and structuration theory a framework of accountability 
relations for tax authorities is developed in this chapter. Based on the notion of 
reciprocity of accountability the framework is built around the competing notions 
of traditional accountability in HMCE and the NPM inspired theme of customer- 
focused accountability. The framework helps in conceptualising a shift in 
emphasis from one form of accountability to another through accounting 
reforms. 
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8.1 The Building Blocks 
Fowles (1993: 102) states that `accountability' has become a widely used word in 
discussions of public policy, both as "a buzzword or simply as an emblem". 
However the notion of accountability is still considered to be quite complex 
(Robinson, 2003) and authors keep proposing theories and frameworks to 
understand the notion in both private and public sectors. For instance Roberts 
and Scapens (1985) elaborate a theoretical framework for analysing the operation 
of systems of accountability within organisations. Ahrens and Chapman (2002) 
use structuration theory of Giddens (1984) to examine the accountability system 
of a restaurant chain. Gray and Jenkins (1993) argue that the analysis of 
accountability in the public sector had remained focused upon ministerial 
accountability due to the dominance of political science in the field of public 
administration. They stress the need for a conceptual framework of 
accountability which draws on other social sciences but takes as its focus the 
accountability relationship itself. They propose a framework based on principal 
agent model. Referring to the work of Bird (1973), they state that stewards are 
given resources by the principal, where stewards expect a reward for their 
services while the principal expects that the resources will be used according to 
the aims and objectives set by the principal. The authors argue that in addition to 
stewards and principal the third element of an accountability relationship is `code 
of accountability'. They define it as "a system of signals, meanings and customs 
which binds the principal and steward in the establishment, execution and 
adjudication of their relationship" (p 55). 
Roberts (2001) reviews the works of other authors and identify various 
mechanisms of accountability such as formal and informal types of 
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accountability. The author terms procedure-based accountability, direction-based 
accountability and performance based accountability together as the 
administrative model of accountability. 
The existing literature is focused on identifying and classifying various forms of 
accountability relationships. Theorising the interaction of various accountability 
relationships in a situation where the principal and agent can have reciprocal 
roles is not so well addressed in the literature. This PhD study provided an 
opportunity to fill this gap and in the remaining part of the chapter the framework 
based on reciprocal accountability relationships will be developed. 
In chapter 3 the main research question was decomposed into four constituent 
questions with the help of principal agent model of accountability. The questions 
were: 
1. Who is (are) the principal (principals) in the case of a tax administration? 
2. Who is (are) the Agent (agents) in the case of a tax administration? 
3. What is the format of accounts and what are its contents for the purpose 
of performance measurement and reporting? 
4. What are the remedial/control powers available to the principals? 
Questions 3 and 4 can be seen as approximating to the code of accountability as 
defined by Gray and Jenkins (1993). The framework can be improved if insights 
are drawn from the stakeholder theory which provides the following set of 
questions (Frooman, 1999): 
1. Who are the stakeholders? 
2. What do they want? 
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3. What influence strategies do they have? 
4. How are they going to use those strategies? 
If the principal agent model related schematic questions and the stakeholder 
theory related questions are considered together, the following questions can 
provide a framework for analysing accountability system of a public sector 
organisation. 
1. Who are the stakeholders? 
2. How are they related to one another in terms of principal agent model? 
3. What does the principal want from the agent(s)? 
4. What is the format of accounts and what are its contents for the purpose 
of performance measurement and reporting? To what degree do the 
accounts reflect the demands of the principal? 
5. What influence strategies does the principal have to ensure that the 
accounts reflect his/her expectations? 
6. What are the remedial/control powers available to the principal if he/she 
is not satisfied with the level of performance reported by the agent(s)? 
In the NPM inspired literature and official publications the term `accountability' 
is repeatedly used. In chapter 2 it was noticed that accountability relationships 
can be of various forms such as public, managerial or legal accountability. Since 
accountability for the purpose of this PhD research was defined in its formal 
meaning of `giving and taking of accounts', it is important to know who is giving 
accounts to whom and in what format? 
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The stakeholders in the case of HMCE are restricted to only those who have a 
relationship of `giving and taking of accounts' on a regular basis. As such the 
following can be identified as the main stakeholders: 73 
" Taxpayers74 
9 Government (The Treasury is the department to which HMCE is 
accountable) 
" HMCE (the department can be seen as comprising the Board which 
formulates policy in consultation with the Treasury and the tax collectors 
(operational level employees) who interact with the VAT registered 
businesses on a regular basis) 
In the simplified accountability model proposed in Chapter 2, three stakeholders 
were identified as Government, Public Sector Organisation and Citizens. In the 
context of HMCE, the taxpayers take the place of citizens. At a broader level, i. e. 
in terms of public/political accountability, the taxpayers are also citizens, so they 
enjoy the rights which citizens enjoy in any democratic society. However, when 
legal accountability is considered, the taxpayers are individuals acting on their 
own, with the assumption that they are motivated by a desire to minimise their 
tax liability. The citizens, as a whole, want every tax payer to pay the correct 
amount of tax. In order to achieve this goal the tax collectors are equipped with 
necessary legal powers to hold tax payers to account for their tax liability. 
73 The importance of other stakeholders like the society and media is well recognised however 
they have not been considered here since they are not directly involved in `giving and taking of 
accounts' in a formal manner or on a regular basis. 
74 VAT registered Businesses are assumed to be the taxpayers for HMCE. Technically the VAT 
registered businesses are not the taxpayers as VAT is a tax on final consumers but since these 
businesses collect and deposit VAT on behalf of the government, they have a `giving and taking 
of accounts' relationship. 
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The taxation organisation is also seen to be characterised by a dual role. In one 
role, it holds the taxpayers to account by making them file tax returns and then 
audit those returns. In the second role, it is held to account by the parliamentary 
committees for its conduct towards the taxpayers (in their capacity as citizens). 
The department can, therefore, be seen as comprising two stakeholders for the 
purpose of accountability framework. One, the Board; which is responsible for 
policy formulation, and whose chairperson regularly appears before the 
parliamentary committees to account for organisational policies towards the 
taxpaying citizens. Second, operational level tax collectors who interact regularly 
with the taxpayers and hold the taxpayers to account with their legal powers. 
This understanding helps in answering the question as to what kinds of 
accountability relationships these stakeholders have with each other. The guiding 
premise is that the stakeholder who gives accounts for performance is `the agent' 
while the stakeholder who demands and receives accounts is the `principal'. 
Accountability is the cementing relationship for the principal agent model where 
the principal allows the agent to continue utilising resources due to the 
accountability powers of incapacitation and deterrence75 which the principal 
enjoys. In the case of HMCE different kinds of `accounts taking' can be 
identified. 
The traditional job of operational level employees of HMCE is to audit the 
accounts of taxpayers (i. e. VAT registered businesses) on a regular basis. 
This 
relationship makes the VAT officers and their managers the principal and the 
taxpayers who (in their individual capacity) present their accounts (in the 
form of 
75 These terms were explained in chapter 2 with reference to principal agent model of 
accountability. 
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VAT tax returns and other accounting records) for audit as the agent in terms of 
principal agent model. This form of accountability relationship can be labelled as 
`legal accountability relationship'. Since the tax collectors are the operational 
arms of the Board and Government, the two also stand included in this form of 
accountability relationship. 
The operational level employees report their performance on a regular basis to 
the Management Committee of the Board. So this account taking makes the 
Board the principal and the operational level employees the agent. The form of 
this accountability relationship can be labelled as `managerial accountability 
relationship'. The Board of HMCE reports the overall organisational 
performance to the Government (the Treasury). This relationship of account 
taking makes the Board the agent and the Government the principal. The form of 
this accountability relationship is also a `managerial accountability 
relationship'. 
The Government (the Treasury) presents its performance report to the 
parliamentary committees which audit these reports with the help of experts in 
the field and NAO. In this relationship the parliamentary committees can be 
thought as acting on behalf of taxpayers (as citizens) and thus are the principal 
while the Government can be termed the agent. This form of accountability can 
be labelled as `public/political accountability relationship'. The tax collectors 
and the Board are the operational arms of the government so they also stand 
accountable to the taxpayers in this relationship. They are also accountable for 
behavioural aspects of performance and the quality of services provided to the 
taxpayers. 
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This duality in the role of tax payers and tax collectors results in an 
accountability relationship which is of `reciprocal' nature. According to 
structuration theory expounded by Giddens (1979: 1984) all social systems are 
comprised of day-to-day social interactions involving situated activities of 
human agents existing in time-space, and are constituted by regular, reproduced 
relations of interdependence between either individual agents or a collective 
group (1979, p. 69). Giddens uses the term `integration' which is defined as 
"regularised ties, interchanges or reciprocity of practices between actors or 
collectivities" and refers to the degree of interdependence of action (or 
"systemness") associated with system reproduction (1984, p. 76). The notion of 
`reciprocity' is important for the accountability system of HMCE as an element 
of reciprocity can be identified in the process of `accounts giving and taking' in 
the case of HMCE. 
It is not being suggested that this reciprocity is only unique to tax authorities as 
some degree of reciprocity is present in all social relationships. However, as 
stated at the very outset in Chapter 2, only formal form of accountability is 
considered for this PhD research. A relationship qualifies as an accountability 
relationship only if it is characterised by a regular and formal `giving and taking 
of accounts'. Based on this qualification, the public sector organisations can be 
categorized on a continuum of reciprocal accountability relationship which is 
defined as a relationship in which two actors are accountable to one another by 
virtue of mutual accountability expectations. 
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Service Delivery 
organisations (e. g. NHS ) 
A 
Law Enforcement 
organisations (e. g. Police) 
B 
Tax authorities 
C 
Fig 8.1: Reciprocal-accountabilities based classification of public sector organisations 
On the increasing intensity line, point A represents the weakest form of such a 
relationship and point C is the strongest form. The service delivery organisations 
like NHS, Schools, etc are accountable to the recipients for provision of high 
quality services, but the recipients do not have any formal accountability 
relationship to them which are operationalised by formal accounting systems. At 
the most they are expected not to defraud these services, in which case they can 
be held to account. But this is not a regular form of `giving and taking of 
accounts'. In the middle are Law Enforcement organisations such as the Police. 
Though there is some degree of reciprocity of accountability between the 
recipients of services and these organisations, there is an important distinction as 
well. The recipients here demand these services of their own accord, and do not 
resort to avoiding receipt of those services. For instance, more police patrols and 
quick response to help calls are considered valuable services by the people in 
general. Moreover, no regular returns are filed by residents of an area to the 
police. On the line, point C represents the strongest form of reciprocal 
accountability as both service providers and recipients are held to account by 
virtue of formal accountability arrangements. For instance, in the case of HMCE, 
minimising tax evasion by cash based businesses and tax avoidance by the large 
firms are the main policy goals of compliance strategy (HMCE, 2002e: p 13). 
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The taxpayers are held to account by returns filing and risk based audits. On the 
other hand the tax authorities are also held to account to the taxpayers by formal 
accounting methods (customer- focus based accounting) such as PSA policy 
targets like taxpayers' satisfaction and compliance costs reduction, number of 
complaints and service charters which are scrutinised in parliamentary 
committees' hearings. 
The literature on public sector accountability, reviewed in Chapter 2, is primarily 
focused on organisations situated on point A to point B. The underlying 
assumption there is that the organisations are accountable to the recipients of 
services/goods. However, if the analysis is extended to the public sector 
organisations on point C, the traditional analytical tools are not sufficient because 
in such organisations accountability is reciprocal. Drawing upon the previous 
discussion, the accountability system of a tax administration like HMCE has 
been summarised in the fig 8.2. The system can be seen as comprising of three 
main forms of accountability relationships, managerial, legal and public among 
taxpayers (the clients of HMCE for tax payment purposes), the tax officials, the 
Board and the Government. 
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Fig 8.2: Reciprocal Accountability Framework developed by the PhD author 
Two forms of accountability relationships are of special interest in the 
framework with regards to a tax administration. First is the `legal accountability' 
relationship which is the traditional form of accountability (derived from legal 
powers). In this form the taxpayers are held to account through compliance 
enforcement by the department. The second is the NPM inspired customer- 
focused accountability 76. The striking feature of this framework is that the 
taxpayers and the department are in the state of reciprocal accountability to each 
other. In the legal/traditional form, the taxpayers, like an agent, have to give 
accounts to the department, who act as a principal. In the political (or public) 
accountability relationship, the roles are reversed, and now the department acts 
like an agent and has to give accounts to the taxpayers, the principal, which are 
scrutinised by the parliamentary committees on behalf of the taxpayers. 
76 The managerial form of accountability essentially is an intermediary form which is an 
extension of either traditional or customer-focused accountabilities. 
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The Board has a peculiar and important position in this framework. Seen as an 
extended arm of the government it is actively engaged in tax policy making. 
Moreover, it oversees the operational activities of the tax auditors (called VAT 
assurance officers) and can influence their activities through managerial 
accountability. It can therefore be argued, that the Board is accountable to the 
taxpayers for the tax policy of the government and activities of the tax collectors. 
Consequently, the Board and Government, together are held to account by the tax 
payers (through parliamentary committees)77. The lower half of the rectangle 
represents this form of accountability relationship between the tax policy makers 
and the tax payers. 
On the other hand, the taxpayers are also accountable to the Board. The powers 
of holding the taxpayers to account for their tax liability are entrusted through 
Acts of the parliament upon the Commissioners of HMCE who are members of 
the Board. The taxpayers are made accountable with the help of operational level 
personnel of HMCE. It can therefore be concluded that the Board and Taxpayers 
are accountable to each other reciprocally. The two-directional diagonal BD 
represents this reciprocity between the Board and the taxpayers. 
The managers of all public sector organisations have to respond to cross 
pressures of multiple accountability relationships (Romzek and Dubnick, 2001). 
In the context of HMCE, the RAF rectangle can be seen as made up of two 
triangles which provide the orientation of the PMSs used to operationalise the 
relevant accountability relationship. The triangles reflect what is central to the 
relevant definition of performance and identification of what will be measured? 
77 This is not just a theoretical proposition, as the parliamentary hearings are attended by both the 
Economic Secretary (minister of HMCE) and Chairperson of HMCE. 
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The upper triangle represents the traditional form of accountability relationships 
and all policies associated with this aspect of performance. Since this PhD 
concerns use of accounting information to operationalise accountability, only 
PMS is taken into account here. The PMS influenced by traditional/legal form of 
accountability will have performance measures/PIs which account for 
compliance of taxpayers to the tax laws. Examples are, revenue collection 
figures, anti-evasion cases, audits conducted etc. 
The lower triangle represents NPM inspired and relatively newer pressures of 
accountability upon the tax managers. Here the tax payers can be thought of as 
members of the citizenry, enjoying legal rights which can be classified into two 
categories. First, civil liberty rights, which are guaranteed by laws other than 
revenue laws, such as Human Rights Act, 1998 and common law. By virtue of 
these rights the taxpayers, as free citizens, enjoy certain rights of privacy of 
person and property which can not be violated by any authority, including tax 
authorities (OECD, 1990). Second, strict tax liability rights, which are best 
explained by Adam Smith's following observation: 
" 
... Every tax ought to 
be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out of the pockets of 
the people as little as possible, over and above what it brings into the public treasury of the 
state". (Wealth of Nations Book V, Chapter 2, part II) 
Put briefly, it can be argued that while every good citizen is expected to pay the 
due tax in full, he also enjoys the right that in discharging his tax liability he is 
not forced to incur any extra monetary costs over and above the tax amount; he 
also enjoys the right that he is not forced to experience any psychological worries 
in meeting his tax liability. 
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Adam Smith also mentions the issue of psychic costs of taxation: 
11 ... though vexation 
is not, strictly speaking, expense, it is certainly equivalent to the 
expense at which every man would be willing to redeem himself from it. " (ibid) 
VAT is generally considered to be a complex tax system, and historically tax 
evasion and avoidance have been high, as is evident from the following 
observation made by the Economic Secretary in the foreword of a high level 
strategy paper of HMCE: 
"We are launching a strategy to tackle the revenue shortfalls which - over the last decade or 
more - have become a standing feature of the VAT system" (emphasis added: HMCE, 2002e: 
foreword). 
A senior manager made even more frank admission with respect to unpopularity 
of taxes, especially VAT, among general businesses: 
"I would say that most people don't want to pay taxes. Certainly most VAT registered 
businesses would rather not be unpaid tax collectors, so they have problems" (SM2: p 22) 
The above discussion should enable us to answer the question as to what do the 
taxpayers, as the stakeholders in this system, want from the tax policy makers 
and managers. They want the tax system to be simple to understand, with a very 
high level of respect for their civil rights and which refrains from subjecting 
them to high compliance costs. 
The diagrammatic representation of pressures of accountability should not lead 
us to believe that the tax authorities will be under equal pressures from 
government and taxpayers. In fact, the stakeholders do not have equal powers in 
influencing the decisions of managers and arguably `resource dependence' 
becomes the dominant factor in this power asymmetry situation (Frooman, 
1999). The government being the resource provider enjoys an advantage as 
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against other stakeholders. The taxpayers may counter this advantage of the 
government by utilising `public opinion' pressure upon the tax department. The 
parliamentary subcommittees can be thought of as the most important 
representative and guardian of the taxpayers' rights. For instance, the seventh 
report of the Treasury Committee of House of Commons is titled The 
Administrative Costs of Tax Compliance (TSC, 2004) which deals specifically 
with the issue of minimizing compliance costs. The importance attached to the 
demands of taxpayers is evident from the following lines: 
"The Paymaster General told us that it was probably fair to say that reducing compliance 
costs had a higher priority now than five years ago and that "whilst it was always there, we 
are pushing ahead and trying actually to bear down on it in a more systematic way" (P 5). 
The upshot of the preceding discussion is that the `political accountability' of 
Government to its taxpaying voters is operationalised in the political process 
(Parliament, voting) and along channels of public opinion like the press, 
academic research and business associations. It can, therefore, be argued that the 
area of this public accountability driven triangle represents the policies and 
actions undertaken by the Government which explicitly aim to minimise the 
problems perceived by taxpayers to be associated with tax, like compliance 
costs78, excessive `red tape', and corruption. 79 However, as stated earlier, the 
78 Even the official report on merger also mentions compliance costs reduction as an important 
objective of merger of the two departments. 
79 Considering performance management in the case of Inland Revenue, Fitzgerald et al (2004) 
distinguish between two types of accounting in the following way: 
Customer accounting has been developed to facilitate the customer focus imposed to 
reorganise IR facilities and processes, as well as to report on customer service, support and 
enablement. Some forms of reporting are externally mandated - e. g. customer service 
standard reporting. Others have had to be developed, e. g. customer support. 
Compliance accounting focuses on another aspect of performance. Tax departments are 
judged on how well they collect the tax that is assessable under existing tax policy and law. 
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concern of this PhD is restricted to the use of PMS for operationalising 
accountability. Consequently only accounting information made available to the 
taxpayers with regards to performance of HMCE (or any tax organisation) on this 
dimension will be of interest in RAF. 
8.2 The Reciprocal Accountability Paradox 
The essence of Q4 of the six questions framework identified earlier in this 
chapter is to determine as to which accountability relationship is the dominant 
one. This can be answered by considering two probing questions: 
" What measures/PIs are used by the tax department to assess its 
performance?, and 
" How performance is reported in the narrative form? 
It was identified that the diagonal BD in the framework represents the reciprocal 
accountability relationship between the taxpayers and the tax department. They 
are principal and agent to each other under the accountability relationships of the 
upper and lower triangles. Arguably, the two triangles represent potentially 
contrasting objectives of a tax administration, and the possible tension between 
the conflicting aims of a tax policy may not be easily resolvable. A recent study 
by CIOT (2003) is a good example of the nature of relationships between the tax 
collectors and taxpayers (or their consultants). The study finds that while the two 
groups had a sharing of views on some issues they were quite divergent on 
Some measures are externally mandated: net tax revenues raised, as well as amounts written 
off. An additional important element is: Has as much as possible been collected 
The Customer accounting and Compliance accounting can be seen as the operational] sation of 
NPM inspired customer-focused PMS and the traditional compliance driven PMS of RAF. 
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others. The possibility of tension between notions of performance is evident from 
the following slightly sweetened conclusion: 
"There was strong support from both tax advisers and HMCE staff for avoiding an 
adversarial approach and for increasing the amount of consultation with taxpayers and tax 
advisers before new measures are introduced" (CIOT, 2003: p 17). 
The possibility of conflicting notions of performance is also mentioned by 
the TSC in its report cited earlier in this section. 
"We recognise the conflict between producing a tax system that is simple to understand and 
operate. and the need for checks and safeguards to bear down on tax avoidance" (TC, 2004: 
p 5). 
'Therefore, it can be argued that due to this potentially conflicting situation, the 
policy managers will be faced with three possible scenarios with respect to the 
proposed framework. 
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Fig 8.3: Dilemma in Reciprocal Accountability Framework 
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First, the desired policy of the government and the tax administration would be to 
ensure a trade-off between the two triangular halves in such a way that we have 
two symmetrical triangles. This ideal situation can be term as Symmetrical Policy 
Framework; which is achieved when concerns about compliance regulations and 
public accountability are equal in magnitude thus the reciprocity diagonal which 
establishes a two way mutual accountability relationship between the taxpayers 
and the tax policy managers (i. e. the Board) stays intact. In this situation the 
PMS of the tax administration will have PIs which relate to the two halves in 
equal importance. This means that not only there will be PIs indicating 
compliance and taxpayers' satisfaction but that they will be given importance in 
textual narratives and rewards/penalties will be linked to the two as well. 
Second possible situation can be when the concerns about revenue enhancement 
through greater enforcement outweigh public accountability concerns. If the 
measures/PIs are all related to compliance enforcement (e. g. revenue collection, 
detections, seizures) then it is an indication that the traditional form of 
accountability dominates the system. This can be termed as Compliance 
Dominant Policy Framework. In its extreme situation, in the Fig 8.2 the 
compliance driven part of the rectangle will squeeze out the public accountability 
area of the rectangle. The tax policy managers feel themselves to be only 
accountable to the government and the tax policies and PMSs of tax authorities 
reflect tax revenue generation as the only policy goal. 
Third possible situation can be termed Public Accountability Dominant Policy 
Framework; when the revenue enhancement concerns are less influential as 
against concerns about respecting civil rights of the taxpayers and wooing 
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investors. In its extreme hypothetical situation all the measures/PIs are related to 
public accountability concerns (e. g. taxpayers satisfaction, compliance costs 
reduction, complaints handling) and thus the compliance driven part of the 
rectangle is squeezed out by the public accountability area of the rectangle. 
A fact noticeable in the framework and often found in the official discourse of 
the tax authorities is the desire for pursuing symmetrical policy framework where 
both enforcement and taxpayers' problems would appear high on the policy 
agenda of the tax policy managers. But the paradox faced by the policy makers is 
that they find it difficult to increase the area of one triangle without shrinking the 
size of other. It's not to suggest that a tax policy maker always intentionally 
wants to see asymmetry between the two triangles. The point to stress is that both 
compliance driven and public accountability driven policies entail unintended 
consequences which impact the area of corresponding triangle. 
It is often seen that when tax policy makers launch a compliance/enforcement 
drive, there can be a resulting perception among the taxpayers that any 
improvement in compliance performance is achieved by the department at the 
expense of the taxpayers' civil legal rights or increased compliance costs. This 
point can be illustrated with the help of efforts made by HMCE in combating 
Missing Traders Fraud which will be discussed in the next chapter. The 
department prominently mentioned the success of efforts made towards 
minimising this large scale fraud in its annual reports. But there were some 
unintended consequences of the drive as can be noted from the following excerpt 
of a story appearing on the AccountingWEB. com (20-Aug-2002) 
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"The legitimate mobile phone industry is being affected by Customs' overreaction to the 
fraud. Tax consultant Don Mavin claims Customs is panicking and refusing to pay out 
legitimate VAT repayments until checks have been made on the entire trading chain". 
Another story appearing on the AccountingWEB. com (22-Apr-2003) illustrates 
the point more clearly. The story claims in its opening paragraph that: 
"Customs & Excise is being given draconian new powers to combat VAT fraud. Measures 
in the Finance Bill published last week threaten to hit legitimate traders - especially in the 
fraud-riddled computer chip and mobile phone industries - for VAT losses caused by the 
activities of criminals, reports The Independent. These measures will allow Customs to 
impose liability for payment of lost VAT on suppliers or recipients of goods either side of 
a missing trader, even if they were not knowingly involved in the fraud". 
The high level strategy papers80 of HMCE state that anti-avoidance strategy is 
one of the pillars of the new VAT strategy (HMCE, 2002: p 16). While pursuing 
this strategy the intended goal is to achieve improved performance on 
compliance side of the accountability framework. However, as an unintended 
consequence there can be apprehensive perceptions among the taxpayers or their 
representatives as well. This is suggested by the following remark of Hugh Love, 
a tax director at PricewaterhouseCoopers and a former senior Customs officer in 
the aforementioned story. 
"Customs have been over-enthusiastic in their anti-avoidance operations lately. What I fear 
is, if they do not like a trader's response or it's a bit slow, they will use these new powers 
too broadly". 
Similarly, in a written evidence before TSC, PricewaterhouseCoopers remarked 
that HMCE "has a culture of seeking to maximise the tax collected rather than 
collecting the tax that is properly due under the law" (TSC, 1999c). 
80 These high level strategy papers will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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The PhD researcher, with the help of the secretary of the VAT practitioners 
group, obtained written answers from 20 tax advisors (annex 10.2). The generally 
shared theme of the replies was that the HMCE's performance was driven by the 
Treasury demands for more tax revenue while the taxpayers' legal rights were by 
and large ignored 
In view of the above evidences it can be argued that the tax authorities are faced 
with the paradox of maintaining a symmetrical framework in a situation where 
good performance on one triangle of the framework might be perceived as 
infringing upon the area of the other triangle. 
8.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter a framework for analysing accountability relationships was 
developed with the help of insights from structuration theory, stakeholder theory 
and principal agent model. The skeletal framework is fleshed by empirical 
evidence of accounting changes implemented by HMCE during the period of 
analysis of this PhD research. If the PIs of HMCE discussed in chapters 5 and 7 
are re-examined, it can be seen that the Next Steps and CSR (1998) PSA were 
compliance driven as compliance enforcement related measures were not only 
prominent in measuring performance but the textual reporting in Annual Reports 
was also done with reference to these measures alone. However with SR (2000) 
PSA it can be said that a conscious effort was made by the reformers to shift the 
focus of performance measurement from traditional form of accountability to the 
customer-focused one. The measures/PIs listed in SR (2000) PSA do suggest 
such a shift. However, it is important to notice that the narrative reporting in the 
annual reports continued to be dominated by the traditional measures of 
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performance. The tensions created by the new PIs were discussed in the previous 
chapter. To what degree the shift in focus permeated the ethos of the organisation 
needs analysis of further evidence which will be dealt with in the next chapter. 
This further analysis of evidence is required so that it is known how did the 
department cope with the accounting changes of SR (2000) PSA (Laughlin, 
1995; Oliver, 1991). 
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Chapter 9 
Reconciling the Tensions - the Tax Gap Based PMS 
Introduction 
In the previous chapters it was argued that the performance measurement of 
HMCE moved away from outputs to outcomes based multidimensional 
framework. The shift in focus from traditional form of accountability to the NPM 
inspired customer-focused PSA resulted in tensions between the two forms of 
accountabilities. It was also learnt that the accountability relationships between 
HMCE and its clients the taxpayers characterised an element of reciprocity. 
Traditionally, the focus had been on the compliance enforcement side of this 
reciprocal relationship. How did HMCE cope with this shifting of focus towards 
customer-focused PMS is the focus of this chapter. Three types of evidence are 
examined for this investigation purpose. First, the views of the employees are 
analysed to identify if the accounting changes had any visible effect on how 
performance is conceptualised by them. Second, the accounting changes 
themselves are analysed to see what happened to them and how they were used 
or redefined. Third, the merger of HMCE with Inland Revenue is briefly 
investigated to see if it lends substance to the conclusions. The overall evidence 
helps in concluding that the PMS introduced by PSA 2000 failed to make any 
significant impact upon the traditional ethos of HMCE. 
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9.1 The Notion of Performance 
Acknowledging the fact that `performance' is capable of no simple definition, 
Otley (1999) suggests that an organisation that is performing well is one that is 
successfully attaining its objectives. The notion of performance articulated in the 
official publications is influenced to a great extent by the private sector models 
of performance management (Likierman, 1994; Bromwich and Lapsley, 1997). It was 
stated in chapter 6 that in the latest official performance reports of HMCE, 
organisational performance has been construed in terms of implementing 
organisational strategy as spelt out by PSA aim and objectives. For instance, the 
Spring Report, 2003 outlines the new strategy based conceptualization of 
performance: 
"We have adopted a strategic approach to our responsibilities and reformulated our main 
targets to be outcome based. This means we assess and quantify the size and nature of the 
problem to be tackled and determine an appropriate strategic response that drives outputs and 
operational interventions to deliver quantified outcomes. Output based targets are used as 
management indicators - it is the outcomes that are the goals ... 
The Government has 
invested in our approach. This is reflected in our new Public Service Agreement. It focuses 
first on compliance, second, on improved efficiency and third, on service quality" (HMCE, 
2003b: p7). 
The Annual Report refers to this new conceptualization of performance by 
comparing it with the traditional meaning of performance. 
"Traditionally we measured our performance in terms of the level of certain activities: 
smuggled goods seized, numbers prosecuted and efficiency gains achieved. In 2000 the 
Department changed fundamentally its approach to setting objectives and measuring 
performance" (HMCE, 2003c: P7) 
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The shift in meaning of performance is also orchestrated in the discourse of very 
senior managers. For instance one such respondent referred to this process of 
conceptualising as: 
"... that it's down to us here to, as it were, to translate the information, the information on 
performance measurement, we get from regions, to translate that into national picture, so that 
we can say, that we are on track to meet our national departmental objectives, or not, ... 
" 
(SM1; p 1). 
The description of the notion of performance from the top level official discourse 
would suggest that the new notion of organisational performance is conceived 
with clarity across the whole organisation. But when the same question was put 
before the middle and operational level employees the notion of performance 
was defined by the respondents in their own particular ways which arguably 
reflected their nature of jobs, personality types and experience. Some defined 
performance in terms of more returns and thus more revenue (MM7), others 
equated it with number of audit visits made (MM1), still others viewed it as 
meeting the quantitative target allocated to the office (MM3), some defined it in 
terms of meeting objectives but had difficulty in detailing objectives (OL1). Still 
others found defining performance very difficult (OL5). 
The importance of `bringing in money', the traditional form of accountability, is 
still a recurrent theme in the discourse of operational level employees: 
"I think most of the time even in the past we have always been judged on the number of 
hits, basically have you received an assessment or not and I think it still goes on even now 
they are saying well the money doesn't really matter, although they still want the money 
they want the compliance, they want" (OL6: p8). 
Same concern for `more revenue' is clear from the replies of two other 
interviewees as well. 
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"Yeah, if you say, yeah I went out, I didn't get the money but I didn't get any complaints I 
don't think you're going to get the benefit from that really" (OL3: p22). 
"I am more interested in the money ;I mean it's not finding anything which is not there; 
but you are interested in finding money; because that effectively is why we have gone out 
there" (OLI: p13). 
An operational level employee was also candid in admitting his ignorance about 
the PSA objectives: 
"There are documents that have come around routinely... yes; there was something sent 
around quite recently by an email; I think I glanced through it but ... 
[laughingly] yes; I 
don't have time to read all that sort of stuff; I know there is perceived problem with VAT 
gap at the moment" (OL1: p12-13). 
Good performance is also construed on contingency approach basis which is 
quite often the case in most of the organisations. One Officer put it like this: 
"I think it tends to be where you find major problems and concerns because those are the 
things that take more resolving, they are more immediate because you find the area, you 
take the action to correct it or whatever so that is what is occurring now" (OL6: p8). 
In chapter 2, reference was made to Brumbach (1988) who defined performance 
along the dimensions of results and behaviour. The author argued that good 
results can be achieved through either bad behaviour or good behaviour. A 
success is positive when good results are achieved through good behaviour. In 
the case of HMCE positive success would mean achieving good results with 
good behaviour towards the taxpayers so that the relationship builds upon mutual 
trust (Daunton, 2001). Thus it can be argued that the new PSA framework 
desired to shift the overriding emphasis upon revenue figures to good behaviour 
towards the taxpayers, i. e. from mere results to positive success. The review of 
the notion of performance held by the operational level employees suggests little 
that this transformation was actually achieved. 
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It was argued in the previous chapters that the main aim of PSA framework was 
to implement the customer focus ideal of NPM styled reforms. However when 
the interviewees were asked to express their views on the notion of `customer 
focus', there was a general lack of enthusiasm for the phrase. Historically, as was 
noted in chapter 4, `customer' was one of the key customs officers in the 
medieval days. Under NPM, all recipients of services from public sector 
organisations are considered as customers (McGuire, 2002). Some HMCE 
managers, while remaining sceptical over complete relevance of such terms, did 
try to defend the usage of the phrase. For instance, one manager replied with an 
expressly official tone: 
yes; I mean this is where, as I spoke to you earlier on, where the move is I suppose 
move away from us putting so many of our people out to the businesses to conduct audits 
with the prime objective of hopefully finding additional tax; to actually moving a lot of those 
into areas of compliance management which is very much customer-focused activity; it is 
activity whereby we want a different approach from our offices; we want them to be very 
nice and very friendly with the businesses and improve our image in that way"(MM1: p 12 ). 
Another manager while accepted that lack of choice for taxpayers as problematic, 
yet he defended customer-focus as a useful concept: 
"... I see your point, that you don't have a choice. Okay, you don't have a choice but that 
shouldn't taint my view as to how I treat you. I shouldn't treat you with the sort of contempt 
that well, you've got no choice and you will do this; won't you? Don't give me any of your 
problems please, just do this for me. That's where I think the customer emphasis comes 
in 
.............. So I can see where traditionally it does not fit the terminology of customer, 
because you don't really have a choice, but I think it's the right terminology to use because 
that puts us in the frame of mind of dealing with people in the right manner" (MM6: p 25) 
But many managers were sceptical about the phrase, as is clear from the 
following reply: 
"Any people that we deal with are in theory our customers and it's not a word I can use... 
They're not customers. They're the traders, they're the people that we visit... I wouldn't call 
them a customer. I know it's a buzz word now... But I'm not in favour of it... You know 
we're intruding on them and I wouldn't say that they wanted us" (MM7: p 33). 
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A middle manager when asked to comment upon customer focus as an 
organisational ideal was frank in sharing his disdain for the new private sector 
jargon: 
"... it all started with, when we as a department decided to accept the American business 
schools influence;... that for the last number of years the department has been using outside 
business practices and outside business techniques and outside business jargon in order to try 
and introduce some professionalism into the department; it has failed to increase the 
professionalism or it's like the silly jargon words that do not apply" (MM4: p 21). 
When an operational level employee was asked about his notion of customer 
focus he spontaneously replied "That doesn't mean anything to me ". When the 
phrase was explained to him he replied: 
"... customer focus to me is a marketing tool; (a pause) not a marketing tool but a way of 
looking at customers; (after deep thinking) I don't think traders are customers to Customs 
and Excise in a way; they are registered businesses and they have to pay VAT; I don't see 
them as customers; they are operating businesses; it's a government regulation that they have 
to be registered and therefore they will pay VAT and as a part of that they can have 
inspection obviously to find out if their returns are right ; as I said customer focus to me is a 
marketing term" (OL2: p 10). 
Another important notion interrelated to the notion of performance is that of 
accountability. This research found that the employees of HMCE viewed 
accountability mostly in its managerial sense and appreciation of other forms of 
accountability were less pronounced. For instance one manager replied that: 
"I think it [accountability] is two way. I am directly accountable to, and the person, I am first 
accountable to, has got to be my manager ... 
but I also feel that I am accountable to my 
management team here; the other managers across this division, I am accountable to them 
... and we do operate as a team we also meet in a formal meeting at 
least once a month and 
we will take decisions about how we are going to do things within this division; within the 
parameters that we are allowed to work within, so it's a bit of a mix of both; I am 
accountable to those that are with me locally and also to my manager" (MM I: p 16). 
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The interviewee defines accountability in terms of managerial responsibility to 
the superiors and sub-ordinates. Same emphasis on managerial meaning of the 
term is evident in the following reply of another manager: 
"I think the general sort of well-being and management of the team is where the 
accountability stands" (MM3: p 39). 
Some interviewees understood accountability in terms of performance appraisals 
(PA), as the following reply suggests: 
"well ! [accountability is] to my line manager; I mean she is the one who is doing the PA 
[performance appraisal] meeting on Tuesday" (0L2: p 17). 
The issue of controllability also surfaces in the reply of one interviewee. Raising 
lack of effective control on events as a major concern, the manager airs anxiety 
over the multiplicity of accountability expectations: 
.. I mean I have to accept that I am accountable for things that happen around me that I'm 
not readily in control of, like Health and Safety issues. If anything happens to any of my 
people then it's down to me ultimately if there's been a problem, then I've got to be 
accountable for it. I have to be, I have to provide assurance that the budgets allocated and 
what we spend on travelling and subsistence are correctly spent within the parameters of the 
instructions. I'm accountable for the actions of my people on the ground. So if they get lots 
of complaints, well yes, they'll be under the microscope but so will I. What have I been 
doing about it? I'm accountable for their development. I'm accountable for their input to our 
business and the Plan, and so I think you're accountable on a huge field of issues and 
basically the buck stops with you, ... 
I'm accountable for their [subordinates] behaviour, if 
I'm with them and I witness bad behaviour then I'm accountable for addressing it... Well I 
think the pressure is that I feel like I'm accountable for everything" (MM6: p 26). 
Some managers viewed accountability as meeting quantitative targets. For 
example one manager remarked: 
"My accountability and what I strive to do is to achieve the targets, That's what I'm there 
for" (MM7: p 38). 
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A few respondents did try to view accountability in a wider perspective but the 
emphasis remained on managerial accountability, as is evident from the 
following lines: 
"... Really [accountability] goes in various stages. So here, I mean we're accountable 
directly to our manager but then there's a whole wider picture above that in terms that there's 
a higher management but then there's the Government and the Ministers and then ultimately 
there's the taxpayer out there as well.. . 
Yeah I mean the only one that really impacts greatly 
on you is your own manager because you get the feedback and things from that" (0L3: p 
25). 
It was documented in chapter 4 that the department performs diverse functions 
and has different work pattern regimes. A manager stated that the common belief 
of protecting society from the nefarious activities of fraudsters and criminals held 
together various strings of functions and sub cultures within the department 
"... but at the same time there's a common theme, isn't there, which is I suppose the protection 
of society and ensuring that the right tax is paid at the right time. There's this common thing 
that holds it all together, and I think the other area that's coming through as well is that they're 
all business tax-related and we're purely looking at the taxation, whether it be Excise reliefs, or 
whether it be Customs duties or, when you start bringing in the prohibitions and restrictions it 
broadens it out a little bit more, but in essence these are the consistencies within the department 
across the board" (MM3: p7). 
Thus it can be seen from the analysis of the discourse of the operational level 
employees of HMCE that the PSA based accounting changes did not change the 
notions of performance and accountability relationships as the employees 
continued to define the notions in terms of the traditional ethos of law 
enforcement. 
9.2 From Customer-Focus to Risk Management 
In the earlier chapters it was found that the SR 2000 introduced `outcomes' based 
PMS in the form of PSA 2000. The new PMS gave prominence to customer- 
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focus based PIs and relegated the traditional revenue collection figures to a Trust 
Statement. It was also found that the new PIs put HMCE in a difficult situation. 
How did the organisation cope with the tensions created by PSA 2000 is the aim 
of this section. 
In 2001 HMCE published a high level policy document titled Tackling Indirect 
Tax Fraud, (TITF) (HMCE, 2001d). This was the first document which 
described the Government's strategic approach to tackling revenue losses, which 
was based on: 
" accurately assessing the size and nature of each problem, 
" setting clear objectives and targets for tackling it, 
" identifying the operational responses required to achieve those targets and 
" monitoring the delivery of results. 
The policy document was followed by Protecting indirect tax revenues, (PITR) 
in November 2002 (HMCE, 2002e) which extends the strategic risk management 
approach applied in the case of cigarettes/Tobacco smuggling and Oil Smuggling 
to all indirect taxes, most importantly VAT. 81 A new VAT strategy (Annex 9.1) 
is announced which lists the main sources of revenue losses as: 
" VAT missing trader fraud 82 
" VAT avoidance 
81 The publication has three sections. In Section 1 the importance of strategic approach to revenue 
losses is explained. In Section 2, Excise duty losses with respect to Tobacco, Oils, and Alcohol 
smuggling are discussed and the strategy to minimise the losses is laid down. Section 3 builds 
upon the claimed success of strategic focus in the case of Tobacco and Oils and is extended to 
VAT losses. 
82 Missing Trader Fraud is mentioned as an EU-wide problem, in which bogus traders register 
for VAT, complete intra-Community transactions, and disappear before paying over the VAT 
due to the tax authorities. An interviewee commented: "It's a major, major VAT problem... I did 
gold frauds which were big in their day, but these are even bigger" (MM5: p8). The details of 
this type of fraud and other VAT losses can be read in Annex 8.1. 
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" Other VAT losses 
These policy documents prescribe risk management as the basis of strategic 
approach for HMCE. The new PMS introduced by PSA 2002 and the subsequent 
annual reports of HMCE are based upon this risk management approach (HM 
Treasury, 2002a). In fact, the Annual Report, 2003 describes HMCE as a risk 
management organisation whose aim is declared as achieving the status of `the 
best risk manager in the public sector', comparable to the best in the private 
sector (HC52,2003: p 7). In the Resource Accounts reported in the Annual 
Report, 2004 it is claimed that the department has sought to raise its standard of 
risk management to equal the best in the private sector (HC 119,2004: p 47) 83 
An OECD publication defines the phrase `risk management' as: 
"... a formal process whereby risk factors for a particular context are systematically 
identified, analysed, assessed, ranked and provided for... It is a proactive, systematic 
analysis of possible events and responses to them rather than a mere reaction mechanism to 
those limited events that are detected" (OECD, 2001: p 3). 
With the latest version of PSA in 2002, the shift from customer-focus to risk 
management is complete. Risk management requires not only identification of 
risk areas but also the ability to measure success in minimising those risks. 
Therefore, just as the PSA objectives and policy targets have been defined by 
reference to high level strategy papers, the new Technical Notes document which 
accompanies the PSA (SR2002) refers to publications Measuring Indirect Tax 
Fraud (HMCE, 2001e), and Measuring Indirect Tax Losses (HMCE, 2002f). 
These documents explain how performance against specific targets would be 
83 The increasing emphasis upon strategic risk management is evident from the HMCE's latest 
Annual Reports, as well. The term risk has been used 271 times while the phrase risk 
management has appeared 37 times in the latest 2004 Annual Report, while the two terms were 
used 260 and 28 times respectively in the Annual Report 2003 
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measured. The policy targets under the three objectives of PSA specify the 
targeted level of performance required for achieving the stated objectives. 
HMCE claims that the new PSA has even sharper focus on strategic aim of the 
organisation (HMCE, 2003: p 7). But before the significance of the new PSA is 
analysed it seems necessary to first examine the measures and PIs used in this 
version of PSA so that its difference from the earlier versions of PSA becomes 
clearer. 
The policy targets under the three objectives of SR 2002 PSA specify the 
targeted level of performance required for achieving the stated objectives. The 
levels of performance desired under the new PSA have been tabulated by the 
researcher and produced in table 9.1. 
Objective Policy Targeted Desired level of Targeted 
No Title Target Item/service performance Date 
1 compliance 
Reducing oils 2% 31 March 2006 
illicit market 
as proportion 
of total 
market 
tobacco 17% 31 March 2006 
reducing the 12% or less of from March 
scale of the theoretical 2003 
VAT losses VAT liability 
Improve Electronic service 100% by 2005 
Customer delivery through a 
service common 
Government portal 
take-up for key 50% by 2005 
electronic services 
Reducing 
compliance costs 
2 Anti-drugs 
trafficking 
Reduce the Increasing the U. K 
availability bound heroin and 
of illegal cocaine seizures 
drugs 
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disruption/dismantl 
ing of criminal 
groups involved 
the recovery of 
drug-related 
criminal assets 
3 Value for 
Money 
productivity 2.5% a year 
gains 
without 
affecting 
customer 
satisfaction 
Table 9.1: Targeted levels of performance under PSA 2002 (adapted from HMCE, 2002g, h) 
As is clear from the table, the first objective (compliance improvement) is to be 
achieved by setting up two subsidiary strategic policy targets. The first one aims 
at minimizing tax losses in the case of Oils, Cigarettes and VAT. Time bound 
quantitative targets for the three have been provided under this policy target. The 
first two aim at reducing the market share of illicit oil and cigarettes to 2% for 
oils and 17% for tobacco; while the third deals with VAT losses reduction. 
Measuring Indirect Tax Losses (HMCE, 2002f) explains how the tax gap has 
been measured. The causes of the VAT losses are categorized as due to error, 
ignorance and financial difficulty or due to wilful default like abusive avoidance 
and deliberate fraud. The tax gap can be, therefore, minimized by minimizing the 
scope of both types of tax losses. The specific target is to reduce the scale of 
VAT losses from the 2002 baseline of 15% to 12% or less of the theoretical VAT 
liability which in turn amounts to collecting more than £2 billion per year in 
additional revenue by 2005-06. 
Target 2 under the first objective of compliance improvement is based upon 
service delivery improvement. Therefore, the implied assumption is that 
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compliance with indirect tax liability will improve if the taxpayers are provided 
with better services. The influence of NPM inspired private sector performance 
frameworks is quite evident. The customer service has two ingredients listed as 
measures. First is the provision of services through electronic delivery 84 and 
second is minimising the costs of complying with indirect tax regulations. For 
the first measure the targets are specific, i. e., 100% provision of electronic 
services by 2005 as against baseline 61 %, and at the same time achieving take up 
rate of 50% by 2006. The second measure of compliance costs reduction is 
however without any target and seems more like a wishful declaration. 
The only target under objective II refers to reducing availability of illicit drugs. 
The three performance indicators for this measure are seizing drugs being 
supplied to the UK market, busting criminal gangs involved and seizing assets 
made out of drugs related money. 
Target 4, which is the final target comes under the third objective of Value for 
Money category and aims at achieving productivity gains of 2.5% per year. In 
view of the embarrassing results reported in the earlier PSA, this time the initial 
technical note did not provide details on how this would be worked out, and 
instead promised that the same would be made available in a revised technical 
note in the near future (HMCE, 2002g, h). Finally when the Technical Notes 
document was updated it explained that Progress against the target will be 
assessed mainly in terms of staff year savings and procurement gains. It is 
84 The emphasis on IT reforms is also clear from the title of a recent NAO report "Transforming 
the performance of HMCE through electronic service delivery" As a final conclusion, the NAO 
study is appreciative of the reforms however it adds a cautionary note that: 
"Our'health check' of the e-programme showed that development of the business case and 
benefits realisation plans are the main areas which the Department need to address" (NAO, 2003: 
p 10). 
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mentioned that delivery against the target would be monitored through the 
monthly management accounts and a programme of quantitative and qualitative 
customer surveys would be used to monitor Customer satisfaction. 
9.3 Tax Gap - an Assessment 
The new PSA of HMCE is claimed to be based on the strategic risk management 
approach of. `Tax Gap' reduction. 85 The effect of the change is that the PSA of 
the department got drastically changed as the organisational performance was 
redefined in terms of closing the Tax Gap. Arguably, the new language employed 
appears to be quite appealing and explanation of this new approach in strategic 
management terms is quite persuasive. 
The tax gap was defined in chapter 6. In this approach, a theoretical tax yield is 
first worked out under the assumption of 100% compliance with no intentional 
avoidance or evasion, or unintentional errors based losses of tax revenue. This is 
then set against the actual outturns. The difference between the actual and 
theoretical tax yield is termed tax gap, and the single strategic policy aim is to 
plug the gap with the help of what the tax policy managers call compliance 
management. The high level strategy papers of HMCE (TITF, PITR and VAT 
Strategy) contain detailed accounts of VAT gap. According to the VAT strategy 
document: 
"The amount of VAT that is lost through organised fraud, avoidance, general non- 
compliance and failure to register has been estimated by comparing the theoretical tax yield, 
calculated using ONS National Accounts data on total expenditure in the economy, with 
85 The `Tax Gap' approach is not a ground breaking approach as many other tax authorities (e. g. 
Swedish Tax Administration) were already following it as the basis of their performance 
measurement (OECD, 2001: p 36). 
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actual VAT receipts. For the year ending March 2001 the size of the 'VAT Gap' is estimated 
to be £10.4bn, 14.6% of the theoretical tax yield. Historically, the VAT Gap rose sharply 
from 10% to 14% in the early 1990s and has fluctuated between 12% and 14.5% over the last 
6 years (VS: p1) 
The strategy papers talk about considerable new resources to institute a concerted 
strategy to tackle the problem of tax gap. The new risk management approach is 
therefore driven by a concern for minimising revenue losses, which in effect 
means increasing revenue collection figures. Strong law enforcement measures 
form an important part of the new strategy together with enabling approach 
(Hoskin et al., 2001) to help those who are potentially compliant taxpayers. 
Pollit (2002) groups together various theories such as institutional economics 
(e. g. Principal agent and property rights theories), contingency theory, and 
rational choice theory as a functional theory of organisational change. . 
The 
common feature of this category of theories is that they all explain a 
phenomenon in terms of intended results. 
According to these theories the search for new practices is governed by rational 
choice making. The institutional theory, discussed in chapter 2, is a competing 
theoretical lens which has gained popularity among writers of various disciplines 
such as economics, political science, marketing, organisation theory and 
sociology (Scott, 1995). The essence of this theory is encapsulated by Scott 
(1987) who contends that organisations change : "... because they are rewarded 
for doing so through increased legitimacy, resources, and survival capabilities" 
(p. 498). 
In chapter 8, two potentially competing PMS were identified in the RAF. But 
when a tax management system is viewed from a functionalist perspective, the 
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tax payers and the tax collectors are believed not to be in any state of competition 
or conflict of interests. The underlying belief can be best explained by making a 
reference to the social exchange theory86, discussed in chapter 2. The 
government gives the tax administration economic resources to collect tax 
revenue with which it finances its public programmes. The citizens in the 
capacity of taxpayers can be seen as not `paying customers' but rather as 
`obligatees' who provide `compliance' in return for good services and fairness 
from the tax authorities. The tax authorities can obtain compliance through 
coercive means like more audits, arrests and imposition of penalties. However all 
these methods are costly and are to be used as a last resort against wilful evaders. 
`Voluntary compliance' not only improves efficiency of the tax administration 
but it also results in exchange of other values as well. For instance, other 
taxpayers feel more confident about the tax laws enforcement while the citizenry 
at large benefits from wealth distribution effects. Thus the notion of customer- 
focus oils the wheel of accountability in the proposed accountability framework. 
The citizens as taxpayers exchange voluntary compliance with the tax authorities 
in return for equity, good behaviour and services. This helps the tax authorities in 
providing good results to the Government on the traditional/financial 
performance dimension in two ways. First, the tax revenue itself increases. 
Second, voluntary compliance decreases the costs of collection, thus resulting in 
savings and improving productivity. The government can then also provide good 
results to the citizens in terms of public spending, on one hand, and the citizens 
in return also demonstrate less political hostility to taxation. 
86 The theory emphasises a broadened notion of social exchange in as against the restrictive 
notion of service delivery of private sector models. A distinction between citizenry and clients is 
an important feature of social exchange theory. The clients are also classified into paying 
customers, beneficiaries and obligatees. 
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Therefore, if the social exchange theory lens is used it can be argued that the 
taxpayers and tax collectors are partners in achieving the common goal of 
financing the provision of public goods by the government. Since both the 
stakeholders are partners therefore the notion of `performance' under this 
functionalist approach is also not a contested one. The `tax gap' method of 
measuring performance can, therefore, be seen as the appropriate measure as 
both the tax collectors and the taxpayers act in collaboration to reduce the tax 
gap. 
It was noted in chapter 2 that writers using institutional theory for analysing 
organisational reforms underscore the importance of context of any particular 
organisation and often view legitimacy as the primary motive of organisational 
reforms (e. g. Kurunmaki et al., 2003). The difficulties with measuring and 
reporting performance in terms of SR (2000) PSA were discussed in chapter 8. 
The new customer-focused accountability for performance brought in tensions 
which were explained in the previous chapter. In terms of Laughlin (1995)'s 
framework, the sceptical view would be that the department resorted to the 
policy of Re-orientation which is a policy that aims to internalise the disturbance, 
through often permanent organisational changes, but in such a way that the 
interpretive schemes remain untouched and undisturbed by the alteration. It can, 
therefore, be argued that the new approach of tax gap approach in PSA (2002) 
sits comfortably with the organisational ethos of law enforcement. 
While, both functionalist and NIS explanations have their respective merits, the 
implementation of the approach is challenging in terms of performance 
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measurement. For instance, an OECD publication identifies problems associated 
with measuring tax gap and makes the following conclusion: 
"To sum up, the general position on measuring the tax gap is that it is difficult if not 
downright impossible and even if it were possible to get a reliable total figure it 
would not tell us much of practical value in the struggle against non-compliance" 
(OECD, 2001: p 31). 
Under this approach performance is conceptualized as plugging the tax gap 
which in turn is measured by meeting the targets of extra revenue promised by 
the new strategy. Therefore overall organisational performance is interpreted 
through PIs that are all about extra revenue collection. Therefore, performance 
measurement is arguably much easier in this approach as compared to the one in 
PSA 2000 where customer-focused PIs resulted in embarrassing results. But 
ironically, when it comes to operational level PMS, the approach is keen on 
abandoning the `old' ways of measuring success, but does not articulate in 
unequivocal terms what will be the alternative measures, as is evident from the 
following official response: 
"Your references to number of visits/ assessments are no longer valid, our measures have 
changed to reflect the current PSA of closing the VAT Gap" (EM 1). 
At the official level the new strategy required new performance 
conceptualization and measurement, as remarked by a senior manager: 
"... we said well we have got to stop this we have got to end this division here because what 
it means is that the strategy now becomes business as usual ; it now becomes what we are 
doing and everybody in this unit should be contributing in some way to the strategy and if 
they are not then they have got to say; why we are not doing... " (SM I; p 11) 
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But many respondents were frank in admitting their lack of clarity as to how 
performance was to be measured under the new tax gap reduction strategy, while 
they continued performing the same old functions: 
"It's about getting a different approach in future that will get us an outcome, and that's 
difficult because we're all conditioned to see, almost like mathematics, you can do a sum and 
you know what the answer is, unlike the English literature and the language, you do not 
know what the interpretation is, ... and we've been in this regimented area of mathematics 
and we're coming into this bit more abstract issue, which has still got an outcome. That's 
difficult for us all to understand" (SM2: p20). 
The manager also cautioned against expectations of immediate results: 
... and 
it's going to take a long time, and it's going to need courage from senior management, 
because you have, to get an outcome result, you have to wait. You have to find indicators 
that will tell you whether you're on track,... (SM2: p 17). 
Another manager expressed his concerns over distraction from the real job if the 
management became too occupied with academic debates. 
"Well this year we honed it into saying, if you look at an under-declaration how much of it 
actually sticks with Treasury, or how much of it just goes round between traders, and what's 
one person's under-declaration is just claimed back by somebody else, so we came up with a 
measure called Sticking Tax. But then we'd spent most of the year trying to define really 
what Sticking Tax means. So we do get ourselves in a bit of a quandary over measures 
sometimes as to what these measures mean, and that gets a little difficult at times because we 
spend so much time talking about what it may be, that everybody distracts, gets distracted 
from the real work. So that's the problem we have with measures, but the basic premise of 
what we should really be focussing on is Sticking Tax or as we term it globally the Tax gap 
issues, we want to close that gap of what we're not collecting. It's spot on. We've just got 
to do further work on refining how we measure success"(MM6: p 8). 
The sticking tax is not the term used in the published official documents however 
in the discourse of managers it was found to be widely used. It refers to that 
amount of tax which can not only be identified by audit work but also defended 
in a court of law and thus represents actual increase in tax revenue. The 
interviewee manifestly refers to the limitations of measuring success. 
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A middle manager while approved of the new approach had also problems with 
assessing his part in the success of the strategy and thus offered his own 
interpretation as: 
"... this strategy only started at the beginning of this year, April, that we're hoping that we're 
managing it properly and if we're doing our job properly, then it should come down. The tax 
gap should reduce and the returns should be coming in and we'd be collecting more money" 
(MM7: p 14). 
The emphasis on more money as an indicator of success of the strategy is quite 
noticeable. This is not surprising as the same emphasis on revenue figures and 
extra revenue collected is present in the chairman's foreword to the Annual 
Report., 2003 
"Net revenue receipts remained strong at some £108.7 billion (falling within the target range 
of plus or minus 2.5% of the forecast). This was in part due to positive economic factors, but 
it was largely a consequence of our compliance strategies, which are delivering impressive 
results...... Our comprehensive VAT strategy is now in place with the goal of securing more 
than £2 billion a year in additional revenue by 2005-06" (HMCE, 2003c: p 5). 
A new rule/routine resulting from the VAT strategy was the contacts made with 
businesses that were never contacted due to costs savings driven strategy in the 
past. Under the old rules and routines established since the 1990s by virtue of 
reforms introduced by Conservative Government the majority of newly 
registered businesses and other small scale businesses were never contacted as 
they were not considered important in terms of tax liability potential. Under the 
new strategy they deserved attention as a matter of rule/routine and formalised 
arrangements were accordingly made mostly through telephones as explained in 
chapter 6. Since this new routine was in congruence with the organisational ethos 
of holding taxpayers to account, the research found its prevalence in the 
discourse of employees. The telephoning exercise was interpreted by the 
`holding to account' institution of the department, as an important activity which 
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the department could not do in the past because they were coerced by the reforms 
of 90s not to do so. This is clear from the following remarks made by an 
interviewee: 
"So there is an argument there that just by literally picking up the phone and talking to 
somebody there is a good chance compliance will improve because they know we are still 
around, we haven't forgotten who you are and hello here we are ... 
"(OL5: p7). 
This is in stark contrast to customer accounting related changes introduced 
through PSA 2000 which failed to alter the performance data related practices 
and did not have an impact upon interpretive scheme of the organisation. 
Thus it was found that in absence of clear explanation of the new measures of 
success the operational level employees were to a varying degree in a fix as to 
how their performance would be evaluated under the new strategy of VAT Gap 
closure, and in what ways it would be different from the old arrangements. The 
result was that the institutionalized notion of performance was used to interpret 
success as bringing in more revenue. In terms of RAF outlined in chapter 8, it 
can be argued that the accounting changes have made the PMS of HMCE a 
compliance driven framework. The new strategy's success is measured by a 
single dimension of tax gap reduction, which in turn is measured and reported 
with the PI of extra revenue collection. As a consequence, it will not be possible 
to distinguish between the proportion of extra revenue which was added by 
enabling factors (e. g. better service delivery, greater mutual trust) and the 
proportion which is added by factors infringing upon public accountability driven 
performance e. g. measures like increased intrusiveness, or less respect for legal 
rights, thus lowering the taxpayers satisfaction. The notion of performance is 
therefore defined by the concerns of tax department while the concerns of tax 
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payers are not reflected strongly in the performance measures/indicators used in 
PSA2002. 
9.4 Perceptions of the Customers 
The research also collected written replies from 21 VAT practitioners. A simple 
questionnaire (Annex 9.2) desired to investigate the perception of HMCE among 
the tax practitioners. Twenty one VAT practitioners were requested to send in 
answers by completing the questionnaire. Due to the small size of the sample, 
generalizing the results for the whole population is not possible however the 
replies were helpful in strengthening the conclusion drawn from other sources. 
The premise was that the conclusions would be invalidated if the replies of the 
respondents suggested that the PSA related measures had penetrated the 
organisational ethos in a positive way so that the organisation is perceived as a 
customer-focused organisation and less as a pure law enforcer. However only 5 
out of 21 (24%) respondents termed HMCE as a customer-focused organisation. 
Even these approving respondents made certain qualifying remarks. What should 
be worrying for the organisation is that 52% still believe it to be law enforcing 
organisation employing coercive methods. In another question the respondents 
were asked if HMCE was doing enough to become taxpayers' friendly 
organisation. Only 2 out of 21 respondents said clear yes to this statement while 
14 respondents (67%) believed that while HMCE was trying to improve yet it 
needs to do a lot more before it could be termed a customer-focused organisation. 
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In the case of HMCE, despite adoption of outcomes based multidimensional PSA 
framework, little organisational effort was noticeable in the area of cultural 
change. The following observations were made by a respondent who had the 
vantage view of being an ex HMCE officer and now serving as a tax practitioner: 
"I find the Department basically well intentioned towards tax payers, but hamstrung by 
political requirements to maximize the tax yield regardless of circumstances. As an ex-C&E 
officer I am also aware of a great absence in understanding of the needs and constraints of 
business. I have learned far more about how businesses actually operate and the pressures on 
them since I joined private practice, than I ever did during many years in the 
Department"(VP 1). 
The remarks are representative of the way in which the organisational culture of 
HMCE is generally viewed outside the organisation. These results when seen 
together with the in-depth interviews conducted with the employees provide 
evidence that the accounting changes could not transform the organisational 
culture which evolved from law enforcement origins. 
9.5 The Merger of HMCE 
While this PhD dissertation writing was in progress the Government announced 
the merger of HMCE with Inland Revenue to create a combined department - 
Her Majesty's Revenue and Custom in 2004 following a report of a review of the 
two departments by the permanent secretary to the Treasury Gus O'Donnell (HM 
Treasury, 2004). HMCE had historically been always opposed to merger of 
HMCE with IR. Since the parliamentary committees had been stressing the need 
for merger for quite some time, the interviewees were asked about the prospect 
of merger. They were all unanimous in their opposition to any move of merger. 
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For instance one manager stressed the difference in the basic nature of VAT and 
direct taxes: 
"The VAT is a tax given to the businesses by the consumers for onward deposit with the 
national Kitty. Thus the businesses hold this amount of tax as a trustee, and if they don't 
deposit it they commit an act of theft. The direct taxes are different as the businesses 
contribute a portion of their own profits to the national treasury. Hence there is a room for 
negotiation and lesser stringent regime of penalties" (0L6: p10). 
Another manager referred to the difference in the time scale for completing audit 
work in the case of VAT: 
"I mean they look at things so historically; generally speaking, a taxpayers record which are 
two years old; we look at things that are just gone; very current ; if we discover things wrong 
in a VAT trader's record which are more than three years old we can't do anything about it; 
because it's out of time. The IR don't even start looking at stuff until it is two years old and 
so these are some of the obstacles, some of the problems". (MM1: p11) 
Another respondent also referred to this difference: 
"But I think that our time scale is a lot shorter than Inland Revenue's. We are literally in and 
out ; we are supposed to be doing four visits a week and one day in the office so if I am 
going into a trader I have to be intrusive because I am in there, I have only got four five 
hours but I have got to look at everything for I am targeting specific risks; I need to assess 
the business as a whole but I have got to be in there fairly quickly" (OL1 :p 11). 
But despite this opposition of the HMCE personnel to the idea of merger the 
Government went ahead with merging the two departments into one. The merger 
is outside the scope of this PhD study however the reasons cited in the official 
publication on merger are important for their evidential value. In the foreword to 
O'Donnell report, the chancellor cites three main reasons for the merger plan. 
Those are: 
" Efficiency savings 
" Customer focus 
" Greater accountability 
214 
The efficiency argument is reiterated in the official publication which outlines 
the proposed structure. In the O'Donnell report a full chapter is devoted to the 
issue of accountability. It is stated that by separating policy (for which the 
Treasury will be responsible) from implementation (for which the new 
department HMRC will be responsible) the accountability framework will be 
improved. Thus the implied admission is that the accounting changes did little to 
improve accountability system of HMCE. Therefore the Government had to 
resort to the decision of merging HMCE with IR so that the culture of HMCE is 
improved by the culture of IR which is perceived to be customer-focused 
(Hoskin et al. 2001). 
9.6 Conclusion 
The SR (2000) PSA was found to be aiming to achieve a shift of focus in 
accountability relationships by enhancing the importance of customer focus 
related measures and relegating the traditional measures of performance e. g. 
revenue collection figures. In terms of RAF this can be viewed as shifting the 
focus of accountability relationship from the traditional compliance driven part 
of the rectangle to the newer public accountability driven part. In this chapter 
three evidential sources were discussed to ascertain if the accounting changes 
were successful in achieving the intended aims. The discourse analysis 
established that while the importance of PSA related changes was evident in the 
official publications and senior management, no such appreciation was 
noticeable in the discourse of the operational level employees. By using the tax 
gap as the basis of performance measurement it can be seen that the department 
has redefined outcomes by linking it back to the traditional notion of 
performance. Thus the department has gone back to a single measure based 
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performance measurement framework abandoning the multidimensional 
framework of SR (2000) PSA. And finally the Government found that 
accounting changes could not achieve the desired aim of transforming the ethos 
of HMCE along customer focus and merged it with IR. Thus the three evidences 
together establish that the accounting changes failed to act as a force of change in 
the case of HMCE. In the next chapter this analysis is continued to consider the 
probable causes and account for the failure of accounting changes. 
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Chapter 10 
Explaining the Dilemma of Performance Measurement in HMCE 
Introduction 
In the previous chapters accounting changes through PSA framework were 
discussed and it was argued that the changes failed to transform the ethos of 
HMCE. This chapter discusses the reasons for failure of the accounting changes 
in achieving the desired aims. The discussion moves from `what' to `why' 
analysis. The second part of the chapter identifies some issues with regards to 
performance management. The purpose is to provide the readers with an 
opportunity of naturalistic generalization which is advocated as a merit of case 
study by Stake (1994). 
10.1 Complexity and Performance Measurement 
The evidence presented in the preceding chapters established that the accounting 
reforms through PSA-related changes failed to shift the focus of accountability 
relationships from the dominant compliance-driven to the NPM-inspired 
customer- focused one. The notion of performance was found to be 
conceptualised differently by official publications and personnel at different 
levels of HMCE. This section examines the reasons for this lack of uniformity 
in 
conceptualizing performance and designing adequate performance measures in 
the case of HMCE. 
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Stewart and Walsh, (1994: 45) argue that performance is an elusive concept in 
the domain of public sector and it can never be fully defined. No wonder the 
policy managers in the central Government of the U. K have long been troubled 
by defining performance. 87 The difficulty in articulating the notion of 
performance in the case of HMCE is further compounded by the dilemma of 
achieving a balance between the compliance-driven and public-accountability 
driven dimensions of performance in terms of Reciprocal Accountability 
Framework proposed earlier in chapter 8. It was argued that the presence of a 
high degree of reciprocity in the accountability relationships between the sen'ice 
providers and service recipients ushers in further complexity to the organisation. 
It is not that HMCE's top management is unaware of the potentially competing 
accountability demands, as is clear from the following excerpt from the then 
chairman's foreword to the Annual Report, 2003: 
"Our strategic approach to compliance now applies comprehensively to the full range of our 
core responsibilities: delivering agreed, measurable and published outcomes, such as 
reducing the market penetration of smuggled cigarettes, and reducing revenue losses as a 
result of fraud and other forms of non-compliance... At the same time, recognising that most 
businesses want to be compliant, we are working to make it easier and less costly for them to 
be so, not least through a major investment programme to renew and modernise our IT 
capacity and to provide a range of new, cost-based customer services" (HMCE, 2003c: p5). 
However, articulating an all embracing notion of performance acceptable to all 
the stakeholders at the same time is a problem which HMCE found difficult to 
overcome. The existence of tension between the historically imprinted notions 
of performance and accountability and the new NPM inspired notion was 
admitted by one manager: 
87 Talbot (2000) reviews the problematic nature of the notion of performance in the U. K public 
sector domain and concludes that there is little conceptual clarity as to what constitutes good 
performance. He enlists various examples, such as 3Es, customer service, BSC, indicating 
varying degree of emphasis on different issues at different times. 
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"How will we know we're successful and we've started, well at Senior Management level, 
the Plan will be equally as much about facilitating traders as the traditional let's find money 
or mistakes from them. So in theory those two parts now are equal partners, but again the 
problems you have is, I mentioned earlier on, that we have a very mature and experienced 
workforce and it's hard to change the culture overnight, so you still feel as if you've done a 
good job if you've found X million of under-declared. You don't perhaps feel as if you've 
done as good a job if you helped the trader with a problem they have" (MM6: P6). 
Shifting the focus from a compliance-driven notion of performance to the public- 
accountability driven one is easy in theory but difficult in practice, argues the 
manager in his reply. But the tension is not merely between the thinking of the 
old guard and new strategic vision. The very nature of the work performed by 
VAT officers contains a dichotomous situation, as explained by one manager. 
"VAT is a self assessment tax; and under the indirect control of the department, rather, as it 
was excise, in the direct control; we changed that, we said, o. k., well any amount of money 
we find is a measure of our good performance; so the conflict is that the more we encourage 
and succeed in getting traders to be compliant, the fewer errors there are out there to look to 
find with the consequence of our [ thinking of proper word], our discovery of errors will be 
down ; and somebody then is either going to conclude, right, we have almost corrected, or 
secondly what are these blokes doing if they are not bringing in the money... " (MM4: p24). 
Thus the tension between two forms of performance measurement and reporting 
is clear as the manager argues that good performance on customer focused 
dimension may lead to poor performance on the traditional compliance 
enforcement based performance measurement. 
HMCE is a public sector organisation, as was discussed in Chapter 4. Like other 
similar organisations it receives monetary resources from government to fulfil 
organisational aims and objectives. But despite having common attributes of 
public sector organisations, it has a few distinguishing features of its own. In 
terms of Fig 8.1 in Chapter 8, the most distinguishing feature of HMCE is the 
presence of strong reciprocity in accountability relationships. And consequently, 
many notions of the private sector performance frameworks are not so easily 
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applicable. For instance, the notion of customer is not well established, as was 
explained in chapter 8. Similarly what is the service that the department provides 
is also not well defined, as the recipients of the services view the HMCE as an 
organisation which tries to achieve its revenue targets. These contextual 
differences make the application of private sector inspired customer focus based 
performance measurement all the more difficult in the case of HMCE. 
The issue of difficulty in applying well known performance frameworks to 
HMCE can further be analysed with the help of a generalised framework 
proposed by Carter (1991: p 89). The author suggests seven determinants of 
difficulty in conceptualising performance and hence designing adequate 
performance measures in the case of organisations. The framework is explained 
by the author by considering the examples of public and private sector 
organisations e. g. the Police and Supermarket". The author argues that if an 
organisation is providing heterogeneous and complex services for which defining 
`outcomes' is difficult, then designing adequate PIs is difficult for such 
organisations, irrespective of the fact that they are public sector or private sector 
organisation. The author argues that the higher an organisation is on the 
dimensions of Accountability, Heterogeneity, Complexity and Uncertainty the 
more difficult would it be to define performance in simple terms and thus hard to 
assess it. 
88 The author enlists three most important determinants as heterogeneity, complexity and 
uncertainty. By the degree of heterogeneity the author means the number of different products or 
services provided by any organisation. The author believes that conceptualising and assessing the 
performance of a single-product organisation is less difficult than assessing that of a multi- 
product organisation. By the degree of complexity the author means the extent to which an 
organisatIon has to mobilise a number of different skills in order to deliver its services or produce 
its goods. Lastly, by the degree of uncertainty the author means the unclear causal relationship 
between means and ends. 
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In earlier chapters the historical origins and the range of functions performed by 
the HMCE were discussed which established that it is a very complex 
organisation. HMCE scores high on the dimensions of Accountability, 
Heterogeneity, Complexity and Uncertainty in terms of the framework proposed 
by Carter (1991). Its functions are quite diverse and range from simple tax 
collection to anti-smuggling activities, and lately, anti-terrorism activities as 
well. This makes HMCE quite a heterogeneous organisation. Similarly skills 
requirement range from legal, accounting and auditing to pure law enforcement 
and management. In terms of outcomes, tax revenue and tax gap minimisation 
are outcomes which are not entirely dependent upon the efforts of HMCE alone. 
Therefore, it is not surprising to find that conceptualising performance is not an 
easy task in the case of HMCE and the presence of reciprocity in accountability 
relationships makes a customer-focused performance measurement [e. g. SR 
(2000) PSA] difficult to work. 
10.2 Influence of Private Sector Performance Frameworks 
The preceding discussion underscores the context of HMCE which is elaborated 
in terms of organisational and accountability complexity where the element of 
reciprocity in accountability relationships is an important distinguishing factor. 
Many authors (e. g. Mueller et al. 2004, Talbot, 2000) argue that the governments 
have been hastily adopting private sector models of performance measurement 
and management under the influence of NPM. Despite its different context, the 
HMCE also implemented the PSA related accounting reforms. But is there any 
direct evidence that the private sector models have influenced the PMS of 
HMCE? The mere fact that performance is measured and reported is not 
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significant since the use of performance indicators is not something which the 
public sector borrowed from the private sector (Williams, 2003). However when 
performance is approached by the public sector managers in terms of drivers and 
determinants of performance it can be termed as a visible impact of private 
sector performance measurement frameworks. 
Fitzgerald et al. (1991) in their framework RDF classified measures into two 
types: relating to results (competitiveness, financial performance) and to 
determinants of those results (quality, flexibility, resource utilisation and 
innovation). 
How can the PMS prescribed by the PSAs of SR 2000 and SR 2002 be 
interpreted with the help of results and determinants approach? In order to apply 
RDF, the first challenge is defining what is `result' and what are `determinants' 
in the case of HMCE? The definitions would depend upon the perspective of 
performance as viewed by different stakeholders. For instance, the tax managers 
would view revenue collection figures or tax gap reduction the `result' and all 
other measures such as quality of service delivery, taxpayers' satisfaction would 
be considered `determinants'. But if the RAF approach is taken, the perspective 
of taxpayers will be equally important. Therefore, the two triangular halves, 
compliance driven PMS and Public accountability driven PMS, will have their 
own results and determinants, independent of each other. In this paradigm of 
accountability relationships compliance accounting provides information to the 
resource provider, while customer accounting informs the taxpayers as to how 
well the tax authorities performed from their perspective. Hence in this approach, 
both compliance driven dimension and public accountability dimension of 
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performance will have their own results and determinants. It is possible that 
some determinants may be common to both dimensions but, importantly, it is 
equally probable that a positive determinant for one dimension may prove a 
negative determinant for the other. 
Dimension Ob jective Outcome Targets exaWples Pis 
Compliance Results 
Right revenue at right time Projected tax collection targets Correct returns filed 
with a quantitative 
target) 
Extra revenue collection target 
Determinants 
Better IT enabled services electronic returns filing %age of services 
available and take up 
rates (with quantitative 
targets) 
Better advice coverage through advice service standards targets 
provision centres like National Advice (common to all Central 
Centre for VAT enquiries government 
departm nts) 
Taxpayers improvement in taxpayers level surveys conducted 
satisfaction of satisfaction with the services through private sector 
provided by tax department researchers 
Better resources utilisation achieve productivity gains on % savings by costs 
annual basis reduction without 
undermining services 
provision 
Public Results 
accountability 
Compliance costs Reducing compliance costs to % reduction assessed 
reduction the minimum level through surveys 
Psychic costs reduction Reducing complexity of tax Simplified legislation 
laws through taxpayers 
surveys 
Taxpayers satisfaction improvement in taxpayers' surveys conducted 
satisfaction with the services through private sector 
provided by department and researchers 
conduct of tax officials 
Determinants 
Better IT enabled services electronic returns filing %age of services 
available and take up 
rates (with quantitative 
targets) 
Better advice provision coverage through advice covered through service 
centres like National Advice standards targets 
Centre for VAT enquiries (common to all Central 
government 
departm nts) 
Trust based self 
assessment 
Reduced intrusion into 
affairs of compliant 
businesses 
Table 10.2: SR (2000) PSA in the format of RDF and informed by RAF (adapted by the PhD 
author) 
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The SR 2000 PSA of HMCE can be re-examined for results and determinants, 
keeping the two competing perspectives of performance in mind, and the results 
are tabulated in Table 10.2. From the table it can be seen that some determinants 
like better IT enabled services, advice provision and taxpayers' satisfaction can 
be common to both dimensions of performance. However some determinants like 
reduced intrusion into affairs of businesses may improve perception of 
performance on public accountability dimension but it may result in possible 
evasion of taxes by opportunist businesses and thus lead to poorer performance 
on compliance dimension of performance. Similarly, efficiency gains can be 
achieved by shifting the burden of collecting taxes to the taxpayers which result 
in increasing the compliance costs (Sandford et al., 1981). 
Thus in RAF approach there is recognition of the possibility of tension between 
the two aspects of performance89. In 2002 new PSA was introduced by HMCE as 
explained in chapter 9. It can be argued that the new PSA 2002, based upon `tax 
gap' approach, brought the PMS much closer to the private sector styled RDF. If 
the design of PSA 2002 is examined, it is not difficult to identify the underlying 
assumption that the tax collectors and the tax payers are partners in achieving the 
common goal. It can be seen that in terms of RDF customer accounting is not 
juxtaposed in competition with the compliance accounting but instead is seen as 
a detenninant of performance resulting in good compliance results i. e. 'positive 
success' (Brumbach, 1988: p 388). Financial performance in the case of HNICE 
is the achievement of theoretical tax yield. This result is measured by compliance 
89 Since the Treasury Select Committee represents the interests of Government as a resource 
provider on one hand and taxpayers as citizens on the other, it can se seen as a broker to strike a 
fair trade-off between the competing interests of the two stakeholders of a tax system. 
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accounting related measures/Pls. Customer accounting related measures can then 
be viewed as measuring those drivers which help in achieving the desired final 
result of theoretical tax yield or minimising the tax gap. Thus customer 
accounting can be viewed as somewhat equivalent to the deternfinants of RDF or 
the customer perspective of the BSC. Arguably, the implied assumption here is 
that better customer focus would make the taxpayers more satisfied which would 
increase voluntary compliance and that in turn would lead to the achievement of 
final outcome, i. e. the theoretical tax yield. If the PSA 2002 of HMCE is recast in 
the form of RDF, it may look like the following table: 
Category Objective Outcome Targets Measures and PIs 
Results: 
Achieving theoretical Projected tax collection Revenue Collection 
tax yield targets Figures, Correct returns 
filed ( with a 
quantitative target) 
Extra revenue collection Extra revenue collected 
target 
Determinants 
Better IT enabled increasing electronic %age of services 
services returns filing available and take up 
rates (with quantitative 
targets) 
Better advice coverage through advice Service standards 
provision centres like National targets (common to all 
Advice Centre for VAT Central government 
enquiries departments) 
Taxpayers satisfaction improvement in taxpayers Surveys conducted 
level of satisfaction with through private sector 
the services provided by researchers 
tax department 
Better resources achieve productivity gains savings by costs 
utilisation on annual basis reduction without 
undermining services 
provision 
Table 10.3: The PSA 2002 in RDF fon-nat - adapted by the PhD author 
In the RDF proposed by Fitzgerald et al (1991) determinants like innovation, 
flexibility and resource utilisation help a business entity achieve competitive 
edge which leads to better financial performance. One may argue that the tax 
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authorities are monopolies therefore the question of achieving competitive edge 
does not arise. However the new performance accounting system implemented 
through Resource Accounting and Budgeting (RAB) by the central government 
since 2001 creates a proxy market competition situation for all the government 
departments. An important government report claims that RAB would improve 
planning and controlling of spending and increase the incentive to manage 
resources more effectively (HM Treasury, 1998: p 10). Moreover, resources are 
tied up with performance targets in order to shift focus from inputs to outcomes 
(Likierman, 2001). In response to a question by a TSC member, the Chief 
Secretary of the Treasury replied: 
II 
... as part of the Spending Review process, of course, there are negotiations with departments about resources going forward. At the same time, we are negotiating about the 
toughness of targets and the two are a joint exercise and obviously there are discussions with 
the Prime Minister as well" (TSC, 2003) 
Therefore in order to receive funds from the Treasury, all government 
departments are in a state of competition. Their continued resources support 
would depend upon good performance with regards to achievement of 
performance targets and productivity gains. Therefore the efficiency determinant 
in RDF remains as valid in the case of HMCE as it is for private sector 
businesses. 
The determinants like Better IT enabled services, Better advice provision, and 
Taxpayers satisfaction can be appreciated if it is understood that voluntary 
compliance by the taxpayers is the most important driver of performance for any 
tax adnunistration. Customer-focused improvements encourage taxpayers 
comply with the tax laws voluntarily which in turn lead to good financial 
perfon-nance, i. e. increased tax revenue or as per jargon reduction in tax gap. The 
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overriding emphasis upon such enablers of good performance is also explicit 
from the following comments of a senior manager: 
the e-programme is a very expensive programme, in as much as; there is a lot of 
government money going into that and over three year period and what the chairman was zn 
saying was, you know, this is the other area, that you are going to stand or fall on; you can deliver the strategy, you can deliver the e-programme, and similar to the strategy is very important to have articulated the e-programme in a way that has been sufficiently, I shall say, 
sufficiently compelling and persuasive to get ministers and treasury and the office of e-envoy 
to say yes we like what we see, we think we should invest in that, and that's major 
achievement we got that for and now the next stage, really beginning now is to, over the next 
three years, to deliver that, and, now what, it's important for the vat business is that first of 
all, it should lead to efficiency to the way we do things, it should lead to the efficiency to the 
way taxpayers do thing... " (SM I; p 12). 
Four themes are noticeable above. First, IT development i. e. e-programme is as 
important as the overall strategy itself. Second, failure in e-programme amounts 
to failure in overall strategy implementation. Third, there are improved chances 
of getting greater funds from the resource provider, the Treasury, if they are 
convinced that the e-programme will lead to achievement of strategic objectives. 
Thus for the Treasury giving additional funds to HMCE is like making a prudent 
investment with the hope of cost savings (less cash outflows) and additional tax 
revenue (more cash inflows) in the near future. Fourth, the improved IT facilities 
to the taxpayers lead to reduction in compliance costs which improve voluntary 
compliance which in turn results in impr I oved revenue collection by FIMCE. 
If the Results and Determinants approach is applied with insights drawn from the 
social exchange theory as expounded by Alford (2002), voluntary compliance of 
tax laws by taxpayers can be thought of as the desired result. The determinants 
for this result are the perceptions of fairness and equity in the minds of 
taxpayers. These perceptions can be measured through taxpayers' satisfaction 
surveys. Customerfocus can therefore be viewed as the efforts made by the tax 
authorities to improve the taxpayers' perceptions of fairness and equity. This 
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fusing of RDF with social exchange theory resolves some of the difficulties 
associated with conceptualisation of private sector notions of customers, 
customer-focus and service deliverv. The pnnclpal 's ldentlfied as the 
Government to which the tax administration is accountable under managerial 
accountability. The accounts take the form of PSA based performance 
measurement. The government as a Principal certainly has both powers of 
it 
incapacitation" or "deterrence" (Elster, 1999: 255), as HMCE depends on 
resources it gets from the Govemment. However the approach works as long as 
taxpayers are not treated as a stakeholder in their own right. 
10.3 The Balanced Scorecard 
While reviewing the PSA based performance measurement framework of the 
New Labour government in Chapter 6, it was observed that the influence of 
Lynch and Cross (1991) in official publications was quite evident. In the 
previous section it was learnt that the latest PSA of HMCE is styled after Results 
and Determinants Framework of Fitzgerald et al. (199 1). The review of official 
publications on accounting reforms in chapter 6 had also suggested that the 
influence of BSC, one of the most popular performance measurement 
frameworks popularised by Norton and Kaplan (1992), was also quite visible in 
the accounting reforius of the New Labour Government. In this section the role 
of BSC as a strategic policy instrument is briefly reviewed and then it is 
examined as to what extent this has been followed by the HMCE. 
Kaplan and Norton (1996) suggest that the BSC helps an organisation introduce 
four new management processes that, separately and in combination, contribute 
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to linking long-term strategic objectives with short-term actions. The authors 
claim that the first process, translating the vision, helps managers build a 
consensus around the organisation's vision and strategy. The second process 
identified is communicating and linking which lets managers communicate their 
strategy up and down the organisation and link it to departmental and individual 
objectives. The scorecard gives managers a way of ensuring that all levels of the 
organisation understand the long-term strategy and that both departmental and 
individual objectives are aligned with it. The third process business planning 
enables companies to integrate their business and financial plans. The authors 
advocate that managers should use the ambitious goals set for balanced scorecard 
measures as the basis for allocating resources and setting priorities so that they 
are able to undertake and coordinate only those initiatives that move them toward 
their long-tenn strategic objectives. The fourth process, feedback and learning, 
helps in strategic learning as an organisation can monitor short-term results and 
modify strategies to reflect real-time leaming. 
It is clear from above description that BSC adopts a holistic view of perfon-nance 
management where performance is clearly understood and the meaning is shared 
across the board in an organisation. It can be argued that HMCE adopted the 
BSC styled outcomes based performance management system of PSA with some 
notable omissions. For instance, this PhD research found that the BSC's second 
process of communicating and linking had been inadequately addressed by 
HNICE while implementing major accounting changes. Though, the middle level 
managers interviewed were mostly aware of the emphasis on new strategic focus 
and reconceptualisation of performance in terms of plugging the tax gap, yet 
PSA and its objectives did not appear to be prominent in their discourse. Even 
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when PSA was specifically mentioned to them, they appeared not to be very 
familiar with the contents of this strategic document. Their concern was mostly 
with their own day to day official duties and related engagements. Hence their 
conceptualisation of performance was governed mostly by their own experiential 
knowledge and the operational level accounting routines such as perfon-nance 
agreements and reports90 
Like many other large organisations, HNICE is using email and intranet mainly 
for the purpose of communication with its personnel. This over reliance on IT 
based facilities has compromised the quality of communication, as one manager 
lamented: 
"We don't get that any more. It's all on the Intranet and when you ask well where do I find 
out this, oh read it on the Intranet. And it assumes that you have got, I don't know, an hour 
each day to sit and read it. If I read everything that was put on the Intranet every day, I'm 
not sure how long it wouldtakerneto dothat (MM5: p2l)". 
The ignorance of an operational level employee (OLI: 12-13) about PSA was 
mentioned in Chapter 9. In fact, the officials were found too occupied with their 
own day to day activities to afford time for pursuing and understanding strategic 
level changes on their own. As one official remarked: 
"... day to day official stationary going in trays; it gets in the way" (MM4: p12). 
No organisational level effort was witnessed to inculcate new meaning of 
performance or other accounting changes into the mindsets of employees. 
Therefore, it was found that PSA was considered by the respondents to be a high 
90 Romzek and Ingraham (2000) examine the unintended consequence of relying upon 
information technology as the only means of intra. organisational communication. They observe 
that the speed of communications coupled with the casual attitude individuals take to email 
communications may increase opportunities for miscommunication. 
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level policy document which is only of concem to the policy people sitting In the 
HQs. 91 
It can therefore be argued that even though revenue maximization had been taken 
off the policy targets of HNICE in PSA 2000 and reported separately in a Trust 
Statement, it still remained the most important desired outcome for tax policy 
management. For instance, a senior manager explaining the newly adopted 
strategic approach said: 
".... we are here to help reduce that gap and therefore all of our policies; everything we do in 
vat should be contributing to that so the strategy and the chancellor agreed to that and in the 
budget statement there is a commitment; there is first of all an acknowledgement that this is 
and also there is actually a commitment saying what the Customs and Excise is doing is 
focusing on reducing, not eliminating, because that's impossible, reducing that gap and we 
have a commitment to reduce that gap.... " (SM I: p8). 
The main publication outlining the departmental strategy also makes a clear 
reference to this desired strategic outcome: 
"The strategy is designed to reduce the size of the shortfall and produce more than E2 billion 
per year of additional revenue by 2005-06. This is the Government's aim, but in line with its 
cautious approach to the public finances, and with the agreement of the National Audit 
Office (NAO), a lower estimate of the yield is being projected in the Pre-Budget Report 
public finance forecast" (HMCE, 2002e: executive summary). 
Kaplan (2001) adapted the balanced scorecard to non-profit organisations by 
realizing the importance of mission objectives in the multidimensional 
framework. In this modified version both the resources providers and recipients 
of the organisational services have been placed at the same level below the 
mission of the organisation. Then follow the business processes and internal 
91 The department did not provide any training or special directions to the middle or operational 
level employees. All such material was placed on the official intranet, which appeared not to have 
been read by majority of the respondents, as they were already hard pressed with their daily 
official routines. 
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learning perspectives. If the PSA of HMCE is compared with the balanced 
scorecard of Kaplan (2001) it can be seen that the emphasis on multi-dimensional 
nature of perforinance is also visible there. 
The Mission 
The rather than the fin. andatIshareholder 
objectives drives the orgariLzations strategy, 
li we succeed., haw 
ývill we look to olir 
'ýfinamlial 
do-nors? - 
I ý'To al,, h, ieve ou rv is ion, 
how must we took io our 
customtrs/recipimts? " 
"To satisht Oul' cu"O"CTS, 
finandal donors, and tvission, 
at which bu,. -Mrjesý, 
proce"Ses I'llust we excell? " 
ýTci achieve oul . -1 W"i v-51011,1108V n' I 
our people learn, communicate, 
and work toge-ther? " 
I 
Fig 10.2: BSC for Non-profit organisations (Source: Kaplan, 2001: p 361) 
By setting up policy targets for various aspects of performance like compliance, 
taxpayers satisfaction, and productivity the policy managers clearly made an 
effort to design a multidimensional perforinance framework. If the PSA of 
HMCE is viewed from BSC lens, it can be redesigned and presented as: 
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AIM 
Administer the indirect tax and customs control systems fairly and efficiently, and 
make it as easy as possible for individuals and businesses to understand and comply 
with their obligations. 
Resources Provider perspective 
By 31 March 2006 reduce illicit market share within the excise 
regi . me to no more than: 
" 2%fOr oils in England, Scotland and Wales; and 
" 17%. for tobacco; and implement a strategy for reducing 
the scale of the VAT lossesfi-om March 2003. 
Reduce the availability of illegal drugs by increasing: 
the proportion of heroin and cocaine targeted on the UK 
which is taken out; 
the disruption/dismantling of those criminal groups 
responsible for supplying substantial quantities of class A 
drugs to the UK market; and 
the recovery of drug-related criminal assets. 
Value for Money 
Make productivity gains of at least 2.5% a year, without 
detriment to accuracy or customer satisfaction. 
Recipients of services perspective 
Improve customer service by: 
0 ensuring by 2005 that 100% of services are offered 
electronicall - v, 
wherever possible through a common Government 
ponal, and take-upfor key services of at least 50% by March 2006; 
and 
. delivering reductions in the costs of compliance for businesses. 
Internal processes perspective 
[no measures and targets] 
Employees learning perspective I 
[no measures and targets] 
I 
Fig 10.3: PSA 2002 in the form of BSC (adapted by the PhD author) 
It can be seen that two perspectives of BSC, the internal processes perspective 
and employees learning perspective do not appear in the PSA. However this 
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should not necessanly lead to the conclusion that the HMCE management does 
not give importance to these drivers of perforinance. In fact, as already noted in 
earlier chapters, in the official discourse there has been a recurring emphasis 
upon modernization of IT systems used by the organisation. Similarly there are 
training courses available to different categories of employees. But as Norreklit, 
(2000: 67) argues, the balanced scorecard views all perspectives of importance as 
equally important: 
"The crux of the balanced scorecard is the linking together of the measures of the four areas 
in a causal chain which passes through all four perspectives". 
The authors of BSC have also underscored the need for including the indicators 
of performance drivers along with the outcome indicators in the scorecard: 
"A scorecard should contain outcome measures and the performance drivers of those outcomes, linked 
together in cause and effect relationships" (Kaplan and Norton, 1996; p. 4) . 
The PhD research found little evidence to suggest that the designers of PSA for 
HMCE had consciously adopted BSC or that the performance policy managers 
had pursued implementation of BSC as a policy target 92 . No clear references to 
adoption or adaptation of BSC were found either in the official publications or 
the discourse of the management of HA4CE. For instance, the managers 
responsible for operational perfon-nance indicators and individual performance 
appraisals did not mention BSC in their replies to questions asked by the PhD 
92 In stark contrast we do find such clear policy pronouncements in the case of Inland Revenue. 
For instance, the former IR chairman Mr Nick Montagu, delivering his speech as a foundation 
speaker at the Public Policy and Management Forum, Qinghua University, Beijing in January 
2002, and explaining the public sector reforms with the help of IR, made a very specific reference 
to the balanced scorecard. Similarly the Swedish Tax Administration supplemented its 
Perfon-nance Measurement Model (PMM) with a balanced scorecard so that the top management 
could gain a broad view of performance through a limited number of key indicators reflecting 
central elements of the management plan. (OECD, 2001; p 46-47). 
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researcher regarding perfon-nance measurement within RMCE. A senior level 
manager (SM I: p 6) was categorically asked about BSC with reference to IR but 
even though he did stress the adoption of strategic focus approach as something 
new in the organisation he never mentioned BSC as the instrument for achieving 
the same. Thus in view of these evidences it can be concluded that HMCE has 
not considered adoption of BSC as the basis of its performance measurement 
framework. 
A relatively new framework of performance measurement Performance Prism, 
proposed by Neely et al (2000), was mentioned in chapter 2. The framework 
demonstrates the way in which an organisation's results (stakeholder 
satisfaction) are a function of determinants (the other Prism facets). The authors 
thus broaden the scope of performance measurement by incorporating 
stakeholders approach into multi-dimensional framework. The PSA of RMCE 
does carry imprints of the stake holder approach as is visible in the prism 
performance framework. Examining the objectives and policy targets with 
performance indicators in the PSA, it can be argued that the resource provider 
(The Treasury), society at large and the tax payers are the identifiable 
stakeholders around whom the PSA framework of HMCE has been designed. 
However it does not follow the perfon-nance prism in ternis of detailed 
articulation of the stakeholders and the relevant processes and their associated 
measures. 
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10.4 Limitations of Performance Measurement 
The literature on performance measurement also looks at the limitations of 
performance measurement as a tool of performance management. For instance, 
Sinith, 1993 identifies the unintended consequences associated with perfon-nance 
measurement. This PhD study has already highlighted the difficulty of HNICE in 
reconciling the two competing PMS corresponding to reciprocal accountability 
relationships. In an earlier section organisational and accountability 
complexities were found to be the explanatory factors for the difficulty in 
implementing the NPM inspired customer-focused PMS. The PhD study 
identified some additional issues which are important for understanding the 
context of HMCE with regards to PMS: 
10.4.1 Reporting Good Performance 
In terms of principal agent model of accountability the first and foremost purpose 
of measuring perforinance is to enable the principal decide whether the agent has 
utilised the resources in the most effective manner and that whether the desired 
duties perfon-ned well? In the case of HMCE it was found that the notion of 
performance was influenced mostly by the historically Imprmted ethos of law 
enforcement. However since HA4CE is a department reporting to the Treasury, 
any definition provided by the latter will have the force of authority. One such 
statement was found by PhD research in a conversation that took place between 
members of TSC and senior management of the Treasury department. 
"Q2 Chairman: Thank you very much. The focus for our session this afternoon is the 
departmental report. The report has a foreword by the Chancellor which refers to the 
government making progress, but I cannot find anywhere in the 85 pages any summary of 
the Treasury's own performance. This is an 85-page document costing E19,1 think. Why is 
there no summary showing us how well the Treasury has done? 
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Mr O'Donnell: May I ask what you mean? I see the Treasury's performance in terms of how 
well we are delivering on our objectives. What you get in terms of delivery is in terms of 
how we are doing against our Public Service Agreement (PSA) target. In terms of how the 
Treasury is doing as an institution, as a department, is that what you mean? 
Q3 Chairman: No, I should like to stick with performance first. Is it simply measured 
against the targets? 
Mr O'Donnell: Absolutely" (TSC, 2003). 
Since Treasury department is the owner and enforcer of PSA framework, the 
unequivocal answer in the above excerpt establishes that the official definition of 
performance is. achievement of taLgets set out in the PSA. Therefore, in the case 
of HMCE, organisational performance would also mean achievement of targets 
as set out in its PSA. Applying this definition of performance, the PhD research 
made an interesting finding which is explained below. 
From the resource accounts in the Annual Report, 2001 (HMCE, 2001a), the 
targets met or not met are summarized and presented in table 10.4 below: 
Policy Targets PIS Met PIS Not met PIS 
discontinued 
% Met of total 
I Compliance 2 2 0 50% 
2 Cigarettes 3 1 1 60% 
3 Drugs 5 0 0 100% 
4 Int Trade 1 2 2 20% 
5 E-services 2 1 0 66% 
6 Compliance costs 0 1 1 0% 
7 Productivity gains I 1 0 50% 
8_ Customer service 0 1 0 0% 
Table 10.4: A summary of targets met or not met 
In the table above column I is the policy targets, while columns 2 and 3 represent 
how many of the PIs specified under a policy target were met or not met. Some 
of the Pls were discontinued due to some organisational changes or irrelevance 
and listed in Column 4. The last column provides percentage of PIs met, thus a 
measure of performance. If all Pls are considered the final performance picture 
is given by the following table 10.5. 
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Total Pls Met Not Met Discontinued % Met 
28 14 10 4 50% 
Table 10.5: Performance as achievement of targets 
It therefore follows that as per the Treasury's definition of perforinance, HNICE 
had a 50% achievement of targets on the whole. The picture is even worse, if the 
policy targets are seen in terms of their relative importance. If Compliance, 
Customer satisfaction and productivity are identified as the three major outcomes 
areas, the department did not meet targets in the customer satisfaction and 
productivity areas. Non-achievement hence rises to almost 66%. So should we 
conclude that perfon-nance measurement shows that the department achieved 
33% of performance level expected of it? In any private sector organisation, this 
should have caused much unrest. But oblivious to the numbers, the Spring and 
Annual Reports of HNICE in 2001 and 2002 only highlight achievements in 
traditional fields of revenue collections and law enforcement. The point 
emerging from this analysis is that the PMS is failing in its basic purpose. It is 
not telling its users in clear terms 'how well the organisation is doing? This will 
have consequences on accountability system as the basic purpose of performance 
measurement is to operationalise the accountability relationships. 
10.4.2 Operationalising an Outcome Targe 
The difficulty in reducing an outcome target to an operational target is well 
documented (Likierman, 1993; Carter, 1991) 93 . In chapter 
6 the confessions of 
93 A survey by NAO shows that public sector organisations face the greatest challenges in dealing 
with issues of ownership and reward for achieving targets, with lesser but still common 
challenges in influencing service providers' priorities and integrating PSA targets into normal 
planning activity (NAO, 2001) 
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the top management of HMCE before the TSC established that the efforts of 
HMCE to operationalise outcome targets of SR (2000) PSA failed as these 
produced somewhat embarrassing final results. One such target was that of 
productivity. In order to avoid the same results in the future, special care was 
taken to redefine the productivity measure in the new PSA announced in 2002. 
Interestingly no calculation method for productivity gain was provided in the 
Technical Notes for almost a year. It seems that after many internal deliberations 
the measure was finally recast in such a way so that positive outcome could be 
reported on this dimension of performance as well. It is now measured in terms 
of staff years reduction and procurement savings. Not only was productivity 
measure fine tuned to avoid any nasty surprises, other performance measures that 
were sitting uncomfortably in the earlier PSA were also sidelined and relegated. 
These included Customer Satisfaction as measured by Customer Satisfaction 
Index (CSI) and compliance costs reduction, which do not appear as the main 
policy targets in the new PSA. Not surprisingly, in the latest Annual Report, all 
measures including productivity are positive. 
10.4.3 Ease of Comprehension 
Since the purpose of performance measurement is to enable the principal make 
an informed judgement on the performance of the agent, it is important that the 
principal should be able to read and understand the accounts without much 
difficulty. The review of PSA framework establishes that the format of accounts 
is not easily understandable to a lay person. This is evident from the fact that 
even the chief secretary to the Treasury (the owners of the PSA framework) had 
239 
difficulty in explaining various terms used in the performance reports to the 
members of TSC. 
"Forgive me, but it is cleafly not transparent enough when an intelligent colleague on this Select Committee pointed out "on track" and "ongoing" and you had great difficulty 
explaining, you, an intelligent man, what on earth it was about ... (TSC, 2003). 
The taxpayers were identified as the principal under public accountability 
relationship to the HMCE in RAF. In view of the difficulty in reading and 
understanding the performance measurement and reporting of PSA, it can be 
argued that the taxpayers will not find performance reporting of HMCE an 
effective instrument of accountability. 
10.4.4 Fragmented Performance Measurement 
The private sector frameworks advocate a holistic view of performance 
measurement where performance is measured in the form of a cascading 
pyramid. The PMS of HMCE was found to be quite fragmented. While PSA is 
the high level performance framework, the department also reports performance 
for National Standards and Diversity. Similarly, many operational level 
performance sheets (inherited from pre-PSA era) are in use in different field 
formations. These stand alone perfon-nance reports are however not integrated 
into the PSA framework; therefore it is not clear how these various performance 
regimes are prioritised at the organisational level. 
10.4.5 Lack of Verifiability 
The accounting data is expected to play its role as an instrument of 
accountability only if the data is of very high quality and externally verifiable. 
The performance reporting in HMCE suffers from the problem of lack of 
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verifiability. This problem is inherent in the PSA framework on the whole. For 
instance a special report of Public Administration Committee (PAC, 2003) 
reviews the limitations of target setting suggested that there should be external 
verifilcation of targets being met or not met. Same concerns are expressed by the 
Treasury Select Committee in one of its sessions when the Treasury's top 
management defended the quality of data: 
"I come back to the point. Do you think there is no scope at all for getting the NAO to come 
in and extemally verify this data and make it more transparent? Do you think the public is 
happy with what you are producing or do you actually think there is something in what 
Parliament and some parts of Parliament are saying, which is that we should get an external 
verifier in? Do you not think there are any grounds for that at all? Is that what you are 
saying: it is so great that there is no room for improvement? " (TSC, 2003: Q55) 
The issue of verifiability is all the more important in the case of HMCE as the 
main outcome measure 'tax gap' is a hypothetical measure. Due to this fact, and 
recalling the difficulties faced by the department in measuring and reporting its 
performance in SR (2000) PSA, the need for external verification can not 
therefore be overemphasised. 
10.4.6 Separation of Policy and Operational Measures 
The HMCE reports to the Treasury and hence it can be assumed that the Treasury 
has the policy function while HMCE is obliged to carry out operational 
functions. But the picture is blurred if the Annual Reports of both HMCE and the 
Treasury are exammed. It is found that the performance of RMCE is not well 
knit with any of the PSA objectives and policy targets of the Treasury. In fact out 
of total of 10 policy targets of the Treasury's PSA (Annex 10.1), only one target, 
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i. e. Policy target No 8 appearing under objective 7 has any taxation content94 . As 
can be seen the child poverty reduction target shared with DWP in no way 
reflects the performance of HNICE which is a subordinate department of the 
Treasury. One may argue that the tax gap reduction related revenue collection by 
HMCE helps the Treasury achieve its macroeconomic related objectives such as 
fiscal balance measured by targets such as net debt etc. However, the PMSs do 
not provide any information as to what contribution is made by HMCE towards 
the performance of its parent department, the Treasury. Therefore, the 
accountability relationships between the principal (the Treasury) and agent 
(HMCE) do not seem to be cemented by the linkages of PMSs. This finding of 
the PhD research was substantiated by the O'Donnell report (which proposed 
merger of HMCE and IR) as it cites separation of policy and implementation as 
one of the key objectives of the merger. 
"a Framework Document setting out who is accountable to whom, for what, in the new 
department, should be published. The Framework will be an opportunity for Ministers to set 
out long-term principles to govern the work of the department" (HM Treasury, 2004: p 12) zn 
Whether the new department will be able to achieve the desired level of 
separation between policy and implementation and measure success by adequate 
Pls is a question which can be answered by a future research conducted in a few 
years time. 
94 Objective VII: promote a fair and efficient tax and benefit system with incentives to 
work, save and invest. 
8. Reduce the number of children in low-income households by at least a quarter by 2004, as 
a contribution towards the broader target of halving child poverty by 2010 and eradicating it 
by 2020. Joint target with DVVT 
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10.4.7 Performance Measurement as a Planning and Control Tool 
Planning and control are the foundations of any managerial system (Drury, 2000: 
95 
p 6) . Three levels of control in the form of a pyramid: i. e. strategic, 
management and operational, were identified by Anthony in his seminal work in 
1965 (Anthony, 1989: 11). It has been argued by many management accounting 
authors that the presence of an adequate rewards and penalties system is essential 
for effective working of a control system. For instance, Otley (2003: 312) argues 
that the actual functioning of control systems can best be judged from rewards 
and their distribution inside the organisation. Similarly, applying Otley (I 987)'s 
framework of performance management, Moon and Fitzgerald (1996: 446) 
contend that an adequately designed system of rewards and penalties for good or 
bad performance at both individual and organisational level is essential for 
ensuring accountability and control. However in reality the functionality of a 
rewards system depends upon the nature of activities performed by an 
organisation and the degree to which the desired outcomes are related to 
controllability (Ghosh and Lusch, 2000). 
From the replies of interviewees it could be gathered that the rewards system was 
not well developed in the case of HMCE. This is not to suggest that the 
management has been less thoughtful about its performance management system. 
Arguably, the organisational context of HMCE constrains the application of a 
95 Drury reminds that Control is a word with 57 varieties of meaning ranging from 'dominate' 
through to 'feedback. In managerial sense, the author refers to a range of possibilities, ranging 
from the domination of the management class over the workers (at the Marxist end of the 
spectrum) through to the adaptation of organisational activities to meet environmental exigencies 
(from a systems theory approach). Planning is defined as the design of a desired future and of 
effective ways of bringing it about, while Control can be defined as the process of ensuring that a 
firm's activities conform to its plan and that its objectives are achieved (Ackoff, 1981). 
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private sector performance management model. Otley (2001) also cautions 
against a single universal design of rewards as cultural differences are of great 
significance. This is not only true for country specific cultural differences but 
also applicable to organisational level cultural differences. As one manager in 
HNICE argues that linking reward system to achievement of targets maybe 
appropriate for organisations where final outputs are quantifiable and 
standardized, but very difficult to situations where final outputs are not clearly 
defined or controllable. One manager explained the systemic constraints in the 
following manner: 
"Well I don't think we're any different from any other Department or any other sectors that 
deals with something that's not a tangible production ... 
if you have numerical measures you 
must have qualitative as well, because it's no good producing a thousand cups if they're all 
chipped, so you must have qualitative side, and then we have the behavioural side also. But 
then it's still very difficult at times to distinguish one person's performance from another" 
(MM6: p 5). 
Tax collection is a process whose final output, i. e. tax revenue, is dependent 
upon many factors which are beyond HMCE managers' control, as explicitly 
expressed by one manager: 
"... that is right because, you know, to some extent the outcome is only partly with in your 
control" (MM2: p 4) 
Due to these systemic constraints, the desired 'accountingisation' can play a 
limited role in performance management of HMCE. Consequently, the use of 
targets-based performance management model, operationalised through PSAs, in 
a cascading manner, proved very difficult. Though the cascading model had been 
prescribed by the Government in its Business Planning Model (HM Treasury, 
2001 a: p 6), the HMCE managers were almost unanimous in considering 
quantitative targets as inappropriate. The following reply makes it clear: 
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"they are not assigned quantitative targets except in the case of the highest risk group that we 
are dealing with which is trader group 6, the only targets we have there is to ensure we use 
the time allocation that is given to us but we have no targets in terms of results from 
them ... so we have these figures to go for but I think your question is that each individual 
has individual targets. The answer is no. [adding] Union does not agree to that" . (MM2). 
The historical review of the organisation in chapter 4 and the categories of 
functions performed established the highly complex and heterogeneous nature of 
the outcomes desired by I-fMCE. It is therefore not surprising to find that while 
achievement of outcome targets is appreciated at managerial and organisational 
levels, there is no system of rewards and penalties. An excerpt from an interview 
makes it clear where the interviewee is asked about likely consequences of not 
achieving targets: 
"MM4: there wouldn't be repercussions exactly; it's just that if a division were to fall to 
meet its targets its obliged to say why, to provide some sort of explanation as to why this or 
that target has not been met 
HS: so if the explanation is satisfactory then its o. k.; and if not then some penalties maybe 
imposed, so what are the penalties? 
MM4: there are no penalties 
HS: and what are the rewards if you achieve the targets? 
MM4: none" 
The research found that the traditional performance appraisal (PA) system was 
still used for evaluating individual performance in HMCE. The problems 
associated with PA system are well recorded in HRM and applied psychology 
literature (e. g. Bowman, 1999; Fried et al, 1992)., At the time of interviews, the 
PA process had been simplified, with the size of the standard appraisal form 
reduced from ten to two Pages and more emphasis placed on regular face to face 
feedback from managers (TSC, 2001: para. 1.3). It was however found that the 
employees were still not very satisfied with the PA system, believing it to be too 
subjective. The interviewees had concerns about the box division system 
whereby the individual was placed in good, effective or less effective boxes. 
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Many expressed their misgivings about the widely held suspicion that the centre 
wanted placing 10% of the employees in the less effective box. 
HMCE was found to operate a performance related bonus pay system. Two 
interviewees from HRM team, at HMCE's London Head Quarters, in their reply 
specifically mentioned bonus pay system as a tool of performance management. 
However the PhD researcher had already discussed the issue with a few line 
managers who had declared them to be of no impact for practical reasons. When 
the HRM interviewees were confronted with those non-conformist remarks, they 
smiled and had to admit with approving body language like nodding that in 
practice effectiveness of such official recipes is limited. 
At the organisational level, however it can be contended that HMCE would 
consider the attainment of its targets important because there is an element of 
competition involved. Under the new Resource Accounting and Budgeting 
system all the departments compete for allocation of funds. As argued earlier in 
this chapter, the likelihood of better funding would be increased if a department 
demonstrates good perforinance in terms of meeting PSA targets. Therefore 
reward for good performance would be continuation of or increase in funding 
while the penalty would be the opposite of that. This is also evident from the 
former chain-nan's reply to TSC: 
"I have to say that on each one, as we have introduced the tobacco strategy, the oil strategy and 
the VAT strategy, in every case the Government have badged resources to these new strategies, 
so I have no problem at all with that. The issue really is, should an organisation of our sort, which 
is a large organisation with many processing functions, also be able to generate year-on-year cost 
reductions and efficiencies, to which the answer is also "yes". (TSC, 2002b: Q37) 
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The distaste of professionals for statistical targets is well documented (e. g. 
Broadbent and Laughlin, 1998). Some managers of HNICE were also candid in 
their lack of enthusiasm for using quantitative targets for the purpose of 
performance management. For instance, one manager dismissed the whole 
system as 6 number game' 
"... At the moment as it is, I understand, the targets are being set probably at director level, 
advised by their advisers, whoever they may be, all the policy people. I am still waiting to 
hear what's happening on the VAT side of things. I've certainly been involved in them, I've 
said that I don't agree with the numbers game... " (MM5: p 24). 
At the official level such discomfort with 'accountingisation' is, however, less 
noticeable. Those associated with the policy analysis wing in the HQs do use 
accounting information for the purpose of feed-forward control. Explaining the 
usefulness of accounting information, one manager explained the manner in 
which the performance related information is utilized: 
"Yes, and out from that then the Director and his Regional Heads will have what's called the 
traffic light system which has got all our measures and all our targets, and you know green if 
we're all right, amber if we need to worry about it, red if we need to panic" (MM6: p 13 ). 
From the above quote it can be see that performance measurement is used as a 
'then-nometer' 96 ,a wanning system. 
A senior manager at HQs (SMI: p9) explained the use of performance data for 
exercising feed-forward control. According to the interviewee if resources were 
used in one region in strategically less important areas, he would inform the 
concerned Director along with remedial options, though the final decision was 
taken by the Director. Thus the information data is monitored by a dedicated 
9' Boukaert (1993: 12) and Hirschmann (2002: 239) debate whether performance measurement is 
more like a sauna which gives out heat rather than a then-nometer which only measures heat. 
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team which advises the Decision makers on more efficient utilization of 
resources for achievement of strategic objectives. Neely et al (1997) stress the 
system of generating useful performance data as the most important element of a 
PMS. However, the process of generation of useful accounting data in HNICE is 
itself marred by problems, as evident from the following remarks of a manager: 
"But it has been troublesome pulling all that information together, and certainly at an 
operational level staff get frustrated that they're constantly asked for more data by several 
sources. But a lot of that has to do with the fact that we have some Departmental systems 
which are creaking at the seams, and those that that issue is being addressed, but it takes a lot 
of money to address those for a long time" (MM6: p 13) 
Even NAO expressed its concerns about lack of uniformity regarding generation 
of useful data: 
"... at present there is no central performance reporting within the Business Services and 
Taxes Division, bringing together results for Large Business Group and Regional Business 
Services on a comparable basis. Both groups require their own unique reporting systems 
given their distinct business priorities" (NAO, 2003a: p 14). 
Therefore, it can be concluded that in the case of HMCE management accounting 
is used for planning purpose, as evidenced by PSA, SDA and Departmental 
Plans. However systemic constraints limit the effective use of accounting 
information for the purpose of control, though it is partly used for feed-forward 
control. 
The empirical analysis of performance measures used during 1997-2002 
suggested that accounting data was used for enhancement of accountability in its 
multidimensional meaning. However the discourse of employees and the 
adoption of tax gap based performance measurement suggest that performance 
measurement has limited success in enhancing multidimensional form of 
accountability. Thus it can be argued that in I-IMCE performance measurement 
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has a well defined planning role but little evidence was found for enhancement of 
control and accountability. 
10.5 Conclusion 
In the previous chapter, evidence was presented to establish that the accounting 
changes, such as PSA 2000, failed to shift focus from the traditional form of 
accountability relationships to the new NPM inspired accountability 
relationships. In this chapter explanatory factors for this failure were analysed. 
In terms of institutional theory it can be argued that the context of HMCE made 
it not suitable for implementation of the public sector wide PSA reforins of SR 
(2000). The HMCE, therefore, resorted to the response strategy of manipulation 
(Oliver, 1991) and re-orientation (Laughlin, 1995). It was argued that the PSA 
measures were recast so that the compliance based measures regain dominance 
over the competing public accountability based measures of perfonnance. In 
addition to this generic explanation of institutional theory, other organisational 
specific reasons were also explored. While reviewing the PMS of HMCE a few 
other issues were also identified. The PSA 2000 and PSA 2002 were analysed 
with the help of RDF, social exchange theory and RAF, which was developed in 
Chapter 8. It was found that the private sector perfon-nance measurement models 
had influenced the PMS of RMCE. However, the influence is only implicit, and 
not a result of conscious adoption of any particular PMS e. g. BSC. It can be 
argued that though the PMS in prescribed by PSA 2000 and PSA 2002 was 
tailored according to the private sector models but the contextual ground realities 
made the private sector models limited in their use and effect. 
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Chapter II 
Findings and Conclusions 
Introduction 
The PhD thesis set itself the research question of investigating the influence of 
NPM on a tax administration's accountability system, as operationalised by 
performance measurement. It desired to address the calls made by accounting 
scholars to carry out case studies in new research sites to improve our 
understanding of the process of accounting changes. Such case studies also 
improve our understanding of the change management ability of accounting 
changes with the help of the evidence generated by such case studies. In the 
previous chapters a study of the 1997-2003 period was carried out with the help 
of insights drawn from stakeholder theory, principal-agent model, institutional 
theory and the private sector models of perfon-nance measurement such as RDF 
and BSC. In this chapter findings of the study are brought together and 
conclusions are made with regards to the main research question of this Phl). 
11.1 A Review of the Chapters 
Before the final conclusions towards the research question are drawn, the main 
points of the previous ten chapters are first reviewed so that the findings are 
brought together and final conclusions drawn. 
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In Chapter I the research area of this PhD study was introduced and motivation 
for the research topic explained. It was noted that despite the importance of tax 
authorities as public sector organisations they had largely remained very little 
researched (Tomkins et al. 2001). Since 1997-2002 was a period of major 
accounting changes in the public sector, the case study of HMCE provided an 
opportunity to analyse the pathways of accounting changes and to know as to 
what degree did they modify the accountability relationships. In chapter 2 
important themes of relevant literature were reviewed with three main purposes. 
First, it helped in identifying important themes of NPM literature to set up the 
context in which the research had to be done. Second, it helped in identifying the 
theoretical underpinnings of the analytical tools used in the subsequent chapters 
and third, it also helped in spotting the obvious gaps in the literature so that the 
research could contribute towards filling those gaps. 
In chapter 3 the case study method of research was justified as the most adequate 
method for this kind of research. The main research question and a few 
schematic questions were also formulated In the chapter. The chapter also 
identified primary and secondary sources of the PhD research. In chapter four the 
case study organisation was introduced and its historical ongins were traced. 
This historical analysis helped in identifying the organisational ethos of the little 
researched organisation as many institutional theorists (e. g. Stinchcombe, 1965) 
argue that organisations formed at one time typically have a social structure 
which gets imprinted on the organisational psyche. The chapter also explained 
the existing structure and working of HMCE. 
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In chapter 5a framework of categorising the PMS of tax authorities was 
proposed. Three examples of PMS of tax authorities were examined and it was 
found that the traditional emphasis on revenue collection/compliance vaned in 
each case. While in one, i. e. CBR of Pakistan, performance was measured and 
reported solely on the basis of revenue collection figures, in Swedish Tax 
Authority, perfon-nance was measured and reported with greater sophistication; 
with the help of multidimensional outcomes, productivity, quality and 
effectiveness. The actual examples of how Pls are used differently by tax 
authorities helped in proposing a framework for categonsing PMS of tax 
authorities. According to this framework, all PMSs of tax authorities lie on a line 
starting from the traditional fonn (where revenue raised and compliance 
enforcement defines performance) to the outcomes-based multi dimensional 
PMS. In between the two extremes are PMS where in addition to traditional 
revenue collection figures, some behavioural aspects are also measured and 
reported. The pre-PSA format of performance reporting of HNICE is analysed 
and cited as an example of a PMS where performance is mainly reported in terms 
of resources providers' concerns (i. e. revenue collection/ enforcement activities 
and productivity), however a few behaviour related PIs are also included to show 
that the organisation is not just vying for 'results' but rather for 'positive success' 
(Brumbach, 1988). 
In chapter 6 the external environment of the HMCE was scanned. It was 
concluded that the institutional pressures emanated from the norms setting 
external environment, (such as other tax authorities in OECD countries), and the 
political environment (such as central government policies). It can be argued that 
in terms of NIS these normative and coercive pressures compelled HMCE to 
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move its PMS to one in which performance is measured and reported on the basis 
of multidimensional outcomes. 
In chapter 7 the adoption of new PSA framework of SR (2000) was discussed. 
Due to the fact that equal importance had been given to both compliance and 
customer-focus in PSA 2000, it was positioned near point C of the figure. It was 
seen that the PSA created tensions between two competing forrns of 
accountabilities which were operationalised by potentially competing forms of 
performance indicators. The private sector PMS related notions such as 
6 customers', 'customer-focus', 'customer satisfaction' and 'customer-focused 
accountability' were foreign to the ethos of HMCE. The broad brush approach of 
PSA required HMCE to redesign its PMS on the basis of these undeveloped 
notions which resulted in tensions between the traditional and NPM inspired 
cu stomer-foc used performance measures. 
The analysis led to chapter 8 where a simplified framework of interaction of 
accountabilities in tax authorities was proposed in which reciprocity of 
accountabilities had the central importance. The framework captures the tensions 
between competing traditional and public/political accountabilities observed in 
the analysis of earlier chapters. It was stated that the tax authorities (the Board) 
are accountable to the tax payers in tenns of political/public accountability, while 
the taxpayers are accountable to the tax authorities for tax liability in terms of 
legal accountability. The two forms of accountability relationships are 
operationalised by potentially competing perforniance measures/Pls. A multi- 
dimensional notion of perfon-nance is one which is based on information for both 
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resources provider and taxpayers to assess how well did the tax authorities meet 
their respective demands and expectations. 
In chapter 9, three separate sources of evidence were examined with a view to 
achieve triangulation of data. First, the latest version of PSA framework i. e. of 
2002 was analysed and it was contended that the apparent tension between the 
competing forins of accountabilities encountered in the earlier version of PSA 
was dealt with by the response strategy of manipulation and reorientation 
(Laughlin, 1991; Oliver, 1991). It was argued that the new version was based on 
the tax gap reduction approach which ensured that the traditional forin of 
accountability remained dorninant. Second, the discourse of Personnel of l-IN4CE 
and third, the merger of HMCE with IR were also presented as further evidence 
to substantiate the conclusion that the NPM inspired customer-focused 
accounting changes failed in achieving the desired effects. 
In chapter 10, explanatory factors for the failure of first round of accounting 
changes, are analysed. It was found that organisational and accountability 
complexities did not make HNICE a very suitable organisation for the kind of 
accounting reforms that were hastily implemented. The coerced adoption of 
private sector styled performance measurement frameworks was made 
problematic by host of ground realities identified in the chapter. Now in this 
chapter the analytical gains of the previous chapters are put together so that the 
main research question is answered. The conclusions are grouped under three 
headings. First, the claims of NPM identified in chapter 2 are revisited with a 
view to ascertaining their validity in the light of evidence generated by this PhD 
research. Second, the RAF developed in chapter 8 is briefly reviewed and its 
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importance highlighted. Third, conclusions are drawn wi ith respect to the more 
generic debate on the role of accounting as a force of change. 
11.2 NPM and Tax Administration 
In chapter 2 the impact of NPM upon the public sector organisations was 
discussed. Four interrelated themes of NPM literature were identified which 
were: 
1. Viewing the existing public sector management inefficient it advocates 
adoption of private sector styled managerial practices so that it can be 
made efficient. 
2. Unlike traditional public administration, perforinance is measured and 
reported on the basis of end results or outcomes. This is in contrast to the 
traditional public administration where performance was defined in ternis 
of following the rules. 
3. There is an emphasis on the need for greater accountability of the 
managers where accountability is defined in terms of final outcomes. 
Thus managers are not just accountable for economy or limiting 
corruption, waste and incompetence but also whether they were able to 
achieve the outcomes for which resources were provided. 
4. And there is more strategic place for performance measurement as it is 
considered an instrument of accountability as defined in theme 3. 
Remaining attentive to these claims of NPM with respect to use of performance 
measurement for enhancing accountability, the main findings of the research are 
surnmansed next: 
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1. The influence of NPM inspired accounting changes was visible in the 
case of I-IMCE. This finding was anticipated as HNICE, being a central 
government department, had to adopt the PSA framework based new 
PMS. There is one important distinction, however, in the case of HMCE. 
Many other tax authorities which adopted NPM styled PMSs do make 
specific references to the private sector popular frameworks such as 
97 Balanced Scorecard 
. No such references are made to the private sector 
frameworks either in the official publications of HMCE or in the 
discourse of senior management of the HMCE. The private PMS 
frameworks are, therefore, implied in the PSA versions adopted by 
HMCE. This explains why some important elements of the Balanced 
Scorecard are missing as identified in chapter 10. 
2. The PSA framework does suggest that the organisational performance of 
14MCE had been redefined in terms of desired outcomes. Initially the pre- 
PSA measures and perfon-nance indicators were recast as outputs in the 
first PSA adopted in 1998. The PSA of SR (2000) can be seen as a major 
breakthrough as for the first time the traditional measures of performance, 
i. e. revenue collection figures were relegated to secondary importance as 
they were no longer part of the high level PSA measures. Also customer- 
focused measures were included such as taxpayers' satisfaction and 
compliance costs reduction in the PSA. These measures were also made 
97 Earlier examples were cited of the Swedish Tax Authority and Inland Revenue of UX which 
make clear references to the Balanced Scorecard when explaining the performance measurement 
changes. 
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part of the productivity measure. In the latest form of PSA, i. e. PSA 2002, 
the outcome is termed as tax gap reduction. So the effect of NPM in 
redefining performance as achieving outcomes is quite evident in the case 
of HMCE. However, in SR 2000 outcomes were more customer-focused 
as opposed to PSA 2002, where the outcomes are defined in terms of 
revenue collections efforts, thus more closely tied in to the traditional 
outputs. 
3. The NPM's strong advocacy for using performance measurement is based 
on the assumption that this would lead to greater accountability which 
would in turn result in improved perfon-nance. It is this aspect of NPM 
which is of special interest in the case of HMCE. The causal relationship 
between accountability and performance is not so neatly linked as 
assumed by the NPM defined models of performance measurement. Due 
to reciprocity in formal accountability relationships two sets of 
potentially competing accountability relationships were found in the case 
of HNICE. The table 11.1 summarises all the performance measures and 
indicators appearing in the perforinance reports of HMCE during the 
period of analysis i. e. 1997-2003. After closely inspecting the 
measures/Pls they were grouped into four categories as compliance, 
customer, efficiency and other measures 98 . 
98 The empirical analysis found that the measures could be categorized along four major classes. 
Following Fitzgerald et a] (2004)'s typology, Compliance Accounting measures refer to the 
targets which may appear under different headings but essentially aim to enforce revenue laws 
and regulations. and thereby achieve the aim of maxin-fising revenue receipts and minirnising 
activities like smuggling and drug trafficking. Customer Accounting measures refer to 
activities which make the department accountable to the taxpayers. If the measures relate to 
activities which aim to improve service delivery, e. g., IT based services, making prompt replies 
etc, they are classified as service delivery measures, while those which measure the feedback of 
the users of the services, they are categorised as Users Feedback measures. The broad category 
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Compliance Accounting HRI Customer Other Total 
Efficiency Accounting 
Complianc Anti -evasion Tax Service- feed- 
e & anti-crime_ revenue Delivery back 
Next 25 20 3 6 10 15 79 
Steps 
PSA 0 12 2 6 12 --T 23 56 
1998 
PSA 8 9 2 30 11 5 2 67 
2000 
PSA 7 1 4 12 
2002 
1 1 
Table I I. I: Category wise distribution of Performance Measures/Pls 
No Measures Category % of total measures 
Next 
Steps 
PSA 
98 
PSA2000 PSA2002 
1 Compliance Accounting Measures 61 25 28 58 
2 Customer Accounting Measures 13 23 24 33 
3 Operational-IHR/ Efficiency related 
meas res 
- 
7 11 
I 
45 8 
4 ý Otherrneasures 19 41 1 3 0 
Table 11.2: Percentage wise distribution of Performance Measures/Pls 
It can be seen from table 11.2 that performance reporting in Next Steps 
penod was heavily compliance accounting focused as 61% of the total 
measures/Pls pertained to compliance while 13 % related to customer 
accounting. Thus it can be argued that it was a compliance driven 
accountability framework. With the advent of PSA framework in 1988, 
some sort of balance was tried to be achieved between the two 
competing accountabilities, as 25% and 23% of total number of 
measures belonged to the traditional compliance based and the newer 
customer-focused accountability relationships. But the real impact was 
felt in the SR (2000) PSA when the most important traditional measure 
of Operational/HR/Efficiency measures refer to targets which in essence aim to improving 
organisational efficiency by better management of human and physical resources. There were 
many measures which did not belong to these three broad categories and were thus grouped as 
Other measures. These pertain to functions which are not the core functions but are of ancillary 
nature, e. g. production of statistics, provision of advice or some time bound targets relating to 
preparation of strategy and plans. 
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of performance i. e. revenue collection was relegated to the trust 
statement while customer satisfaction was made one of the highest level 
performance measures. The emphasis, as a result, shifted in favour of 
PMS based on the newer fon-n of accountability. 
4. The tensions created by the two competing sets of measures based on 
two sets of accountabilities were ultimately resolved by the HMCE by 
resorting to the tax gap minimisation based PSA in 2002. Not only the 
proportion of number of measures relating to the traditional form of 
accountability regained dominance (58% of compliance accounting 
measures as against 33% of customer accounting measures), but the 
problematic measures such as taxpayers' satisfaction were also 
altogether removed from PSA framework. Thus the PMS based on 
accountability relationships is again a compliance driven one. 
5. In the private sector performance management frameworks the place of 
an adequately designed rewards and penalties system is important 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1996; Otley, 2003). But in the case of HMCE, it 
was discovered that the accountability framework of the private sector 
can not work in entirety in the HNICE as the rewards and penalties 
system was not well developed in this organisation. Kaplan and Norton 
(2001) observe that making people accept a totally different way of 
measurement is hard if the change is not reinforced through incentive 
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compensation 99 . Under RAB, the new system of funding was provided 
to the HMCE by the Treasury, in terms of the policy targets of PSA. 
However the perfon-nance targets could not be allocated to the 
individuals in a cascading manner, as explained in chapter 10. 
Similarly, achieving the targets or not achieving them did not result in 
any rewards and penalties. Therefore it can be argued that in the case of 
HNICE, the PSA framework had a well defined planning role but it had 
rather a less developed control function. 
11.3 Reciprocity in Accountability Relationship 
Johnsen (2001: 321) cautions against uncritical adoption and implementation of 
the BSC in public management as, he argues, this may result in reintroducing a 
Soviet-type, central planning model in political institutions. This is more likely, 
the author contends, if the underlying assumption is that of one, principal and 
unambiguous goal for the organisation. The RAF developed in this PhD study 
(with the analysis of accounting changes in the period 1997-2003, and of 
discourse of FINICE interviewees and tax advisors) also cautions against such a 
one sided notion of organisational perfon-nance. It can be argued that the 
definition of accountability relationships depends on the definition of 
performance important to a stakeholder. If the tax administration defines the 
accountability relationships it would see them through the traditional ethos of 
99 Kaplan and Norton (2001) argue that often PMS contain non-financial measures, which are 
used more like checklists of measures for managers to keep track of and improve than a 
comprehensive system of linked measurements. They distinguish multidimensional approach 
from the traditional approach by stating that all the measures flow out of the organisational 
strategy (Kaplan and Norton, 1996). One strong indication of considering all the important 
operational measures together can be found in the rewards system associated with achievement of 
targets. 
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law enforcement imprinted on its organisational mind (Stinchcombe, 1965: 
154). Therefore, it would define performance as collecting more revenue and 
reducing tax evasion. Consequently, 'customer-focus' will be viewed as a 
driver/determinant of the final result of revenue collection. However, if 
performance is viewed from the taxpayers' perspective then the performance and 
accountability framework has to be seen as comprising two sets of accountability 
relationships. The RAF is based on the central notion of 'reciprocity' of 
accountability relationship which is argued to be more pronounced, in terins of 
formal accounts taking and giving, in the case of tax departments. It is this 
feature which distinguishes the accountability system of taxation organisations 
from other service delivery organisations in the private and public sectors. 
The basic premise of the RAF is that the Board (i. e. the policy formulating body) 
of a tax administration and the tax payers are reciprocally accountable to each 
other. The taxpayers are accountable to the Board, through the operational level 
tax collectors, for their tax liabilities. The PMS for this kind of accountability or 
code of accountability (Gray and Jenkins, 1993) is based upon PIs such as 
revenue collection, fraud detection, and other enforcement activities. In a 
reversal of accountability relationships, the Board is also accountable, through 
the Government, to the taxpayers for the concerns of the taxpayers as citizens. 
These include respect for civil rights, reduction in compliance and psychic costs, 
making tax system simpler and provision of high quality services to the taxpayers 
so that they can pay taxes without any problem. This reciprocal relationship is 
shown by diagonal BD in Fig 11.1. 
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In the accountability system of a tax department the taxpayers, the tax collectors, 
the Board and the Government employ various influence strategies to see its 
accountability relationship become the most dominant one. The Government 
uses its resource dependence power (Pfeffer, 1992; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), 
reinforced by legal powers, to influence the tax department through managerial 
accountability. The tax payers can exercise influence by resorting to tax planning 
and avoidance strategies. The tax collectors can invoke their legal powers of law 
enforcement. The Board has managerial powers to keep the tax collectors in line 
with the official policy. The tax collectors have the power of professionalism and 
actual field knowledge, i. e., as agent they can take advantage of 'Information 
asymmetry' (Brignall and Modell, 2000). In addition to these strategies both the 
tax payers and the department (the Board and tax collectors) also solicit the 
support of other actors who are indirectly connected with the system and can 
exercise external accountability powers. For instance the actors in RAF can 
approach judicial forums like Tax Tribunals and courts, if they have a grievance. 
The taxpayers also use public opinion making bodies like media, trade bodies, 
and political parties to keep a check upon tax collectors' powers. The legislature 
(through select committees) acts on behalf of both taxpayers and tax collectors 
by reviewing the tax system regularly and by giving audience to the 
representatives of both taxpayers and tax collectors. 
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Tax payers 
4b 
-Z 
zz 
Fig 11.1 Dilemma for tax administration 
Iz 
B 
The Board 
There is an important consequence of the RAF for PMS of a tax administration. 
There is a need for striking a fair deal between the demands of both taxpayers 
and tax administration. If left to the taxpayers, they would like to see the whole 
rectangle occupied by their concerns. Similarly, if left to the tax administration, it 
would like to see only revenue collection related PMS occupying the whole 
rectangle. In wake of this likely competition, the ideal policy framework is one 
where the concerns of both tax administration and taxpayers are accommodated 
in equal importance. When an organisation does not achieve symmetry in terms 
of RAIF, it is either compliance driven or public accounting driven. In the former, 
the PMS favours the concerns of resource provider for more tax revenue, while 
in the latter the concerns of taxpayers gain greater importance. 
D Legal accountability 
Tax collectors 
(Operational level) 
C 
Compliance driven PMS 
(Pls: revenue collection, fraud 
detection, confiscations, more returns 
filing etc) 
Public accountability driven PMS 
(Pls: taxpayers' satisfaction, compliance costs 
reduction, Psychic costs reduction, IT services etc) 
A 
Government Managerial accountabilitv 
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Two qualifications are important for making a RAF symmetrical. First, the PMS 
of the tax administration should contain measures which provide information to 
both the taxpayers and the Government (the resource provider) so that, as a 
principal, they can assess the perfon-nance of the tax administration, as an agent. 
Secondly, and more importantly, the measures/Pls relating to the two competing 
perspectives of performance should be treated as equally important. Kaplan and 
Norton (2001) argue that mere inclusion of a few non-financial measures which 
are used as a checklist does not make a PMS multi-dimensional. What is more 
important is how the non-traditional measures of performance are actually used 
for reporting perfon-nance. A PMS can become symmetrical if perforinance on 
both perspectives is not only measured but, more importantly, is also reported 
and highlighted in the textual reports of organisational performance. In the case 
of HMCE it was found that the poor performance on the dimensions of 
taxpayers' satisfaction and productivity according to PSA 2000 were not 
mentioned in the textual reports at all. Such a PMS can be termed as multi- 
dimensional in appearance but not in spirit.. 
11.4 The PMS of HMCE 
The PhD case study was carried out in order to answer the following research 
question. 
"How are accountability relationships defined and operationalised with the help 
of performance measurement in the case of a tax administration and to what 
degree NPM inspired accounting changes alter such relationships? " 
The 'middle range thinking' advised by Laughlin (1995) was adopted in order to 
design the case study. The skeleton of NPM framework of accounting changes in 
the case of a tax administration was fleshed with empirical evidence gathered 
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from triangulated sources of primary and secondary textual data. The analysis 
helped in development of RAF in chapter 8 which was revisited in the earlier 
section. The RAF answers how are accountability relationships defined and 
operationallsed with the help of performance measurement in the case of a tax 
administration. Using the same framework, the second part of the research 
question is answered in Fig 11.2. 
In chapter 6, reference was made to the PMS practices in OECD countries 
(OECD, 2001). The Pls were found to be categorised as 'productivity', 'quality' 
and 'effectiveness'. Already, a warning had been raised that such tenus do not 
have standard / uniform definitions. However, if PMS of HMCE is reviewed with 
regards to the definitions provided by OECD report, it can be stated that 
'productivity' has been a measure of performance which remained a part in all 
PMS despite many rounds of accounting changes. This Is because the Treasury 
has prescnbed it as a fundamental measure of perfon-nance for all Government 
departments. However, defining 'productivity' has remained a source of problem 
for HNICE, especially when outputs were defined in terms of customer-focus in 
PSA 2000. 
The second category, Quality was made a part of PSA 2000 framework, as 
increasing taxpayers' satisfaction became a part of the high level targets. In PSA 
2002, though references are made to improving services provided to the 
taxpayers, there are no specific targets for this dimension of performance. 
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The third category, i. e. effectiveness, was not present in the PMS frameworks of 
HMCE. However, with adoption of tax gap approach, 'effectiveness' (measured 
by tax gap reduction) has become the defining feature of PMS introduced by 
PSA 2002. 
In chapter 5a three point categorisation was proposed to classify PMSs of tax 
authorities. The PMSs of HNICE during the period of analysis 1997-2003 can be 
summarised as moving on this categorisation line in the following fig: 
Pre-PSA I 
SR (2000) 
Next Steps -------------- 
PSAI 
ARC 
11 
SR 2002 
1 
Traditional Behaviour Outcomes 
PSA 
A 
t4 --------* 
Fig 11.2: Movement of PMS of HMCE during 1997-2003 period 
As can be seen the PMS of HMCE before 1998 is -positioned near 
point B where 
performance was measured and reported by mainly revenue collection related PIs 
and partly by customer-f9cused Pls. It was, therefore, public accountability 
driven PMS. With PSA (2000), the performance measurement moved to 
multidimensional outcomes as both compliance and customer-focus outcomes 
were measured in equal importance. This created tension like situation for the 
management, as explained in chapter 8. Arguably, as a coping strategy, I-IMCE 
adopted the 'tax gap' based PMS in PSA 2002. In this approach though outcome 
measurement is used but a noticeable point is that a single measure of 'tax gap' 
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minimisation attains greatest importance. The Pls used for reporting 'tax gap' 
reduction are the traditional output measures like revenue increase and anti- 
evasion. In view of this it can be argued that the PSA 2002 resorted to the 
traditional PMS but under the guise of tax gap outcome measurement. No doubt, 
the PSA 2002 contains a few measures related to customer-focus as well. But 
those are of secondary importance, and appear as the determinants of tax gap 
reduction (Fitzgerald et al., 1991). Since the PSA 2002 has the features of both 
multi dimensional outcome measures and traditional measures of performance, it 
is positioned between points B and C on the categonsation line in Fig 11.2 
The PhD evidence establishes that within the department performance is still 
defined in terms of revenue collection figures even though there has been a 
conscious effort to distance itself from this traditional notion of performance and 
move towards a more multi-dimensional performance framework. 'What is 
measured, gets done' appears to be the conventional wisdom in the literature. But 
4 what is done, gets measured' explains more aptly the PMS of HMCE. This can 
be argued that the tax gap based PMS is a more refined version of greater 
revenue collection, as the tax gap is minimized if more revenue is collected as 
compared to the previous years. Since targets are not handed down to the 
individual level, performance measurement has a limited role in performance 
management. At the top level, perforinance data is used for planning and feed- 
forward control purpose but the feedback control mechanism is not developed for 
lack of a fully operational reward/penalty system. 
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11.5 Notion of Accountability 
The NPM literature assumes a causal relationship between perfon-nance 
measurement, accountability and performance improvement (Cunningham and 
Hams, 2001: p 146). Day and Klein (1987) in their study on accountability in 
five public sector organisations (Social Services Committee, Education 
Committee, Police, NHS and Water Authority) term their experience of 
interviewing the members of these organisations as a "visit to a strange tribe, 
whose existence is taken for granted in the theoretical literature on 
accountability" (p 72). The authors therefore lament the fact that views of 
members of organisations remain largely unexplored even though they have 
crucial importance. How is accountability conceptualised in the case of a tax 
administration like HMCE? The need for understanding accountability in the 
case of HMCE becomes even more important when even a Government 
publication acknowledges the fact that: 
"Although many organisations understand the theory behind improving accountability for 
results, it doesn't always translate into practice and implementation is often fudged" (HM 
Treasury, 2002b: p 3). 
The Treasury Chief Secretary in his foreword of the publication also underscores 
the need for clarifying accountability relationships at all levels in an organisation 
for better perfon-nance. 
The interviews with the managers and other tax officials of HMCE established 
that accountability was mostly conceived as managerial or legal. The notion of 
public/political accountability or customer-focused accountability was not found 
to be a part of the official discourse. It is basic theme of this PhD thesis that PMS 
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operationalises accountability relationships. However, it is not clear from PSA 
frameworks which accountability relationships had been strengthened? For 
instance, how would we know if all forms of accountabilities have been 
improved and hence the organisational performance? What if compliance targets 
are met, but customer satisfaction target or compliance costs reduction target are 
not met? Do these measures and targets enjoy same importance, or is it that the 
traditional targets have a sway over the non-traditional ones? In chapter 6, while 
analysing the OPA (i. e. PSA, 1998) of HMCE, it found that the senior managers 
of governmental organisations were reluctant to see their organisational 
performance audited by an external auditor such as NAO. Since the NAO reports 
still do not comment upon PSA targets and organisational performance, it can be 
argued that formal systems of accountability are still not very robust in the case 
of HMCE. Moreover, the discursive importance given to traditional performance 
measures in the Annual Reports suggests that they still govern the notion of 
performance in HMCE. Therefore it can be concluded that accountability is still 
a muddled notion in the case of FIMCE, where traditional forms of legal and 
managerial accountabilities reign supreme. 
Theorising the interaction of various accountability relationships in a situation 
where the principal and agent can have reciprocal roles is not well addressed in 
the literature. Through this PhD research, a framework for analysing 
accountability relationships by 'accounts giving and taking' in a situation of 
reciprocity was developed. This way it fills an obvious gap in the accountability 
related literature. 
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11.6 Role of Accounting Changes 
The PhD research was based on the premise that if the accounting changes were 
successful, the discourse of the interviewed line managers and operational level 
employees would reflect the intended changes of customer-focused 
accountability and service delivery. However little evidence of this nature was 
found in the discourse of the employeesloo. 
In chapter 2 three camps of authors were identified with varying degree of stress 
upon the effectiveness of accounting as a change management tool. First, the 
normative writers (e. g. Kaplan and Norton, 2001; Likierman, 2000,1993) 
advocate a primary role for accounting in effecting organisational changesiol. 
Proposing BSC in 1992, Kaplan and Norton claim that: 
"... Originally, we thought the Balanced Scorecard was about performance measurement ... 
Once organizations developed their basic system for measufing strategy, however, we 
quickly leamed that measurement has consequences far beyond reporting on the past ... Thus 
the Balanced Scorecard concept evolved from a performance measurement system to become 
the organizing framework, the operating system, for a new strategic management system" 
(Kaplan and Norton, 2001: p 99). 
The opposing view sees accounting as a mere legitimating tool in the hands of 
change managers, for instance Cooper (1980, p. 164) claims that: 
"accounting may be viewed as a means of sustaining and legitimizing the current social, 
economic and political arrangements" 
100 This is not to suggest that the interviewees were inattentive to the need of better 
behaviour 
towards the taxpayers. In fact they seemed to view "positive success" i. e. achieving good results 
with a good behaviour important. But the managerial emphasis on treating taxpayers well was 
found unrelated to the PSA measures as there is little evidence of ownership of 
PSA related 
measures among managers and employees. Hence no evidence was found which could suggest 
any fundamental change in the organisational ethos of HMCE caused by changes 
in the 
performance measurement framework of the HMCE. 
zD 101 Kaplan and Norton (2001,1996) warn that mere awareness of corporate goals 
is not enough to 
change people's behaviour. They stress that the organisation's high-level strategic objectives and 
measures must be translated into objectives and measures for operating units and 
individuals in 
order to have a strategic shift. 
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Richardson (1987) reviews the views of this sceptic class of writers and 
concludes that the common focus of these papers is the ability of accounting, as a 
set of beliefs and techniques, to link actions and values, i. e. to make those actions 
legitimate. 
The two views on the role of accounting can be seen as a question as whether 
accounting has the ability to take on the role of a choreographer or is it that it 
merely participates as a dancer in ritualistic dancing of reforms? 
Located in the middle of the two extremes, rationalists adopt a processual 
approach and consider the context of an organisation important without 
professing any ideological loyalty. 
The evidence in the case of E[1\4CE establishes that the attempts of NPM inspired 
reformers to change the ethos of the HMCE with the help of accounting changes 
did not succeed. Otley (2003) also argues that wIthout changlng the cultural 
nonns of an organisation there is little likelihood of success for accounting 
changes. It was found in this PhD study that not only the traditional revenue 
figures based PMS' regained its dominance in the PSA framework but the 
perception of the clients of the RMCE also d1d not change after customer- 
focused PMS (i. e. PSA 2000) was implemented. This is best explained by the 
following remarks of one of the VAT practitioners: 
"Customs say they are trying to be customer-focused and helpful, have undoubtedly put 
efforts into doing this, backed by well intentloned people, but so far have only proven the 
saying that a leol2ard cannot change its spo " (VP2: emphasis added) 
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According to OECD (2001: 4) revenue and additional revenue recovered by 
audits can be regarded as both 'output' or 'outcome' of the activities of the tax 
officials. It can, therefore, be contended that HMCE continued to use 'revenue' 
and 'extra revenue' as measures of performance; though under the guise of 'tax 
gap' reduction outcome. It can also be argued that the whole process aimed to 
gain eg timacy' in the wake of coercive pressures generated by the NPM 
inspired reformers in the central government (Kurunmaki et al., 2003). In terms 
of Laughlin (1991)'s framework of organisational changes the PSA frameworks 
can be termed as a first order change which had an effect upon the design 
archetipe but the interpretive schemes did not alter at all. Therefore, it can be 
argued that the accounting changes were internalised through the policy of 
reorientation (ibid) or manipulation (Oliver, 1991). 
Doig and Graham (1998) and Colville et al (1993) discuss dancing of HMCE to 
the governmental tunes of the then Conservative government. Interestingly, the 
dancing has continued under different tunes and labels ever since. The PhD 
research therefore found that quick fix solutions that ignore the context of an 
organization end up becoming a ritual dancing, where accounting jumps in to 
perform its pan of the ritual. While the important role of accounting in 
accountability systems and change management is not dismissed, the evidence of 
this case study does not support the hypothesis that accounting can always play 
an effective role as a choreographer. Both past and present instances of 
organizational reforms in HNICE suggest that reforms, accounting changes 
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inclusive, have little chances of success if the core functions do not inform the 
102 intended changes 
Despite the preceding findings, however, like Oliver (1991), this PhD researcher 
also does not believe that responding to the normative or coercive pressures is 
always for the sake of legitimacy and thus not rational. It is possible that 
changes introduced in response to the normative pressures are not self motivated 
but reflect a rational decision ensuring real dividends in the future. But what is of 
essence here is the importance of context of an organisation. Roberts and 
Scapens (1985: 443) also stress the same point as they argue that understanding 
accounting practices in their organisational contexts requires more than a 
technical description of accounting information systems as they are conceived 
and designed in abstract. Even in the private sector many organisations have 
realised that following generic causal models does not necessarily ensure 
success. For instance, Ittner and Larcker (2003: 93) and Pawson (2002: 179) 
argue that businesses often make the mistake of using performance measures 
without giving careful attention to their own contextual factors. 
The PhD research shows that off-the-shelf accounting reform device had 
difficulty of operation in the specific context of a tax administration like 1-fMCE. 
This substantiates Otley's (2003) observation that control systems are built on a 
foundation of shared values and assumptions. The PhD research found that the 
102 Somewhat similar conclusion was drawn by Ball (2001) who after reviewing the 
benchmarking initiatives in the Local Government management concluded that benchinarking 
had skilfully been subsumed into established patterns aligned with 'new' management thinking. It zn 
is argued that the vast benchmarking related data was hardly used for managerial purpose. 
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culture of HNICE was not given consideration while the NPM inspired PSA 
framework was implemented. 
It was found in section 9.5 earlier that in the O'Donnell report which 
recommended the merger of HMCE with IR, a full chapter is devoted to the issue 
of accountability besides explaining efficiency savings and customer focus. It is 
claimed that by separating policy (the Treasury to be responsible) from 
implementation (the HMRC to be responsible) the accountability framework 
would be improved. Interestingly same set of reasons were cited in the official 
publications for introducing PSA and SDA framework (I-IM Treasury, 2000d; p 
3). The repetition of the same policy ideals, therefore, further substantiates the 
finding that the earlier accounting changes based initiatives failed to deliver. This 
also signifies the fact that successful organisational changes require greater 
effort, as deep organisation changes can only be successful if the context of an 
organisation is understood and a good case for change is made so that the change 
effort is owned by all across the organisation (Burke, 2003). 
11.7 Contribution of the PhD Research 
This PhD study makes contribution to the corpus of knowledge in three main 
ways. 
11.7.1 First Studv of PMS of a Tax Administration 
Boden et al. (1998: 268) argue in their paper on NPM's implementation that 
despite very functionalist rationality of NPM when the standardized NPM 
techniques are implemented in organisations where typical service delivery 
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processes do not exist the results can become "idiosyncratically problematic99. 
The case study of HMCE is therefore important that this organ'sation Is not fike a 
typical service delivery organisations such as hospitals, schools or passport 
agency. It is even different from other law enforcement outfits like the police and 
the armed forces as the services provided by these organisations are 
comparatively easier to define. In the case of a tax administration like HNICE a 
great deal of conceptualisation is required in order to define the building block 
notions of NPM such as customers, customer focus and service delivery. The fact 
that no research on accountability and PMS in tax authorities had been done so 
far was, therefore, an important gap in the literature. 
Lapsley (2000: 172; 1999: 206) stresses the need for researching management 
accounting innovations in the various contexts of the public sector organisations. 
He argues that research in various types of public sector organisations is essential 
so that the question of using management accounting as a strategic tool in the 
public sector is answered more conclusively. This PhD study is the first ever 
research which considers the impact of NPM inspired accounting changes in the 
context of a tax administration. It, therefore, has addressed the calls made by 
management accounting scholars like Lapsley, Hopwood, Broadbent and Guthrie 
for research in different and new types of organisations, and therefore fills the 
obvious gap in literature. The research also addresses the calls made by Tomkins 
et al (2001) for more research on tax management issues. In this way the research 
opens up the tax management as a potentially interesting and important research 
site for other researchers. 
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11.7.2 Notion of Reciprocity in Accountability Relationships 
While many studies have addressed the accountability systems underscoring 
various types of complexities, the notion of reciprociry and its operationalisation 
has not received much attention. The PhD study has developed the notion by 
analysing the performance measures of HMCE during the 1997-2003 period and 
by categorising them on the basis of reciprocity of accountability relationships. 
The PhD research, therefore, enriches the literature on accountability systems by 
developing the notion of reciprocity in the 'pi-incipal-agent model' of 
accountability which then led to the development of RAF for tax authorities. The 
framework not only emphasises reciprocity in accountability relationships but 
also lays emphasis on modification in accountability relations with the help of 
changes in PMS. The emphasis of performance measurement literature has been 
on using performance measurement for enhancing the accountability relations. 
The PhD study makes a contribution by considering the use of performance 
measurement for modifying the accountability relationships when the two actors 
(i. e. the taxpayers and the tax collectors) are principal and agent to each other in 
their reciprocal roles. The social structure of a tax administration, in tenns of 
Gidden's structuration theory (Giddens, 1984), can be best understood by 
referring to the performance measurement practices over a period of time. The 
RAF developed in this PhD can become a very helpful tool for such kind of 
analysis. 
11.7.3 Role of Accounting Changes 
In this PhD research, the pathways of changes during 1997-2003 were tracked 
and it was found that the accounting changes failed to achieve the NPM inspired 
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customer-focus in the case of HMCE. While this research was in process, 
interesti II in ingly, Cavalluzzo and Ittner (2004) carried out a study of similar nature 
public sector organisations in the U. S. They also found little evidence that the 
perceived benefits from the mandated performance measurement initiatives in 
the US government increase with greater measurement and accountabilItY. 
Referring to institutional theories, they also conclude that systems implemented 
to satisfy external requirements are less likely to influence internal behaviour 
than are those implemented to satisfy the organization's own needs. This in- 
depth PhD study of HMCE furnishes evidence of same nature in the case of a big 
central government organisation in the U. K. 
Bums (2000: 568) calls for more case studies which explore the temporal 
dimensions of change, unfolding over time, through reference to the past, the 
present and the future. Clark, et al. (1988, p. 222) also stress the need for such a 
4processual' approach to accounting case studies: 
"Apart from its analytical and explanatory value in particular cases, the processual approach 
also sensitizes us to the fact that there are no fixed outcomes of change under a given 
system, simply outcomes at particular moments in time". 
The PhD study was based on this 'processual' approach and, therefore, enriches 
our understanding of how accounting changes create difficulties in terms of 
defining perfonuance and how organisations respond to such difficulties through 
various coping mechanisms. 
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11.8 Future Research 
The PhD research made inroads into an unexplored research site of tax 
management. The prospects for future research in this site are enormous. In the 
PhD thesis a generic framework for classifying PMSs of tax authorities of both 
developed and developing countries was proposed. Future research can carry out 
empirical investigation to find how many tax authorities fall in the categories 
proposed by this PhD research. Additionally what are the determinants for a tax 
authority to fall under a particular category can also be an interesting research 
question. An accountability framework (RAF) was developed in the PhD 
research to examine the PMS and accountability relations in the case of a tax 
authority. In future surveys can find out what are the determinants for a tax 
authority to adopt a compliance driven or public accountability driven framework 
of Pms. 
Further research can also be carried out on various managerial issues of tax 
authorities. For instance, it was found in this PhD research that the PSA changes 
in respect of HNICE could not deliver the desired results, therefore, it would be 
interesting to investigate the extent of success of merger on the criteria of 
efficiency savings, customer focus and accountability in 3-5 years time. The PhD 
research has provided a holistic view of performance in the context of a tax 
administration. Future research may also now look into narrower areas of 
perfon-nance such as debt management, productivity, tackling VAT frauds etc. 
The list is virtually endless, and therefore, the area of tax management can be 
rewarding for any interested researcher. 
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Annex 2.1 List of Accounting Journals Included in the Empirical Analysis 
No Journal Private Public Total 
I Management Accounting Research 29 7 36 
2 Accounting, Organisations and Society 15 1 16 
3 Journal of Accounting and Economics 9 0 9 
4 Journal of Accounting Research 7 0 7 
5 The Accounting Review 6 0 6 
6 Journal of Management Accounting Research 5 1 6 
7 British Accounting Review 5 0 5 
8 European Accounting Review 3 2 5 
9 Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 4 1 5 
10 Accounting Horizons 4 0 4 
11 Accounting Forum 3 0 3 
12 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 1 1 2 
13 Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance 2 0 2 
14 Management Accounting Quarterly 1 1 2 
15 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 1 0 1 
16 Contemporary Accounting Research 1 0 1 
17 Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation 1 0 1 
18 Journal of International Financial Management and 
Accounting 
1 0 1 
19 Abacus 0 0 0 
20 Accounting and Finance 0 0 0 
21 Accounting & the Public Interest 0 0 0 
22 Behavioural Research in Accounting 0 0 0 
23 The International Journal of Accounting 0 0 0 
24 Journal of Accounting Literature 0 0 0 
25 Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 0 0 0 
Total 98 14 112 
Public = Articles on public sector related PMS 
Private = Articles on private sector related PMS 
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Annex 3.1 The Interview Instrument 
A. Personal Introduction 
1. When did you join Customs and Excise? What career postings you have worked at? 2. How would you describe the work which you do? 
3. What type of training programmes did you undergo at the time of joining the service or thereafter? 
B. Audit Work 
4. How is the audit work assigned to you? Who selects and in what way, the businesses 
you audit? 
5. In what ways your work is similar to the work of other assurance officers and to what 
extent it is different? 
6. In the wake of recent reforms and changes in the organization, how and to what extent 
your work has been affected? 
7. How do the businesses react/interact when you visit them? 
8. What are the most problematic areas relating to your work? 
C. PMS Issues 
9. Have you received any instructions in connection with PSA or SDA? 
10. How do you report your performance? What measures/indicators are used to record and 
report your performance? 
11. Do you see any significant changes taking place in use of performance measures and 
reporting compared with say five years back? 
12. In what way this performance data is used by the office and the organization as a whole? 
13. Are you given any specific targets in connection with VAT like revenue to be collected, 
or assurance revenue? If yes, how do you manage meeting those targets? 
14. How would you describe your appraisal system? First lets talk about over all appraisal 
of the office; how is reporting done? Second, at individual level, how is appraisal carried 
out? Is performance of managers and employees working in HMCE formally appraised 
or is it an informal affair? 
15. What criteria are important to you when you appraise your staff members? 
16. What criteria do you think is followed when your work is assessed by superiors? 
17. Are there any significant changes which you might have noticed during last, say five 
years, as far as performance appraisal is concerned? 
18. How do you differentiate a good performer from a bad performer? 
19. What is the system of rewards and penalties in terms of performance appraisals? 
20. How is the PA related to promotion, bonus pays, and postings? 
D. Customer focus 
21. In the official discourse taxpayers are often termed as customers? How can taxpayers be 
called customers? What are your views? 
22. How has this renewed emphasis affected your and your teams' work? Do you measure 
performance of your staff on that account? 
23. Some critics say that in private sector, the most vocal customers usually are most served. 
Isn't it that similar attitude would lead to inequalities among customers of public sector? 
24. Some tax practitioners are of the view that VAT people treat all businesses as criminals 
and use highhanded tactics as compared to Inland Revenue? How far that impression I's 
justified? 
25. If you have targets of assurance related recoveries and nice guys image, which target is 
going to matter most to you? Do you subscribe to the view that the targets compete with 
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each other and the staff behaviour is influenced more by traditional performance 
indicators like revenue and cases figures rather than new measures which do not relate 
directly to your professional work? 
26. How can the perception of VAT staff be improved among small businesses? Do you 
think that target indicators measuring customer satisfaction can help improve the 
situation? 
D. Diversity and equality 
27. Are diversity and equality demands kept in view when appraisals are done? In what 
way and to what extent? 
28. What is the impact upon overall performance measures when allowances are 
made for diversity and equality? 
29. Do you believe that there exists reciprocity of accountability between tax managers and 
tax collectors? 
E. Accountability 
30. How is accountability viewed and perceived in your organisation? How can 
accountability be operationalised in a public sector organization especially in a tax 
department? 
3 1. What are different types of accountability pressures that you as a tax manager 
experience? 
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Annex 3.2 Primary Sources of Textual Data 
Category SNo DocumeniTitle or 
code 
Reference 
Interviews 
I SM] Senior Manager VAT Operations 
2 SM2 Senior Manager VAT Operations 
3 MMI Middle level Manager 
4 MM2 Middle level Manager 
5 MM3 Middle level Manager 
6 MM4 Middle level Manager 
7 MM5 Middle level Manager 
8 MM6 Middle level Manager 
9 MM7 Middle level Manager 
10 HQI HQ level Manager 
II HQ2 HQ level Manager 
12 HQ2 HQ level Manager 
13 HQ3 HQ level Manager 
14 HQ4 HQ level Manager 
15 OLI Operational Level Assurance Officer 
16 OL2 Operational Level Assurance Officer 
17 OL3 Operational Level Assurance Officer 
18 OL4 Operational Level Assurance Officer 
19 OL5 Operational Level Assurance Officer 
20 OL5 Operational Level Assurance Officer 
21 JH Dr John Hasseldine, Nottingham University 
Business School, U. K 
22 RB I Dr Rebecca Boden, Bristol Business School 
23 RB2 Dr Roger Bowles, University of York 
24 ZK Secretary, Commonwealth Tax Institute, 
London 
25 RK Secretary, VAT Advisors Group. 
Written replies 
I RKL Secretary, VAT Advisors Group. 
2 MCL HQ level Manager 
3 VOL VAT Operations reply 
4 SML HQ level Manager 
5 VAI to VA20 VAT Advisors 
Documents 
obtained 
I BNS Business Needs Survey Questionnaire 
2 VS VAT strategy 
3 0S Organizational charts for RBS 
4 PR Local Performance Reports 
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Annex 3.3 List of Important Governmental Publications 
I Cm 6163, Financing Britain's Future: Review qf the Revenue Departments by Gus 
O'Donnell Presented to Parliament by the Chancellor of the Exchequer by command of Her Majesty, March, 2004, London, HM Treasury 
2 Cm5922, Treasury Departmental Report, 2003, HM Treasury 
htl2: //\N, ww. hm-treasury. a, ov. uk/media/F74/94/DeptrepO3 Chap[2 64kb. pdf (seen 3-12-03) 3 Civil Service Statistics, 2001, London, Cabinet Office, 2002 
www. civilservice. ýýov. uk/stati,, ticS (seen 3-12-03) 
4 Managing Resources: Accountability, London, HM Treasury, 2002 
5 The second phase of public sector reform: The move to delivery. Cabinet Office, 2002 
Http: //www. cabinet-office. gov. uk/eeg/secondphase. ht , (seen 3-12-03) 6 Reconciliation of SR2000 PSA targets with SR2002 taraets, HM Treasury, 2002 
www. hm-treasury. aov. uk/media/IDDCD/ PSA%20reconciliation. pd 
7 Analysing resource accounts: user's guide. June, London. HM Treasury, 2001 
8 Choosing the Right FABRIC: A Frameworkfor Perfonnance Infonnation. London. 
HM Treasury, 2001 http: Hl 94.200.85.88/performance info/fabric. Rd (seen 3-12-03) 
9 Cm 4915, Service Delivery Agreements 2001-2004: A Guide, London, HM Treasury, 
2000 
http: //archive. treasury., -ov. uk/sr2000/sda/whitepaper/guide. pd (seen 3-12-03) 
10 Cm 4807, Prudent for a Purpose: Building Opportunity and Security for All: 2000 
Spending Review: New Public Spending Plans 2001-2004, HM Treasury, 2000 
11 Cm 43 10, Modernising Government. London: Cabinet Office, 1999 
Http: //www. cabinet-office. gov. uk/modern,,, ov/download/modgov. Pd (seen 3-12-03) 
12 The Government's Measures of Success: Output and Performance Analyses, London 
HM Treasury, 1999 httl2: Harchive. treasurv. ýýov. uk/pdf/1999/opa. pd (seen 3-12-03) 
13 Cm 4181, Public Services for the Future: Modernisation, Reform, Accountability. 
Comprehensive Spending Review: Public Service Agreement 1999-2002., HM Treasury, 
1998 December 
14 Cm 4011, Modem Public Services for Britain: Investing in Reform, July, HM Treasury, 
1998 
http: //wA, w. archive. official-documents. co. uk/documenUci-n40/4011/401 I. htm (seen 3-12-03) 
15 Cm 2929, Better Accounting for the Taxpayer's Money: The Government's proposals; 
resource accounting and budgeting in government, HM Treasury, 1995 
16 Cm 2626, Better Accountingfor the Taxpayer's Monev: resource accounting and 
budgeting in government, HM Treasury, (1994 
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Annex 3.4 Important Strategic Level Publications of HMCE 
SNo Document Name Publication date 
I Protecting indirect tax November 2002 
revenues (PITR) 
2 Tacklin,, Indirect Tax November 2001 
Fraud 
3 Tackling Tobacco March 2000 
Smuggling (TTS) 
4 Measuring indirect tax November 2002 
losses (MITL) 
5 Measuring Indirect Tax November 2001 
Fraud 
6 VAT Strategy March 2002 
7 Public Service 1998,2000,2002 
Agreement 
Importance 
The fundamental strategy paper 
spelling out tax gap based strategic 
approach. 
The forerunner of PITR which laid 
the basis of the new approach. 
The paper introduced strategic 
outcomes based approach. 
The paper spells put how the new 
approach will be measured. 
The forerunner of MITL 
The TTS based approach applied to 
VAT. 
The high level document linking 
together strategy and measurement 
papers on one hand and aligning the 
HMCE approach with the overall 
Government approach on the other. 
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Annex 4.1 Taxes Administered by HMCE 
The indirect taxes currently administered by HMCE are: 
VAT 
Excise duties, e. g. fuel, betting and gaming, cider, wines and spirits 
Landfill Tax 
Customs Duties on goods from outside the European Union. 
Climate Change Levy 
Air Passenger Duty 
Insurance Premium Tax 
Aggregates Levy 4n 
While customs, excise duties and VAT have been the major revenue spinners for the department, 
HMCE had been dealing with many other forms of duty/taxes which are now repealed. For 
instance, duties imposed on medicine were taken over from the Board of Inland Revenue in 1909 
but were later abolished in 1941 under the Pharmacy and Medicine Act. Some other such 
examples have been tabulated as follows: 
SNo Name of levy 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
II 
Railway passengers duty and unsuccessful 
betting duty 
Excise License Duties for appraisers, 
auctioneers, house agents and plate dealers 
Entertainment duty 
Playing card duty 
Television excise duties 
Television advertisement duty 
Retail liquor excise licenses 
Purchase Tax 
Passenger returns for the Department of 
Trade and Industry 
Match and mechanical lighter duties 
The Ships'Registry 
Year abolished 
1929 
1949 
1960 
1960 
1963 
1964 
1967 
1973 
1988 
1993 
1994 (transferred 
Transport) 
to Department of 
(Tabulated from NDAD, 2003) 
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Annex 4.2 Levels of Personnel in HMCE 
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Annex 4.3 The Sectors Falling Under the Derinition of 'Public Sector' 
General Government 
This sector includes all institutional units, that are non-market producers whose output is 
intended for individual and collective consumption, and that are mainly financed by compulsory 
payments made by units belonging to other sectors. It also includes all institutional units 
principally engaged in the redistribution of the national income and wealth. 
Central government 
This sub-sector of general government includes all administrative departments of the State and 
other central a( gencies whose competence extends normally over the whole economic territory. In 
the UK the administration of social security funds is an integral part of central government 
concerning both its funding and decision-making, and so cannot be separately classified as social 
security funds. Some trading bodies that were classified as central government under the previous 
system are now public non-financial corporations because they are market producers, manage 
their own finances, and have sufficient autonomy to be classified as institutional units. Export 
Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) is also a market producer but its finances are not 
sufficiently independent of central government for it to be regarded as an institutional unit in its 
own right; it is therefore within the central government sector. Consistent data foe years since 
1961 appears in the Economic Trends Annual Supplement. 
Civil Service 
The Civil Service comprises the Home Civil Service and the Diplomatic Service but not the 
Northern Ireland Civil Service, locally engaged staff overseas or employees of non departmental 
public bodies. 
Further analysis of Civil Service manpower figures at Ist April 2001, can be found in the 
publication Civil Service Statistics 2001. 
Local government 
This sector consist of all local government authorities which have power to raise funds by means 
of rates, levies, council tax etc. and which are obliged to make annual returns of income and 
expenditure under successive local government acts. It includes all levels of administrative 
authorities (including parish councils) and also local authorities with special functions. It includes 
magistrates' courts, the probation service in England and Wales and police forces and their 
civilian staffs. It embraces all functions of such authorities (including, for example, their 
education services and construction departments) and includes trading activities of local 
authorities, such as housing, theatres etc. From April 1999 grant maintained schools, which had 
been classified to central government, were reclassified to local authority status (the formal 
change was in September 1999, at the start of the new academic year). There are three new 
categories of mainstream school: community, foundation and voluntary. For grant - maintained 
schools, this means that, like other state schools, they will be maintained by their local education 
authorities. 
Polytechnics and higher education colleges were transferred from local authority control from 
April 1989, as were further education and sixth form colleges from April 1993. These are all now 
regarded as part of the private sector (non-profit making bodies). 
Public non-financial corporations 
Public corporations are defined as corporate enterprises, that are publicly owned, and controlled 
but which, at the same time, have substantial freedom to conduct their affairs along business 
lines. Examples include the BBC and the Scottish Water Authorities. 
They are publicly controlled to the extent that the public authority, i. e. central or local 
government, usually appoints the whole or a majority of the board of management. 
Subsidiaries of public corporations are part of this sector if their accounts are consolidated with 
those of the parent corporation. Nationalised industries represent a group of particularly large and 
important public corporations. Examples include Consignia (formerly the Post Office) and the 
Civil Aviation Authority. Some bodies controlled by central government are classified as being 
public corporations rather than central government such as the Royal Mint. 
Source Black et al. (2003: p 39-40) 
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Annex 4.4 Organisational Structure of HMCE After Reforms in 2001 
Chairman 
Revenue Collection 
I Director General - Business Services and Taxes I 
Director, RBS 
Head, LHcad. 
e Head, 
Head, RBS, South 
Ops 
cis] VAT cise Excise Customs 
Ops Ops Ops 
Head, RBS, NortE:: 
] 
I 
Head, RBS, 
i 
Head, RBS, 
ýýnýdon 
I 
Head, BS, N-keland 
EHead, 
S'cotlaný7] 
I Head, BS, Wales 
I 
Director, LBG 
I Head, LB, South I 
Head, LB, North 
Head, LB, 
Cen &Wales 
Head, LB, 
London 
I 
Head, LB, 
Nlreland & 
Scotland 
------------------------------------------------------ Law Enforcement 
Director General - Law EnforcerneDt 
Director' Investigation Director, Director, Intelligence 
Head, Central Intell: Head, Investigation Head, Detection South 
London III 
Head, Regional Intell Head, Detection North 
I Head, Investigation South II 
Head, Intelligence Head, Detection Central 
North & Central 
[-ý7ead, 
Investigation North Head, Detection London & 
National 
Head, Intelligence 
South& London Head, Investigation 
Central 
Head, National Team 
Director, 
HR & Corporate 
Services 
Director, The 
Information &- Solicitor 
E-Services 
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Annex 5.1 Charter Standards 2001/02 of HMCE 
National standards are specific measures, with targets, for certain aspects of our service which 
aim to reflect the needs of our customers and are reviewed every year. They include our 
responses to telephone calls, messages left on answer phones and all types of correspondence. 
National standards 
Measure Target 
I 
Yearend 
31/03/02 
Answer-phones: to return calls to messages left on answer-phones 188% 
within 3 working hours. 
1 Correspondence: to reply to correspondence within 10 working days 92% II 
(including sending an interim reply in complicated enquiries). 
FV--isitors. to see visitors with an appointment within 10 minutes Fg-go-77 199% [V--isit-ors. to see visitors without an appointment within 15 minutes. 10<% 1 IL-1 197.5% 
Telephone calls: to answer telephone calls to Advice Centres and I 80% 1 69 11 
national help-lines within 20 seconds. 
VAT Registration: we aim to process your registration within 15 99% 98% II 
working days of receiving full details from you. 
VAT Learn about menu: we will offerDew businesses a choice of 98% 
options to learn about how VAT works and deliver your choice within 3 
months of a request. 
Customs Declarations: we aim to release consignments for correctly 
completed declarations: 90% 98% 
1 within 4 working hours for electronic declarations 90% 98% 
processed by the CHIEF system; 90% 95% 
2 within 12 working hours for manually produced 
paper declarations; or those selected for additional 
checks 
3 ithin 24 hours for declarations selected for physical 
examination 
Excise and Customs Approvals and Authorisations: we aim to process r - 95% 85% 
pp urappli cation within 15 working days. yo 
Excise and Customs claims for duty refunds: we aim to pay correct l 90% 
ffýl 70% I 
claims within 30 working days. 
Damage to goods: if we examine your goods we will take care of them; 95% 90% 
but if we damage them we will explain what happened and how you can 
claim compensation. We aim to resolve all compensation claims within 
20 working days. 
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Annex 6.1 Derinitions of Important Terms by NAO 
Aim A summary of the overall objectives. It provides a vision statement that embraces the 
desired future that the Organisation is working towards. 
Cost-effectiveness The relationship between the resources consumed and the outcomes achieved. 
Cost 
effectiveness measures highlight how well the costs of interventions have been translated into 4: 1 
desired outcomes. 
Cross-cutting programme A programme of activities aimed at a specific government aim, for 
example Action Against Illegal Drugs or Welfare to Work, which spans across the policy 
responsibilities of more than one Department or agency. 4n 
Input(s) The resources that contribute to the production and delivery of an output. Inputs 
commonly include labour, physical resources, administrative services and IT systems, for 
example. 
Objectives A succinct statement of the key goal(s) being pursued over the medium to long term, 
reflecting the key components of the intended strategy. 
Overarching objectives The Government's overall key objectives, for example Increasing 
opportunity for all and Raising productivity and Sustainable growth, taken into account by all 
Departments when setting their Public Service Agreement objectives and targets. 
Outcome(s) The ultimate impacts on, or consequences for, the community of the activities of the 
Government. For example, reduced crime, higher educational attainment, improved health. 
Outcomes reflect the intended results from government actions and provide the rationale for 
government interventions. 
Output(s) The immediate result of Govemment activities e. g. numbers arrested, proportion of the 
population attending higher education, numbers treated by the NES. Some Public Service 
Agreement performance targets may measure outputs, where outcomes are difficult to measure or 
are not sufficiently within the Department's control. 
Performance indicator Provides a proxy, where it is not feasible to develop a clear and simple 
performance measure. 
Performance measure Establishes the basis or means by which performance can be 
demonstrated against a robust scale. 
Perverse acti-vity Activity which although it meets the individual target is contrary to the desired 
outcome, for example, the subsequent incineration of increased quantities of recyclable waste 
collected. 
Pooled budget A single budget relating to all the activities of a cross-cutting programme, 
managed 
by a committee of Ministers, but administered by one Department. 
Process An intermediate stage to the delivery of outputs and outcomes that should not be 
regarded as ends in themselves. For example, producing White Papers, passing legislation, setting 
up new programmes. 
Programme A basket of Outputs that reflect a major strand of work. Programmes represent an 
amalgamation of related outputs that can be meaningfully classified together as a comprehensive 
and coherent response to one or more Departmental objectives. 
SMART Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Timed. 
Sustainable Development Ensuring a better quality of life for everyone, both now and in the 
future. Sustainable Development is aimed at ensuring that increased productivity and economic 
growth is not achieved at the expense of the environment. 
Target The level of performance that the Organisation aims to achieve for a particular activity 
e. g. a reduction of 5 per cent over a stipulated period. Such targets should be consistent with the 
SMART criteria. 
290 
Annex 7.1 The OPA of HMCE (PSA 1998) 
PART I 
PSA Toilets Perfminauce against Departmental 
I 
Notes 
I 
Objectives 
Objective 1: To secure the UK revenue yield from indirect taxes while minfinising costs 
to businesses, Rsa key component of the G-overnment's policy of ensuilng sound public 
The Department xvill collect each year the Revenue receipts. 
aniount of forecast UK Revealle ýrield fiona 
indirect taxe-, ". sl*ýJcct to external factors 
ou-side the Department's control, The 
actiml amotmt Avill be agreed ammally with 
the. N-Iiniqer by April eacli year, (PSA taivet 
% monthly arrearss of tlie 12 nionth trader 
liability. 
fraud Total UK Revenue evasion preventod. 
The Department will. agree targets for T-, JK 
revenne 4: vasiun lyrevented by April eack 
year, which will cover the Imevention of 
ý: Ivll wid criminal fraud M botli vat and 
excise, Revenue value of detected alcollol and 
tobacco fi-aUd andsmuggling. 
By 31 N-farch 20022 the Depaltment . vill 
a mi nicre-ast of at least L80 nýillion in 
the revenue value of detected alcohol zwd 
tobacco fi-aud. including fiom ý, wuszglfiv- 
This will be ineasured agairi-ýt tLie I; a'sehne 
of f-76 million mvenue value of excist 
goods detections in 1997-9& (PS-A target ii) Munber of nAior eycise sinu-2glitig 
oi ganisatioris dist tqited or dismantled. 
Cost as, a% of revenue collected. 
Objective 2: To detect and deter the smuggling of dvugs and other prohibited goods as M 
a major conhibution to the Governments aim of n-duimising illicit octivity,, such as drug 
inisuse. 
The Department will achieve targets set in -Value (f) of herOýI- cozaille and othex Clas 
cow, ultation Nvith the UK anti-drugs co- A drues Prevented fiom CWC614 the UK- 
ordiiiator. for reducina the availability of - 
<k-tigs in the UK. (PSA targýet iii) 
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Number of strijiggling organis, ations 
trl, iffic"19 in Class A drug"S disrupted or dismantled. 
V, Ilue (; E) of amounts rtalistd against 
COnfis'Cation ordens aud of forfeiture orders 
made by the courts, 
Nxiinba- of Jmýte,, ýtlonz, of indecent or obscene 
material featuring children, 
Objective 3: To secure compliance mith statutory, EU and international customs 
obligations fil'vva * vs Which 
facilitate global trade and be 
*ip the single market ivork thereby 
supporting the Government's aim to make the UK an attractive place to do bu8sinevs. 
Thie Depalinient ainis to go on irriproving its Custorner service, Resnlts gathered froni a A 
custonier siervice perfbrýiance in key areas conveqged custoiner service for VAT, 
which will be the principle focus of its customs and excise business. 
moderni-sation pivaramme. The 
Deyna-ftnent's pedorruance against this 
target. will be ineasured by surveyS at the 
start and end of each CSR period. By the 
end of the CSR period, the Department will 
aim To ha-*, e achin; ed increased satisfaction 
of 6% in the areas of VAT. custonis fiel-alit 
and txcBeý ixhich are to benefit froin the 
investment uuda- the niodcnýsation 
Progranune. (PSA taraet iv), 
Number of detection of import mid expoit 
in, egularities. 
% of import entries tal: -ing advantage 
simplified cltaiance procedure-s (limited to 
MR, "Period Enny). 
Efficiency measure - running cost as a 
proportion of inMx)itJ`exI--, ort consignnient 
Objective 4- To supply to time and light quAlift trade statistics which support the 
development of 'UK and EC economic and trade policy, while keeping to a minimum 
inconvenience and cost to busineSSes. 
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The Depait-nent will niect e, -vdi year the % of agreed timetables met, fol, tile 
quality and timetable requirenitnts agreed production of statistics for the =ntWy 
with the Office of National Statisric, ý and Balwice of Payment.,, publication, 
Eurostat for prodocrIlOn of staustics for the 
nionthly Bala: nce of Payments and OTS 
(0-, ýerseas Traide Statistics) publication 
while taking Lito account custom, =, s' 
requtrements. (PSA taqet v) 
% of m=dments to tra& statistics by value 
3 nionths after publication of accounts, 
Objective 45: To promote the development of efficient tax, customs and related agencies 
around the wofld in support of the GovernmenCss aim on global trading, Good 
govei-nanceand combatting international ci-itne. 
hi the course of f--tch ytar the Department % achievetnent of goals set by sponsors and 
will assess for international n--Cipient'; ' 
technical assistance against its overall 
objectives slid stnitegm prionties. For tlie 
ws; sistance which it dclIN'crs it %-M providt a 
first class . ervice to sponsois and recipients 
to ac[lleve the go-alý, agreed for each 
programme. ýPSA taqget vi) 
% recovery of cosis from progrannnes 
spons'orsý 
Objective 6. To proNide N11148tet-8 vvith policy ad-%ice to a high standard; and to initiate, 
develop, maintain and present policies -*vhkh i-eflecl the Govet-nment's priorities. 
Continue to advise on the developinent of Achievement of k-ey policy objectives as set 
the Tax system so that it uud=pins, the out in the annual plalis of Policy 
Goven-u-n'tIT's pliorititsý inchiding dic Directorateý. 
strategýy on sustainable development and 
, 
PSA target viit 
Produce draft leg'slatirra for Climate Change 
Ln7y which meets the tests of good taxation 
set out in the Govenunent's statement of 
intent On Cn-virDIUDeUtal taXRti0"4 WIldle 
jectives of the the envirolln: =Ital 01> Securing 
levy. 
Contrit'nite to the rcportingý at least once a 
Year, of estimates of the en-virolunental 
impact of the Cior-; enunent's tax reforms. 
PART 2 
P-SA Producti-sity Target8 
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By April 1999 dit Dcpartmem will have 
completed mals for tbe llitroduc6on of call 
cmitivs, Subject to Successful evaluatioll. 
the Departnient will ann to set up a virtual 
call Centre structure to Support the 
introduction of a national one-munber help, 
line for VAT. exclISC and customs fi-ciizlit. 
Thiý, is to be introduced by 31 March 2002 
and will incluele stmtching taraCts for 
aus-, vel- tirýle Sý 
By 31 Mair-li 2002 the Depm-mientwill have 
identified annual savUii2s of at 
million on e., uate spend4. 
By -Septunber 1999 tile Depirtneut uffl have ensnwcd iv, busUicss cnt]Cal IT systcms, 
embeckied chips and pmccidiu-c-s vill not be 
advcncly afkaed by die n0enuium date 
change. A ri-sk- assessment of any know 
non-comphances will havc complewd. 
Busmc, vs Continuity Platis assessed and full 
proccdtu-ýý for Inawgill ,z tile 110cmlitull changeover i-%ill be in placeý 
hdmid Reventic and Customs and Excise 
vvill firdier extmid the scopce for closer 
vvoli6nz 
Evaluate results fio-m the tiials. 
Progress against idcntifýing savinzsý 
Preparation for the signing of a -value 
moncy contract that will. enable thc estate 
Private Fumce Initiative to cornmetice from 
31 March 2001 ý 
User tcSting of all systonis. 
Resoirce and acti'Vity plam in place in týnc 
to nialvage the millmmim-n Changeover, 
Risk assessineent in placeý 
Busine, ýý continuýq, plans k, place to ellsIlre 
that Systems and are (yeratiolyal 
over the ctitical nAleimimn petiod, 
Developinent of Closer-Work-im, 
progralnni,: ý 
Development 
The Dcpartnent will contimc to develop cfficicucyý 
bener measures of efficiency and extend 
dix-ne to cover a wider r-mige of departmental 
The Depattmem will. regularly and 
Systematically I-evirw sel vices and acfi-ý'ities 
over a five y= penod in line with 
2ovennuent policy as se out UI the 6ndbook "Better Qualit-- Seivice-, The 
Department Nvill develop its revicw 
progaurime by September 1999 sefting out 
those scr6ccs and activities that will be 
reviewed each year. with. the intention to 
revitnN at least 60% by value of semices by 
Marcb 200-2, 
Of betteT intasircs of 
Dcvclopm,: nt of die mview progra=nt. 
Proeress agamst PrDarmimit, 
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The Depalment will also contribute towards 
the general improvement in UK producti-, ity 
by mcreasing the availability of electionic 
Communicatiom for the trwLsmisslon of 
information bmi, een traders and the 
Department fmm 291/6 to 58% of potential 
formal dealings. This will be achieved in 
part by making available VAT decla: rations 
for completion on the Internet (s*ect to 
cempletion of successful pilots by 31 March 
2000, including die evaluation of fraud risk-) 
and making available one other business 
process, such a-, VAT registrations. by 31 
March 2002. 
Customs will take steps to contribute to the 
reduction of public sector rates of average 
sickness absence by 20*/* by 2001 and by 
3061o by 2003. Proposed targets for 
reductions in the departmental sidmess 
absences wM be made by February 1999, 
f6flowing an audit of dw actual pattern of 
absences in the Department. to be agreed 
with Cabinet Office by June 1999. 
Fraud: See nicasire under *ective 1. 
nic Deparftncut will implen)cm the 
PiDetwemcid review by 31 March 2002, 
This will inchuic in4wved deployn=t of 
pumbasing staff, pmvision of better trairýug, 
and coMboration with otho governnumt 
departments and agencicsý In particular the 
Department wil 
- pilot ffic corpol-ate pro=-cment card 
&ring 1998-99 and implement by 31 Mmh 
2001; 
- implem= the Procuremea Emcccll=ct 
Model by I April 1999, 
Esublishment of VAT 
declarations trial. 
Establishment of pilot system for VAT 
declarations via the Interriet. 
% of dealing available. 
Sickness rate. 
Completion ofpilot. 
Progmss against Implementation Plan. 
Maintaiuing the levtl of key &migmated 
huplcm=tafion of Mockl, 
- by 31 Mm-ch 2000,75% of the members of posts. 
the Qw-amient Procurement Service m key 
desigaated posts will have, or be working 
towarck, a graduate level proctumnent 
qualification; 
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- when there is no coutractiml provision. or % of undisjxited invoices paid within 30 
other understwiding or accepted practice days. 
goveraing the timing of payments. the 
Departinent will p, ))- wiffiin 30 days of 
receipt of good& or servIces, or the 
presentation of a valid urvoice or silinhu 
ckniand fOr paylilent', WhILlIeVel'IS bier, 
% of '111 iclmtiflecl relliittances eActe<Hng 
f5,000 t)anked on (Late of vei*. )t in ýhe VAT 
Central Unit, 
% of cmcspondcacc rcspmuicd to witl-ýn 10 
woilaii. g days. 
Unit cost of admiaisterfiig indirect t, -ox-, per 
trader. 
Unit cost peT iwpoaýex+iort transaction 
processed. 
Unit cost of pmeessilig tradle statistics items, 
% of muplaints upheld by d= Adjudicators 
office, 
N--Ote$ 
A- Includes fiscal and non-fi,, cal irrea-ularitics. Import irreo-ularities. comprise those exceeding jE500 
, ýkity, revenue, and fliose cauccrned ivith DTI licensinz documm-Aary Proof of ofigin and 
counterfeit or pirated p0ds, Export irregularities comprise UIN sanctions, strategic exports and 
CAP, 
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Annex 7.2 PSA 2000 of HMCE 
Aim 
To administer the indirect tax and customs control systems fairly and efficiently, and make it as easy as possible for individuals and businesses to understand and comply with their obligations. 
Objective 1. 
To collect the right revenue at the right time from indirect taxes. 
PSA Target SDA (How we will deliver) Deliver year on year improvements in the We will improve compliance by: level of compliance of businesses with their - Helping businesses get indirect tax returns right 
obligations. first time; 
Increasing our contacts with businesses; and 
Further improving our risk targeting with a 
particular emphasis on tackling serious non- 
compliance. Core to our strategy will be 
investment in IT, training and research, as well as 
working closely with the Inland Revenue to 
deliver improvements in professionalism and 
service delivery. 
2 Reverse the current trend in tobacco By: 
smuggling so that by 2004-05 smuggled - Enhancing our frontier enforcement effort 
cigarettes represent no more than 18% of against freight and 'white van' traffic; 
the market. - Increasing significantly our inland activity; and 
- Targeting the organisers and increasing 
penalties. 
The Department will limit the market share* taken 
by smuggled goods to no more than 20% in 2003- 
04. 
Market share is defined as the percentage of the total amount of cigarettes consumed that is made up from tD 
smuggled cigarettes. 
Objective 2. 
To reduce crime and drug dependency by detecting and deterring the 
smuggling of illegal drugs and other prohibited and restricted goods. 
3 Reduce the availability of class A drugs by We will deliver this target by leading the 
25% by 2005, and by 50% by 2008. development and implementation of a coherent 
Target contributing to Action Against operational strategy, which will increase the 
Illegal Drugs cross-cutting PSA. effectiveness of the total UK effort to combat drug 
trafficking. We will: 
0 Complete a research programme to develop a 
better understanding of the dynamics of the UK 
and international drugs market and keep updated 
the Class A drugs threat assessment. We will 
ensure, by March 2002, that Customs' operations 
are consistent with what research shows is the 
most effective in reducing supply, with this being 
maintained thereafter. 
- By March 2002 we, in agreement with all 
involved agencies, will have fully implemented a 
coherent operational strategy bringing together the 
work of the Home Office, the Police Service, the 
National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), 
the National Crime Squad (NCS), the Foreign 
Office and the Security and intelligence agencies 
to ensure that overall delivery is as effective as 
possible. 
- Increase the proportion of Class A drugs 
targeted on the UK which is seized, including 
working with other law enforcement agencies 
overseas to disrupt drugs movements nearer to 
source of shipments. 
- Remove the spending power of drug traffickers 
by increasing the total amount of drugs-related 
assets forfeited or secured from post- conviction 
confiscation orders. 
- Increase the number of Class A drug trafficking 
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groups disrupted or dismantled. 
Objective 3. 
4 
6 
7 
To reduce the costs of international trade and improve the level of compliance with customs 
and statistical requirements. 
PSA SDA 
Deliver year on year improvements in the To ensure delivery of this outcome we will level of compliance of businesses engaged in implement simplified systems and procedures to in take forward world-wide, EU and UK initiatives. international trade. This 
will include simplifications already identified and 
exploring the scope for new initiatives. Examples 
include work with the Group of Seven countries, 
community transit reform, and UK customs 
freight procedures. 
The following targets relate to the full range of the Department's responsibilities. 41 tý Ensure by 2005 that 100% of services are To support our plans to modemise and improve 
offered electronically, wherever possible consumer services the Department will seek to 
through a common Government portal, and maximýise use of the benefits offered by 
a take-up rate for these services of at least information technology by: 
50%. - Having 87% of all external services available 
electronically by end of 2003-04. 
- Working with the Inland Revenue JR) for 
common delivery of VAT and self assessment tax 
payer services enabling business to access these 
services through a single gateway. 
- Setting up a service support function to answer 
technical non-business related questions from 
customers about accessing our services. 
- Developing new initiatives to encourage take up 
of the facilities offered to business, to ensure 35% 
take up of these services by the end of 2003-04. 
Deliver year on year reductions in the costs In order to reduce costs to business we will 
of compliance for businesses. undertake a joint programme of compliance cost 
studies with the Inland Revenue to research the 
costs to businesses of complying with the main 
UK taxes and duties. This programme will run 
over 4 years and each study will cover particular 
taxes or duties, the first of which will cover VAT 
and Corporation Tax (in the non-financial sector). 
Once a baseline cost has been established for each 
tax or duty, robust targets for year on year 
reductions in costs will be set. 
Improve value for money by achieving In order to achieve improvements in productivity 
average annual productivity gains of at least the Department will: 
2.5% per year until 31 March 2004, without - Release posts from support for redeployment to 
detriment to accuracy or customer activities which directly contribute to PSA/SDA 
satisfaction. outcomes and 
* Carry out our BQS programme to obtain both 
quantitative and qualitative benefits. 'Me 
opportunity to recycle resource will be created by 
Achieve a 6% improvement in customer 
service from the 1999 baseline, as measured 
by an annual Customer Service Index, by 
April 2002, with further targets for 
improvement identified and delivered by 
April 2004. 
pursuing 
innovative and value for money (vfin) initiatives, 
which will also directly contribute to productivity 
e. g. Information Age Government, transfer of our 
Estate to the private sector, introduction of contact 
centres, strearrilining of management and 
personnel processes. 
This outcome will be achieved through the 
development of our compliance strategy and 
further investment in providing electronic 
services. We will also achieve an increase in 
customer satisfaction by 
addressing the key areas of customer concern 
identified in the 1999 business survey, and 
measure improvements through further surveys in 
2001 and 2003-04. 
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Annex 8.1 Estimates of Indirect Tax Fraud 
f billion Period 
(available 
figures) 
Total cigarette smuggling plus cross 
channel smuggling of hand rolling 
tobacco* 3.5 2000-01 
Alcohol 0.75 1999-00 
Hydrocarbon oils (GB Diesel) 0.45 2000 
VAT missing trader fraud 1.7-2.6 2000-01 
Includes cross-channel smuggling of hand rolling tobacco - Customs are working on a full estimate for hand 
rolling tobacco. 
(Source: NAO, 2002c : 12) 
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Annex 9.1 The VAT StrýLt= 
Section 1. VAT Business Plan 
1. The new' VAT strategy is based on an integrated and comprehensive approach to compliance that will 
also continue to improve the service that Cust6ms offers to business. It will encourage voluntary compliance 
by making it simpler and less costly for business to comply with the requirements of the VAT system and 
crack down hard on those who continue to abuse the system. Its key strategic outcome, derived from the 
PSA target, is to: 
increase VAT yield from its current level of 85 % of the theoretical yield to 88 % by the end of 
2005106. 
In seeking to achieve this the strategy will also aim to: 
promote and support enterprise and economic growth; and 
provide first class tax administration and collection services, which represent value for money to 
the taxpayer. 
2. The SR2002 settlement provided additional funding for the VAT strategy, but at the same time required 
large-scale efficiencies to be made. We intend to make these efficiencies: 
through consolidating management activity in the Advice, Support and operational level; 
through reviewing and changing our policies, for example, in relation to assessments and 
payments. 
through increased use of IT, that will enable a number of our business processes to be 
amalgamated and streamlined thus increasing levels of productivity. 
VAT Strategy 
3. The amount of VAT that is lost through organised fraud, avoidance, general noncompliance and failure 
to register has been estimated by comparing the theoretical tax yield, calculated using ONS National 
Accounts data on total expenditure in the economy, with actual VAT receipts. For the year ending March 
2001 the size of the'VAT Gap'is estimated to be f 10.4bn, 14.6% of the theoretical tax yield' 03 . Historically, 
the VAT Gap rose sharply from 10% to 14% in the early 1990s and has fluctuated between 12% and 14.5 % 
over the last 6 years. 
4. SR2002 provided the Department with considerable new resources to institute a concerted strategy to 
tackle this problem. We aim to achieve the target increase in VAT yield through action in 4 specific areas: 
Tax Avoidance; 
Missing Trader Intra-Community Fraud (MTIC); 
General Non-Compliance; 
Failure to Register; 
5. We will also change our approach and seek to develop working with others and using other avenues, e. g. 
publicity, to achieve the stretching target. 
Section 2 Implementation Plan 
6. From I April 2003 the strategy will be integrated fully with current methods of working to become 
"business as usual". This section, therefore, describes how we will take forward the full VAT business over 
the next three years. Annex A shows the achievement trajectory on staffing and expected receipts over the 
103 This estimate is based on National Accounts data which are accurate to +5%. The estimate of the gap 
is, therefore, 
subject to a margin of error and lies in the range 9.7% to 18.8% of the theoretical tax yield. 
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next three years. 
200312004 
7. Our main objective this year is to achieve the build up of staff in key areas, and ensure that these staff are 
equipped with the necessary skills to support the strategy. HR plans will be established during January/ 
February 2003, to enable recruitment and deployment to take place. The Tax Avoidance area will be a 
priority for early recruitment; we aim to have the additional tax specialists and tax avoidance visiting 
officers in place by I April 2003. 
8. The efficiency savings that we are making will enable us to redeploy a number of 
staff rather than recruit. This process has already commenced and we airn to deploy 
85% of the remaining staff by 30 June 2003, with full deployment by December 2003. 
A training strategy has been developed to underpin these moves 
9. Our system of yield management will be evaluated, developed and modified to ensure that we have a 
clear picture on the movement of yield, and to enable us to predict, act, and react more effectively to any 
fluctuations in the business world. An initial scoping paper is due to be published by 31 March 2003. 
10. Large Business Group (LBG) will pilot an audit assurance initiative. They will introduce a revised risk 
framework to focus on non-compliance and reduce audit activity at compliant businesses. They will share 
their analysis with businesses and work with them to build compliance into commercial computer systems. 
They will move towards closer working with businesses' internal auditors. Evaluation of the pilot is 
expected to be completed by 31 October 2003, with implementation to follow from 31 March 2004. 
11. LBG have addressed service to business and compliance management issues by assigning a single point 
of contact to each of their companies, many of whom are National Business Managers with specific 
responsible for the whole entity, across all taxes and duties. Staff are skilled to ensure a more professional, 
business focused approach. This is allied to a greater emphasis on compliance management events as 
opposed to pure functions. 
12. We will take a fresh look at policy matters to seek to identify ways in which these could work better as a 
too] to delivering compliance. 
13. Through our e-Business programme we will enhance the ability of the NAS to deal efficiently and 
effectively with incoming queries. 
14. We will simplify and increase publicity of the contact points for external customers who need to contact 
us for advice. 
15. Additional funding of F-4.85m, as part of the SR2002 process, will be used in respect of: 
4. '- publicity for the incentive scheme to encourage trader registration; 
4- publicity of our Compliance Management activity, including targeted education; 
external legal costs associated with taking forward anti-avoidance litigation; 
publicity, IT and legal costs allocated in respect of NITIC activity; and 
4. '* IT capital expenditure for outbound telephony. 
16. We will undertake comprehensive internal and external marketing campaigns to ensure that our change 
in approach is publicized. 
17. Our risk management framework will drive our activity along the full range of the compliance 
continuum: 
our resulting action will be based on the best methodology to address and counter risk, and will 
improve our 
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ability to determine the action to be taken from the range available along the compliance continuum, from 
education at one end to fraud action at the other; 
we are looking to be able to analyse and deal with risks before they impact on the revenue yield, and 
become more innovative and flexible in our approach; 
we will adopt our project centric approach to risk to develop both national and regional initiatives; and 
0 the risk management system will be re-evaluated and further refined to ensure that our risk system 
supports the whole business work stream and is sufficiently robust to assist us in pro-active yield 
management. 
18. The main focus for tackling VAT fraud will be missing trader intra-Community (MTl Q, as this 
accounts for nearly a third of the VAT Gap. 
19. We will build on the strategy implemented in September 2000 to: 
tighten pre-registration procedures further to prevent bogus traders from registering; 
step up the enhanced checking of traders in the high risk sectors to identify, slow down, and 
stop existing frauds even more quickly; 
increase efforts to recover missing trader debts from detected fraudsters where possible; and 
to continue our efforts to counter the threat of MTI C. We are proposing three new pieces of 
legislation to support our challenge against this attack on the system. 
20. Already, much has been achieved through a range of activities which, in 2001102 included: 
around 5,000 pre-registration visits to new traders; 
from those visits, identifying and refusing over 1,000 suspect registrations, preventing frauds which 
could have cost up to f2 billion if they had gone unchecked; 
identifying and canceling almost 500 existing missing trader registrations; 
securing injunctions to a value of E47.5 million to meet the VAT debts of missing traders; and 
concluding prosecutions against a number of individuals engaged in Missing Trader fraud, resulting in 
jail sentences totaling almost 50 years. 
21. We are also continuing with our action to scrutinise the repayment returns of exporters in high risk 
sectors, and this is resulting in a reduction of the amounts of VAT repaid in these sectors. But, Customs' 
overall response to the fraudsters' changing tactics has to evolve in order to combat the fraudsters' capacity 
to inflict increasing losses upon the Exchequer, and we are continuing to develop and implement new 
disruption tools. 
22. Tax Avoidance is estimated to be nearly a third of the VAT Gap. These losses will be addressed by: 
* the recruitment of additional specialist anti-avoidance advisors (AAA's) to increase the number of 
legal challenges against existing avoidance schemes, identify and close schemes quickly and appraise 
new legislation to reduce the potential for avoidance; and 
9 increased recruitment and deployment supplementing the existing Tax Avoidance. Partial 
Exemption 
(TAPE) teams, including the introduction of additional AAA's. 
23. We expect the majority of tax avoidance to be within the large businesses and our 
LBG staff will be 
directing their effort towards identifying cases for tax avoidance experts to pursue. 
24. The primary purpose of Compliance Management is to increase contact with 
businesses, update our 
records of businesses on the register, support the businesses who are registered 
for VAT, and enable 
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them to pay the right tax at the right time. We will: 
9 target activity, building on our project methodology to develop and refine our approach, adopting 
different tactics and techniques appropriate to meet specific challenges; 
" develop new methodologies of working for our Compliance Management effort; 
" formulate and take forward outbound telephony requirements. 
4, LBG will also look to improve yield and business focus by better defining audit needs and 
practices to complement compliance management activity undertaken by National Business 
Managers. 
25. An Incentive Scheme will be developed and put into effect to encourage those traders currently 
unregistered but trading above the threshold, to come forward and register. The scheme is due to be 
announced in the April 2003 Budget, and launched shortly after this. 
200412005 
26. Additional funding of E5.8m will be allocated to support the strategy. It will be used for: 
publicity of activity to counter failure to register; 
publicity to support Compliance Management activity; 
legal costs associated with anti-avoidance litigation; and 
public y, IT and legal costs allocated in respect of TFIC activity. 
27. We will further integrate our compliance management activity with our outbound telephony providing 
for more effective usage of the staffing resources undertaking these duties. 
28. We will also see: 
additional staffing to increase the coverage of targeted activity; 
the second tranche of Compliance Management staffing will be deployed; and 
additional staffing will be introduced to undertake widened activity in respect of security action; 
and 
efficiency savings from streamlining process and policy revisions. 
200512006 
29. We are estimating significant progress in extending our coverage of trader contact and will be increasing 
our utilisation of e-business to strean-dine and support some of this activity, and to make efficiency savings 
where appropriate. 
30. We will build on the experience gained so far on our targeted visiting activity and will increase our focus 
in this area. The final tranche of resources will be deployed and there will be a reduction in the deployment 
for Compliance Management. 
3 1. Additional funding of E4.7m will be allocated as follows: 
0 publicity to support the one-off exercise activity; 
publicity to maintain and enhance our targeted education; 
legal costs for litigation for anti-avoidance; and 
publicity, IT and legal costs allocated in respect of MTIC activity. 
32. Additional deployment will be allocated to continue with the failure to register activity, including the 
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one-off Closer Working Intelligence Project in conjunction with the Inland Revenue. 
33. Annex B contains detailed a project milestone plan for 2003104, and an outline for key activities in the 
years 2004/05 and 2005/06. 
Section 3 Accountability 
34. A new high-level Steering Group is being formed to oversee delivery of the strategy. It is to be chaired 
by the Head of VAT Operations, and will include representatives of the "owners" of key elements, 
including: 
e Head of Fiscal Fraud for VAT Fraud (MTI 
Head of VAT Assurance and National Customer Services (General Non- Compliance and Failure to 
Register); 
Deputy Director of Tax Practice (Avoidance); and 
A representative from LBG. 
35. Roles and responsibilities will include managing the delivery of the VAT PSA target, including 
monitoring performance against the delivery plan. 
36. Threats to the achievement of results against the strategy have been identified and ownership allocated 
to named individuals. 
37. An early requirement of the Group will be to ratify the draft schedule of accountabilities at Annex C to 
ensure that the responsibilities will be discharged in a way to achieve success. 
Section 4 Measures of Success 
38. We will monitor the strategy at both a national and regional level through a 
measures framework, which will include input, output and outcome measures Annex 
D includes details of our success criteria. Input measures will demonstrate that we 
are deploying resources in accordance with the VAT delivery plan. 
39. Outputs wiH be used as intermediate indicators to demonstrate the level of activity and that the Strategy 
is moving in the rig t direction. Outcome measures wil-I evaluate the impact of the Strategy on yield and ýh 
compliance. 
40. We have established an approach to calculate a yield target each year, which may be expressed in 
monetary value (net VAT receipts) or in terms of yield as a percentage of VAT Theoretical Tax Liability 
(VTTL). There is a potential margin of error of plus or minus five per cent on the VTTL, worth around 0.5 
billion in 2001102. This margin of error will impact directly on the gap estimate and must be taken into 
consideration when assessing whether or not the compliance target has been met in any given year. The 
problem will be more pronounced in the early years of the CSR period. 
41. This approach will allow us to update the forecast of VTTL twice yearly at Budget and PBR when 
HMT 
produce new forecasts of the economy, and to estimate 'actual' VTTL only once per year, when the 
ONS 
publishes the national accounts Blue Book. (Blue Book is normally published in 
July, but this year it will be 
September) This means that the earliest measurement of our overall VAT yield and 
VAT loss 
performance for 2003104 will be September 2004. Even then data for the most recent year will 
be 
provisional. 
42. It is anticipated that the yield impact of our activity will not be immediate. 
We expect a time lag between 
the activity being undertaken and our ability to detect changes in yield and compliance 
levels. However, we 
will allocate provisional expected provisional yield increases to 
Heads of Business Streams and Regional 
Heads. We will also provide payment and return information to BST Heads at a regional 
level to allow them 
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to monitor their resources' collective impact on compliance, 
43. A number of different methods will be employed to evaluate the impact of our activities on the levels of 
yield and compliance. These include: 
sampling - using statistical representative samples to test assumptions; 
technical analysis of data; 
benchmarking - comparing yield and compliance pre and post activity; 
use of control groups - comparing our targeted results against a group who have had no 
direct contact; and 
0 management assurance - to ensure activity is being undertaken correctly and to the 
required standard. 
44. In order to bring about increased yield, particularly in the areas of failure to register and compliance 
management we have given business heads the freedom to design innovative projects to tackle specific areas 
by trade class, regimes or geographically. Each project will include agreed success criteria, and evaluation 
methods will be tailored to each project. The VAT Strategy Steering Group will monitor progress against 
yield, and the effectiveness of such projects. (Details of the representatives of the Groups can be seen in 
paragraph 34) 
45. We are also committed to reducing the costs of compliance for compliant businesses. Many of the 
measures listed in this strategy have the effect of simplifying the system for such businesses where possible, 
to reduce the time and money it costs them to comply. We will continue to introduce such measures 
wherever possible. 
46. We will monitor to ensure that resources are being deployed, trained and are contributing to the desired 
strategy outcomes by developing new performance agreements at regional head and individual officer level. 
47. We will review progress at the end of the first year and take action to divert energies if need be. 
Section 5 Budgetary Control 
48. key stakeholders will be held accountable for specific elements of the funding namely: 
Solicitors Office for legal and litigation budgets; 
Finance and Strategy for the marketing budget; and 
Regional Business Services for Resource Costs. 
49. Overall control will remain within VAT Operations who will retain decision making powers to ensure 
coordination across the various elements of the strategy, and that expenditure is aligned with operational 
initiatives. 
50. Clear audit trails will be established so expenditure can be monitored against allocations. Budgetary 
reviews will also be included as part of our high level monitoring process. 
Section 6 Delivery Risks 
5 1. To ensure successful implementation of the strategy and the delivery of the PSA target it is essential that 
risks to delivery are effectively managed Therefore a risk register that includes countermeasures has been 
compiled. The risks will be monitored and managed to ensure that we are taking all possible steps to ensure 
effective implementation. Three key areas of risk to delivery are: 
9 Deployment of Staff 
We are increasing staff in certain activities, while at the same time making efficiency savings 
in other areas 
of the VAT Business. This could endanger the overall delivery of the VAT PSA target as the 
deployment of 
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appropriate staff in the required; locations will be difficult to achieve. Efficiency savings that we have to 
make in various areas of the VAT business could endanger the overall delivery of the VAT PSA target. 
e Training 
Staff will need to be properly equipped with the appropriate skills and employ the required behaviours, to 
enable them to deliver the right level of support and education to businesses. If the appropriate training is 
not offered and delivered at the right time, then there is a danger of incorrect action being taken by staff. 
Potential consequences could be incorrect advice, lack of help to legitimate businesses, a loss of credibility 
and a resultant increase in the level of non-compliance. 
9 Change of Culture 
In order to ensure delivery of the VAT Strategy outcomes, staff will have to embrace a culture change in 
relation to the way they carry out their work. Unless they move away from the current approach where the 
focus is on outputs, to an approach where the emphasis is on achieving a balance between assurance, 
business support and education, then the required outcome of improving the level of business compliance in 
the future will be jeopardised. 
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Annex 9.2 
A SURVEY ON VAT PRACTITIONERS' PERCEPTION 
OF HM CUSTOMS AND EXCISE 
Instructions: This questionnaire is intended to be completed electronically. Kindly chose the 
answer (or answers) which best describes your response, and then type the number of chosen 
answer (or answers) in the box. When the questionnaire is completed please e-mail it to: 
techsec@vpgweb. com. Thank you for your help. 
About YOU 
A. How many years have you been practicing as a VAT practitioner? 
B. Which of the following are your regular clients? 
[Please type in the number (or numbers) in the box] 
1. Small Businesses (e. g. takeaways) 2. Medium size businesses 3. 
Large Businesses 4. Charities 5. Local Authorities 6. National 
Health Trusts 
It your main clients are not listed, please enter your answer below: 
3 Are you a member of 1. CIOT 2. Accounting professional bodies 
3. Bar ? or 4. None of these. 
(Please type the appropriate answer nuniberlnumbers in the box) 
4 Do you, or have you, dealt with direct tax matters? 
B. Your Replies 
A. How would you rate compleydty of VAT related legislation for businesses on the 
following scale ? (Please select the number that best describes your response). 
Very Complex 4 Somewhat complex o Not complex 
IIIII 
1 3 4 5 
Your chosen rating? 
B. Which of the following expression best describes your perception of HM Customs and 
Excise? 
1. A customer focused, taxpayers friendly organisation 
2. A law enforcement agency using strong handed, invasive tactics 
3. An organisation with neither of the above two tendencies 
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Please type your chosen answer's number 
here 
Or 
You may like to type in your own description below: 
C. Do you share the perception that HNICE is currently doing its best to cater to the neefic 
of taxpayers? 
1. Yes, no doubt about that 
2. No, not at all 
3. Well, some efforts can be seen but still much is to be done 
Please type your chosen answer's number 
here Fý 
Or You may like to type in your own perception below: 
D. We use the scale below to compare HM Customs and Excise of today with HM Customs 
and Excise of past years, (say 5 years back) on various yardsticks. The right hand side 
increasing positive numbers show percentage improvement while the left hand side 
increasing negative numbers show % deterioration. Choose the number with its positive or 
negative sign to represent your assessment of HNICE on the yardsticks i to v. 
I 
-100 -80 -60 
% detefioration 
11 
-40 -20 0 
improvement 0 
+20 +40 +60 +80 +100 
No Yardstick Positive/negative % change 
Openness and friendliness i. 
Knowledge level and advisory skills of VAT staff 11. 
Providing answers to simple queries In. 
Providing answers to technical queries iv. 
Bullying and harassment of businesses Fv. I 
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E. If HM Customs and Excise and Inland Revenue are compared in terms of service 
I 
delivery and working culture, what would be your assessment? 
1. Both are almost similar 
2. HM Customs and Excise has a much better image, and in all likelihood it would remain so. 
3. Inland Revenue has a much better image and in all likelihood it would remain so. 
4. The image gap between the two departments is shrinking fast and soon both will carry similar 
image. 
Please type your chosen answer's number 
Or here 01. 
Fý 
You may like to type in your own perception below: 
E. What is the most important grievance against RM Customs and Excise that instantly 
comes to your nun . 
Please ývpe in your answer below: 
F. What positive points come to your mind in respect of HM Customs and Excise as a 
public sector department? You may like to list up to three points. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
G. What are the weakest areas of HM Customs and Excise in terms of service delivery ? 
You may like to list up to three such areas. 
1. 
Thank you very much for completing this questionnaire. 
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Annex 10.1 
Objective 
This PSA target refers directly 
to HM Treasury*s overall aim 
to raise the rate of sustainable 
growth, and achieve rising 
prosperity and a better quality 
of life. with economic and . 
employment opportunities for 
all. 
(1) Maintain a stable 
macroeconomic framework 
with low inflation. 
HM Treasury PSA 2002 
Target 
Trend rate of output (excluding oil and 
gas extraction) growth over the last 
complete economic cycle. 
Source: Trend growth estimates made by 
HM Treasury based on Office for 
National Statistics data. 
1. Demonstrate progress by 
2004 on the Government's 
long-term objective of raising 
the trend rate of growth over 
the economic cycle from the 
current estimate of 2.5 per 
cent and make further 
progress towards increasing 
trend growth 
up to 2006. 
Performance Indicator 
2. Inflation to be kept at the 
target as specified in the remit 
sent by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer to the Bank of 
England's Monetary Policy 
Committee, (currently 2.5 per 
cent RPIX). 
(H) Maintain sound public 3. Over this economic cycle, 
finances in accordance with maintain: public sector net 
the Code for Fiscal Stability. debt below 40 per cent of 
GDP; and the current budget 
in balance or surplus. 
(HI) Promote UK economic 
prospects by pursuing 
increased productivity and 
efficiency in the EU, 
international financial 
stability and increased global 
prosperity, including 
especially protecting the most 
vulnerable. 
4. Promote increased global 
prosperity and social justice 
by: 
- working to increase the 
number of countries 
successfully participating in 
the global economy on the 
basis of a system of 
internationally agreed and 
monitored codes and 
standards; 
- ensuring that three quarters 
of all eligible HIPC countries 
committed to poverty 
reduction receive irrevocable 
debt relief by 2006 and 
working with international 
partners to make progress 
towards the United Nations 
2015 Millennium 
Development Goals (joint 
target with the Department for 
International Development), 
and 
- demonstrating progress 
towards the Lisbon goals by 
2006, by working with Our 
European Union partners to 
achieve structural economic 
reform in Europe. 
The equivalent SR2000 PSA 
Target was "Relief of 
unsustainable debt by 2004 
12-month increase in the RPIX. 
The Retail Price Index (RPI) measures 
the change from month to month in the 
average level of prices of goods and 
services purchased by most households 
in the United Kingdom. The RPIX is the 
RPI excluding mortgage interest 
payments. 
Public sector net debt as a percentage of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at the 
end of each year of the economic cycle. 
The average surplus on current budget as 
a percentage of GDP over the economic 
cycle. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
assess member countries' compliance 
with internationally agreed codes and 
standards through production of Reports 
on the Observance of Standards and 
Codes (ROSCs). 
Number of countries reaching 
Completion Point as recorded in 
'Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPQ Initiative: Status of 
Implementation', available on the 
World Bank website at: 
http: //www. worldbank. org/hipc/progress- 
to-date/progres s-to- date. htnil 
Progress is measured using Eurostat data 
for the total EU employment rate (against 
an EU target of 67 per cent by 2005 and 
70 per cent by 2010) and the percentage 
difference between US and EU labour 
productivity per hour and per worker. 
Latest outturn information is for 2001 
Number of countries reaching Decision 
Point and Completion Point as recorded 
in 'Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPQ Intitiative: Status of 
implementation available on the World 
Bank website at: 
http: //www. worldbank. org/hipc/pro., 
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for all heavily-indebted poor ress-to-date/proý_,, re,,, s-to-date. htmI 
countries (HIPQ con-unitted 
to poverty reduction, building in 
on the internationally agreed 
target that three quarters of 
eligible HIPCs reach decision 
point by the end of 2000, " 
(TV) Increasing the 5. Demonstrate progress by International comparisons of productivity 
productivity of the econorny. 2006 on the Government's (ICP) data: output per worker and output 
long-term objective of raising per hour. The data are produced by the 
the rate of UK productivity Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
growth over the economic based on Organisation for Econornic 
cycle, improving Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
competitiveness and data. Last data point 2002 (published 
narrowing the productivity September 2003). 
gap with the US, France and Government estimate of trend 
Germany (joint target with the productivity growth based on ONS data. 
Department for Trade and The main measure for this target is Gross 
Industry) Value Added (GVA) per head in each 
6. Make sustainable re-ion. 
improvements in the 
economic performance of all 
English regions and over the 
long term reduce the 
persistent gap in growth rates 
between the regions, defining Z' 
measures to improve 
performance and reporting 
progress against these 
measures by 2006 (joint target 
with the Office of the Deputy 
Prime Minister and the 
Department for Trade and 
Industry). 
(V) Secure an innovative, fair There is no PSA target for 
dealing. competitive and Objective V. 
efficient market in financial 
services, while striking the 
right balance with regulation 
in the public interest. 
(Vf) Expand economic and 7. Demonstrate progress by For employment, seasonally adjusted 
employment opportunities for Spring 2006 on increasing the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
all. employment rate and reducing z1_ employment rates 
for the working ag _-e 
the unemployment rate over population of Great Britain (GB), with a 
the econonýc cycle (joint judgement as to the economic cycle. as 
target with the Department for assessed by HM Treasury in the Pre- 
Work and Pensions). Budget Report and Budget. 
The equivalent SR2000 PSA For unemployment. seasonally adjusted 
Target was "Increase ILO unemployment rates for the 
employment over the population of GB, aged 16 and over. with 
economic cycle (target a judgement as to the economic cycle., as 
contributes to Welfare to assessed by HM Treasury in the Pre- 
Work PSA, and is joint with Budget Report and Budgetl. 
the Department for Work and Seasonally adjusted ILO employment 
Pensions). levels for the population of Great Britain 
aged 16 and over, with a judgement as to 
the economic cycle, as assessed by ITM 
Treasury in the Pre-Budget Report and 
B udget. 
(VII) Promote a fair and 8. Reduce the number of Number of children in low income 
efficient tax and benefit children in low-income households by 2004-05. 
Low-income 
with incentives to households by at least a households are defined as households 
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work, save and invest 
(VIII) Improve the quality and 
the cost effectiveness of 
public 
services. 
IX) Achieve a high standard 
of regularity, propriety and 
accountability in public 
finance. 
(X) Protect and improve the 
environment by using 
instruments that will deliver 
efficient and sustainable 
outcomes through evidence- 
based policies. 
No SR2002 Objective 
quarter by 2004, as a 
contribution towards the 
broader target of halving child t-I r-I 
poverty by 2010 and 
eradicating it by 2020 (joint 
target with the Department for 
Work and Pensions). 
9. Improve public services by 
working with departments to 
help them meet their Public 
Service Agreement (PSA) 
targets. consistently with the 
fiscal rules 0oint target with 
the Cabinet Office). 
The equivalent SR2000 PSA 
Target was "achieve an 
improvement in value for 
money in public services year 
by year. " 
There is no PSA target for 
Objective IX. 
There is no PSA target for 
Objective X. 
10. By 2005-06, deliver 0 
billion of value for money 
, ains in central civil Government procurement 
through the Office of 
Government Con-imerce. 
The equivalent SR2000 PSA 
target was "by 2002-03, 
deliver f: I billion of savings in 
Government procurement 
through the Office of 
Government Comi-nerce". 
with income below 60 per cent of 
contemporary median as reported in the 
annual Households Below Average 
Income (HBAI). HBA1 statistics cover 
Great Britain. 
Progress is reported against the 1998-99 
baseline figures and methodology. The 
baseline i's 4.2 million children in low- 
income households after housing costs 
(AHC) and 3.1 million before housing 
costs (BHQ. 
Departments are responsible for 
deliverin- their individual SR2002 PSA 
targets. As such, this target can only be 
assessed as each PSA target for SR2002 
comes to completion. Monitored 
centrally using a scorecard approach, 
based on departmental information. 
A nnual returns on value for money gains 
reported by central civil government 
bodies. The reporting is based on 
methodology agreed with the National 
Audit Office. 
As above. 
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